Introduction

Chapter 1. Military-strategic situation on the fronts of the First World War at the beginning of 1916 and the strategy of military operations of the Entente countries

1 The position of Russian troops at the front at the beginning of 1916

2 Preparations for the Entente offensive

Chapter 2. The place of the Brusilov breakthrough in the First World War and history

1 The offensive of Russian troops on the Southwestern Front in the spring and summer of 1916.

2.2 Consequences of the Brusilov breakthrough

Conclusion

List of sources and literature used

Applications

Introduction

Military history is the main component in historical science, since it was wars that, over the course of centuries and millennia, determined the fate of peoples, civilizations, and all of humanity. History shows us the entire evolution of improving the conduct of military operations by the armies of different nations. Military history is the process of development of military affairs from ancient times to the present, it is also a science that studies past wars, the development of military art, armed forces and military equipment of the past.

The First World War is also an integral part of military history, and the study of its history occupies close attention in educational institutions, therefore it is impossible to ignore not a single moment of this war, not to mention its battles. The Brusilov breakthrough is the main object of my research. By the way, the Brusilovsky breakthrough was named after A.A. Brusilov - Russian military leader (August 19(31), 1853, Tiflis - March 17, 1926, Moscow), who commanded the Russian troops and developed a breakthrough plan

The relevance of this work is that in the present, and in the future, it is simply necessary to cultivate a sense of patriotism and a sense of pride for our country and its heroic past among young people. The choice of my topic is explained by the role played by the heroic pages of our history in the education of youth. The First World War has long passed, and there is no longer a single participant left who fought for their homeland, but their exploits should not be forgotten. We should be proud of the exploits of our ancestors and should not forget the heroism of the soldiers who gave their lives for the well-being of our homeland. These are precisely the goals history should have when studying wars.

Source base. During the research process, various sources were used: documents, memoirs, etc. Of greatest importance for the study of this problem is the publication of operational documents in the collection of documents - “The offensive of the Southwestern Front in May-June 1916.”

The degree of development of the topic in the scientific literature. There are many works in historiography on this topic. Active study of this issue begins in the 1920-1940s. Scientists were not only able to learn a lot about the breakthrough, they examined the armed forces of the parties, analyzed war plans, and covered in detail the course of military operations and the goals of the participating countries. Main works: Semanov, S.N. General Brusilov. Documentary storytelling; collection of documents The offensive of the Southwestern Front in May-June 1916; Brusilov, A.A. My memories.

The object of my work is the First World War.

The subject of my work is the main events and actions of the Russian army on the eve of and during military operations on the Southwestern Front in May-June 1916.

Territorial boundaries

The methodological basis of the study was based on the principles of historicism, objectivity and consistency. The study was carried out taking into account the historical, political and socio-economic conditions that prevailed at the beginning of the breakthrough and their subsequent changes during the breakthrough and its consequences.

The purpose of the study is to comprehensively study the Brusilov breakthrough and its consequences.

The following research objectives serve to reveal the purpose of the work:

) consider the purpose and objectives of the breakthrough.

) study the plan and preparation for the breakthrough.

)explore the consequences and significance of the breakthrough.

The scientific novelty of my work is that this problem is considered from the point of view of modern historiography and science.

The practical significance of the study is the possibility of using the materials of this work in the course of lectures and practical classes on the history of Russia when studying sections of the “First World War”, when reading special courses, in classes with an in-depth study of the History of Russia in gymnasiums and lyceums.

The structure of the study consists of an introduction, two chapters, a conclusion, a list of references and applications.

Chapter 1. Military-strategic situation on the fronts of the First World War at the beginning of 1916 and the strategy of military operations of the Entente countries

1.1 The position of Russian troops at the front at the beginning of 1916

By the beginning of 1916, the general situation on the fronts of the First World War was unfavorable for Germany and its allies. During the first two campaigns, the Central Powers expended enormous effort to break the Entente's resistance. Having significantly depleted their material and human resources, they were never able to achieve this goal. The prospect of a long struggle on two fronts continued to occupy the minds of German strategists. The economic situation in Germany deteriorated sharply, since as a result of the naval blockade, the supply of all types of raw materials and food to Germany almost completely stopped.

The Entente countries were in a more advantageous position than the Central Powers. A period of calm on the Western Front in 1915. England and France achieved an increase in their military technical power. By the beginning of 1916, the Entente already had an advantage in the number of divisions (by 75-80 units). The armies of England and France had an adequate amount of heavy artillery, had significant reserves of shells and well-organized planned production of weapons. But there was still no necessary amount of home-produced means of combat. Attempts were made to obtain help from the allies. So, in November 1915, a Russian military mission led by Admiral A.I. was sent to England and France. Rusin. She had the task of placing large military orders abroad. Russia needed gunpowder, toluene, barbed wire, tractors, cars, motorcycles and other military supplies. The mission did not fully achieve its goal. She managed to place orders for only part of the military equipment needed by the Russian army.

England and France, which received a respite in 1915 and developed their military industry at full capacity, did almost nothing to help their ally, Russia, with weapons and ammunition. This created difficulties in strengthening the Russian army, which especially needed heavy artillery. “...Domestic production,” noted M.V. Alekseev on April 16 (29), 1916, “cannot give us not only guns, but even shells in sufficient quantities to perform at least one operation lasting at least 20 days. Attempt "The acquisition in England and France of heavy guns, mainly 6-mm calibers, which are so necessary for us to fight dugouts and shelters, and 42-mm guns was a complete failure. There is no hope for the production of appropriate shells."

The Russian army also emerged from the crisis of 1915 and was preparing for active action in 1916. By this time, the technical and financial situation of the army had improved. The troops began to receive rifles in significant quantities, albeit of different systems, with a large supply of ammunition. More machine guns. Hand grenades appeared. Used tools were replaced with new ones. More and more artillery shells arrived. Russia's human resources have not yet allowed it to increase the size of its armed forces. In 1915, the active army received 3.6 million people. In 1916, another 3 million people were drafted, of whom 2.5 million were sent directly to the front. These reinforcements were used to replace losses (killed, wounded, sick, prisoners) and to create new formations of combat units and rear institutions. The Supreme Command was faced with the task of fighting to preserve the human contingents. There was a danger of their exhaustion. The great evil was the excessive growth of rear institutions and the number of people serving them. But attempts to reduce the rear were unsuccessful. The war exacerbated social contradictions. The movement against the war grew. Surrender, flight from the battlefield, and fraternization began to take on an increasingly threatening character. The divisions within the government camp intensified. A similar picture was observed in all the warring powers.

The army, however, lacked heavy (siege) artillery, which was needed in offensive operations. There were very few planes and no tanks at all. The Russian army also needed gunpowder, toluene, barbed wire, tractors, cars, motorcycles, etc. Russia's allies had all this, as well as a large amount of ammunition, but were not supplied to Russia. But, one way or another, the Russian army in the spring of 1916 turned out to be much better prepared for offensive operations than in 1914-1915. The morale of Russian soldiers and officers also increased. According to A.A. Brusilov, the troops were “in brilliant condition and had every right to expect to break the enemy and throw him out of our borders.” These are the main features of the military-political situation in which the military leaders of both warring coalitions began planning the next campaign. The main concern was to find a strategic solution that would ensure a quick victory over the enemy.

The foundations of the Entente’s strategic plan were determined at the allied conference in Chantilly on December 6-9, 1915. Another conference was held there on February 28, 1916, at which a document was adopted that determined the methods of action of each of the coalition armies and included the following proposals:

The French army had to defend its territory at all costs so that the German attack would break up against its organized defense.

The British army had to concentrate the largest part of its forces on the Franco-German front and therefore, as quickly as possible, transport there all those divisions that it does not seem absolutely necessary to leave in England and in other theaters of military operations.

The Russian army was offered:

to exert as much effective pressure on the enemy as possible, so as not to give him the opportunity to withdraw his troops from the Russian front and limit his freedom of action;

Be sure to begin preparations for going on the offensive.

In its calculations, the Headquarters proceeded from the specific balance of forces that had developed in the Eastern European theater. On the Russian side, three fronts operated there: Northern, Western, Southwestern. Northern Front, commanded by A.N. Kuropatkin, covered the direction to the capital of the empire - Petrograd. It consisted of the 12th, 5th and 6th armies. They were opposed by the German 8th Army and part of the forces of Scholz's army group. Front headquarters - Pskov. Western Front led by A.E. Evert defended the direction to Moscow. It included the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 10th and 3rd armies. In front of them was part of the Linsingen army group. Front headquarters - Minsk. Southwestern Front under the command of A.A. Brusilov included the 8th, 11th, 7th and 9th armies, which covered the direction to Kyiv. The Linsingen army group, the Bem-Ermoli army group, the Southern Army and the 7th Army acted against these troops. Headquarters - Berdichev. On the same day (February 28), a military meeting of the Allies was held in Chantilly, at which it was reported about the offensive planned by the Russian Headquarters for March. Subsequently, other meetings of the allies were held with the aim of developing agreed methods of conducting military operations. It took a lot of time, but the goal was not fully achieved. The reasons were different. Thus, the British stubbornly avoided involving large forces in operations. The Russian Headquarters proposed a plan to attack the most vulnerable place of the German coalition - Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey - with the forces of the Southwestern Russian Front, as well as the Balkan and Italian fronts, but this plan was rejected. England and France probably saw in it Russia's desire to gain a foothold in the Balkans, which was not consistent with the interests of the Western powers. Nevertheless, in the winter of 1915/1916, the Russian armies were preparing for offensive actions - in accordance with the all-allied plan, and this preparation took place under pressure from the Entente, which insisted that Russia quickly implement the decisions of the inter-allied conferences.

It was decided to discuss the plan of operations for 1916 at a military meeting at Headquarters. The meeting took place on April 1 (14) in Mogilev. Nicholas II presided over it as supreme commander-in-chief. The generals heard Alekseev's report. He proposed delivering the main blow with the troops of the Western Front (where the Russians had double superiority over the Germans). The Northern and Southwestern Fronts were assigned a supporting role.

The commander of the Northern Front, the elderly General Kuropatkin (the same one who commanded the Russian troops in the Russo-Japanese War), and the commander of the Western Front, General Evert, who then spoke, were against offensive actions, believing that “it is absolutely impossible to break through the German front, because their fortified zones so developed and strongly fortified that it is difficult to imagine success." General Brusilov's speech sounded dissonant. He categorically disagreed with Alekseev’s opinion about the auxiliary role of his front and expressed his firm conviction that his troops not only could, but should attack. The general went on to say that the main drawback of combat operations on the Eastern Front is the disunity of efforts of the fronts. Brusilov asked permission to launch an offensive. There were no objections. front military Brusilov breakthrough

Upon returning from Mogilev, Brusilov immediately gathered the army commanders and outlined to them his plan for the offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front. Before moving on to presenting the plan, we note what forces were at the disposal of the commander of the Southwestern Front.

Brusilov's front had four armies: the 8th Army (commanded by General A.M. Kaledin); 11th Army (commander General V.V. Sakharov); 7th Army (commander General D.G. Shcherbachev); 9th Army (commander General P.A. Lechitsky).

The latter, due to illness, was temporarily replaced by General A.M. Krylov. The front forces had 573 thousand bayonets and 60 thousand sabers, 1770 light and 168 heavy guns. Russian troops outnumbered the enemy in manpower and light artillery by 1.3 times; in heavy they were inferior by 3.2 times.

With such a balance of forces and means, Brusilov believed, it was possible to attack. All that was required was to find a non-standard move. Having abandoned the breakthrough methods used at that time (on a narrow section of the front with the concentration of superior forces in the chosen direction), the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front A.A. Brusilov put forward a new idea - breaking through the enemy’s fortified positions by delivering simultaneous strikes by all armies of a given front. At the same time, perhaps more forces and resources should have been concentrated on the main direction. This form of breakthrough made it impossible for the enemy to determine the location of the main attack; the enemy, therefore, could not freely maneuver his reserves. Therefore, the attacking side was able to fully apply the principle of surprise and pin down the enemy’s forces along the entire front and for the entire duration of the operation.

The army commanders reacted to Brusilov’s offensive plans without much enthusiasm. Initially, they were approved only by Sakharov and Krylov, and somewhat later by Shcherbachev. Kaledin persisted the longest, whose army was to act at the forefront of the main attack. And yet Brusilov managed to convince this general too.

Soon after the meeting (April 6, 1916), Brusilov sent out “Instructions” to the army, in which he outlined in detail the nature and methods of preparing for the offensive. The “instructions” clearly expressed the main idea of ​​the offensive.

. “The attack should be carried out, if possible, on the entire front, regardless of the forces available for this. Only a persistent attack with all forces, on the widest possible front, can really pin down the enemy, preventing him from transferring his reserves.”

. “The conduct of an attack on the entire front must be expressed in every army, in every corps, outlining, preparing and organizing the broadest attack on a certain section of the enemy’s fortified position.”

The main role in the offensive of the Southwestern Front was assigned by Brusilov to the 8th Army, which was closest to the Western Front and, therefore, capable of providing Evert with the most effective assistance. Other armies were supposed to make this task as easy as possible, drawing off a significant part of the enemy’s forces. Brusilov entrusted the development of plans for individual operations to army commanders, giving them the opportunity to take the initiative. At the same time, the front commander also gave his subordinates specific instructions that should be followed when drawing up plans for army operations. Brusilov left the coordination of actions behind him.

Preparations for the offensive have begun.

2 Preparations for the Entente offensive

Brusilov was aware of the enormous difficulties of breaking through the powerful enemy defenses. Therefore, he demanded maximum thoughtfulness of plans from his subordinates. The preparation for the operation took place secretly, which was, in the opinion of the front commander, one of the conditions for its success.

The entire area where the troops were located was well studied with the help of infantry and aviation reconnaissance. All enemy fortified positions were photographed from airplanes; photographs are enlarged and expanded into plans. Each army chose a site for attack, where troops were secretly pulled up, and they were located in the immediate rear. Hasty trench work began, carried out only at night. In some places, the Russian trenches approached the Austrian ones at a distance of 200-300 steps. Artillery was quietly transported to pre-designated positions. The infantry in the rear trained in overcoming barbed wire and other obstacles. Particular attention was paid to the continuous communication of infantry with artillery.

During this hard and painstaking work, Brusilov himself, his chief of staff, General Klembovsky, and staff officers were almost constantly in position, monitoring the progress of the work. Brusilov demanded the same from army commanders.

By May 10, as planned, preparations for the offensive were basically completed. And on May 9, the emperor visited the Southwestern Front. During this trip, A.A. Brusilov became closely acquainted with the royal family for the first time. Unexpectedly, Empress Alexandra Feodorovna showed interest in military affairs. Having invited Brusilov into her carriage, she asked whether his troops were ready to attack.

“Preparations for the operation were carried out in the strictest secrecy, and only an extremely limited circle of people knew about the expected start dates. The Empress clearly had no need for such information. Therefore, Brusilov responded very restrainedly:

Not quite yet, Your Imperial Majesty, but I expect that this year we will defeat the enemy.

But the queen asked a second question on the same sensitive topic:

When do you think about going on the offensive?

This alarmed the general even more, and his answer was frankly evasive:

I don’t know this yet, it depends on the situation, which is changing quickly, Your Majesty.

Such information is so secret that I myself do not remember it."

Brusilov did not really sin against the truth. The timing indeed depended not only on him. While the Russian army was preparing for offensive operations, the superior forces of the Austrians suddenly attacked the Italian army units in the Trentino area. Having suffered heavy losses, the Italians began to retreat. Soon the Italian command turned to the Russian Headquarters with persistent requests for help.

Chapter 2. The place of the Brusilov breakthrough in the First World War and history

1 The offensive of Russian troops on the Southwestern Front in the spring and summer of 1916

At dawn on May 22 (June 4), a powerful artillery cannonade heralded the beginning of the offensive of the Southwestern Front. Russian artillery fire was extremely effective. This was the result of careful preparation of the operation. Passages were made in the enemy's wire fences, and the trenches of the first and partially second lines were destroyed.

The troops of the 9th Army were the first to go forward (May 22). Wave after wave of Russian infantry chains rolled through the wire barriers scattered by shells, encountering almost no resistance from the demoralized enemy. The 9th Army occupied the enemy's forward fortified zone and captured more than 11 thousand soldiers and officers.

The greatest success was achieved in the direction of operations of the 8th Army. By the end of May 23 (June 5), the corps of her strike group had broken through the first line of enemy defense. Over the next two days they pursued the enemy. On May 25 (June 7), the 15th Division of the 8th Corps captured Lutsk. Characterizing the situation at that time, Quartermaster General of the 8th Army, Major General N. N. Stogov, said that the defeat of the Austrians in the Kovel and Vladimir-Volyn directions was revealed in its entirety. Mass testimony from prisoners paints a hopeless picture of the Austrian retreat: a crowd of unarmed Austrians from various units fled in panic through Lutsk, abandoning everything in their path. Many prisoners... testified that they were ordered to abandon everything except their weapons to facilitate their retreat, but in fact they often abandoned their weapons before anything else...

The offensive was quite successful in other directions as well. On the left wing of the front, formations of the 7th Army also broke through the enemy’s defenses. Initial results exceeded all expectations. In the first three days, the troops of the Southwestern Front broke through the enemy's defenses in a zone of 8-10 km and advanced 25-35 km in depth.

By noon on May 24, 900 officers, more than 40 thousand soldiers were captured, 77 guns, 134 machine guns and 49 bomb throwers were captured. The number of trophies grew every day. With fresh corps approaching from the Headquarters reserve, Brusilov issued a directive to increase the force of the strike. The main role was still assigned to the 8th Army, which was supposed to attack Kovel. The 11th Army advanced to Zlochev, the 7th to Stanislav, and the 9th to Kolomyia.

The attack on Kovel met not only the interests of the front, but also the strategic goals of the campaign in general. It was supposed to contribute to the unification of the efforts of the Southwestern and Western fronts and lead to the defeat of significant enemy forces. However, this plan was not destined to come true - apparently due to the fault of the commander of the Western Front, General Evert. During the first three days of the offensive, the troops of the Southwestern Front achieved a major victory. It was especially significant in the zone of the 8th Army. Although its left flank corps (46th and 4th cavalry) did not complete their tasks, there was complete success in the direction of the main attack. The enemy positions were broken through at a front of 70 - 80 km and in depth by 25 - 35 km. The enemy suffered heavy losses. On May 26 (June 8), Brusilov issued a directive according to which the 8th Army was to, having firmly established itself on the line of the Styr River, develop an offensive on the flanks of the strike force; the 11th, 7th and 9th armies were obliged to continue fulfilling their previous tasks. Brusilov intended to launch an offensive on the Kovel, Vladimir-Volynsky, Sokal line on May 28 (June 10), with the approach of the 5th Siberian Corps.

By the end of May, the troops of the Southwestern Front achieved new significant successes. The 5th Siberian Corps, transferred from the Northern Front, was brought into battle. The 23rd Army Corps also arrived. On May 31 (June 13), Brusilov issued a directive according to which the front armies were to continue the offensive on June 1 in order to complete the defeat of the opposing Austro-German troops. The main role in it, as before, was assigned to the 8th Army. She was given the task of reaching the line Kovel, Vladimir-Volynsky, Poritsk, Milyatin. This was supposed to create conditions for a subsequent offensive in the direction of Rava Russkaya. As early as May 29 (June 11), Klembovsky indicated to Kaledin that the further general direction of our offensive would be towards Rava Russkaya.

The offensive planned by Brusilov largely depended not only on the actions of the troops of this front, but also on how timely and realistic assistance they would receive from the Western Front. This was well understood at Headquarters. On May 29 (June 11), Alekseev telegrammed to Brusilov, Evert and Kuropatkin that in order to more firmly support the operation of the Southwestern Front on the right and more reliably strike the enemy in the Pinsk area, it was decided to immediately transfer one heavy division from the Northern Front to this area artillery and one army corps. The operation at Pinsk, as stated in the telegram, without waiting for the delivery of the corps, should begin only upon the arrival of the 27th division, which is caused by the state of affairs on the Southwestern Front.

However, the coordinated actions of the Southwestern and Western fronts were thwarted due to Evert's fault. Citing rainy weather and incomplete concentration, he delayed the offensive until June 4. Amazingly, the Headquarters approved this decision. The enemy immediately took advantage of the mistake of the Russian high command. The Germans transferred several divisions to the Eastern Front, and “the Kovel hole... began to gradually be filled with fresh German troops.” Only at the beginning of June did the Headquarters become convinced of the need to take advantage of the favorable situation created by the successes of the Southwestern Front. On June 3 (16), she issued a new directive. The offensive in the Vilna direction, which was supposed to take place on June 4 (17), was cancelled. Instead, the Western Front was given the task, no later than 12-16 days later, starting from the evening of June 3, to deliver the main blow from the Baranovichi region in the Novogrudok-Slonim sector with the aim of reaching the Lida-Grodno line. At the same time, part of the troops the front was supposed to launch an attack no later than June 6 (19) to capture the Pinsk region and develop a further offensive towards Kobrin and Pruzhany. The Northern Front was ordered to improve its positions and attract enemy reinforcements.

The immediate task of the Southwestern Front was to strike at Kovol. At the same time, the front was ordered to protect the troops of its left wing from enemy attacks and prepare a further operation to capture the line of the Sana and Dniester rivers. In this new operation, the main blow was also to be delivered by the right wing in order to, if possible, cut off the enemy from San and separate the German and Austrian armies. The directive provided for the immediate transportation of two army corps from the Northern and two heavy artillery divisions from the Northern and Western fronts to the Kovel direction. Meanwhile, the situation on the Southwestern Front was developing unfavorably for the Russians. The Austro-German command at first did not attach much importance to the offensive of this front, considering it demonstrative and believing that it would not lead to serious consequences. However, the Russian breakthrough in the Lutsk area forced this opinion to change. Of particular concern was the danger of losing Kovel, a major railway junction. The entry of Brusilov's troops into this area would affect the stability of the entire German front north of Pripyat. The authors of the Reichsarchiv compared Brusilov's offensive with a flash of lightning. What, according to the way of thinking of General Falkenhayn, was considered almost impossible, happened with the unexpectedness and obviousness of a devastating natural phenomenon. The Russian army showed such striking proof of the offensive power living within it that suddenly and immediately all the difficult, seemingly long-overcome dangers of the warriors on several fronts surfaced in all their former strength and sharpness.

May a meeting of the chiefs of general staff of the Central Powers was held in Berlin. It was decided to urgently concentrate a strike group at Kovel under the overall command of General Linsingen with the task of wresting the initiative from the Russians. The 10th Army Corps, consisting of the 19th and 20th Infantry Divisions, from the Italian front - the 29th and 61st Infantry Divisions, as well as formations from various directions of the Eastern European Theater were transferred to the indicated area from the Western European theater.

(16) June Austro-German troops launched a counterattack. They intended, by means of a concentric offensive in the general direction of Lutsk, to eliminate the success of the Russians and throw them back to their original position. The troops of the 8th Army and part of the forces of the right flank of the 11th Army repelled enemy attacks. The counterattack was not developed. By stubborn resistance, the Russians thwarted the plans of the enemy command. While on the right wing of the front Russian troops repelled the Austro-Hungarian counterattack, the left flank 9th Army successfully developed the offensive. Her troops crossed the Prut River on June 4 (17), and captured Chernivtsi on June 5 (18). Pursuing the retreating enemy, they reached the Seret River on June 6 (June 19). Then the 9th Army launched an attack on Kolomyia.

In his memoirs, A.A. Brusilov writes about this time like this: “Although abandoned by our comrades in arms, we continue our bloody military march forward, and by June 10 we had already captured 4013 officers and about 200 thousand soldiers; there was military booty : 2190 guns; 644 machine guns, 196 bombers and mortars, 46 charging boxes, 38 searchlights, about 150 thousand rifles, many wagons and countless other military materials."

Finally, the front commander orders “pending orders to stop the general offensive and very firmly gain a foothold in the positions currently occupied, which are actively defended.”

By June 12, there was some calm on the Southwestern Front. By this time, Brusilov's armies had achieved success in almost all directions. Giving an analysis of the current situation, A.A. Brusilov writes in his memoirs: “If we had a real supreme leader and all the commanders-in-chief acted according to his decree, then my armies, without encountering strong enough opposition, would have moved forward so much and the strategic position of the enemy it would have been so difficult that even without a fight he would have had to retreat to his borders and the course of the war would have taken a completely different turn, and its end would have accelerated significantly.Now, alone with a gradually strengthening enemy, I was slowly sent reinforcements from inactive fronts, but and the enemy did not yawn, and since he took advantage of the opportunity to more quickly reorganize his troops, their number increased with a much greater progression than mine, and in their numbers, despite the enormous losses in prisoners, killed and wounded, the enemy began to significantly exceed the forces of my front ".

The front command, based on a directive from Headquarters, began preparing a new general offensive. A telegram from the chief of staff of the front, V.N. Klembovsky, to the army commanders said: “This break in the offensive should be used to replenish units with people, accumulate firearms supplies, regroup and prepare an attack... Although the enemy is upset and his positions are weaker than those we have already taken, however thoroughness and thoughtfulness in the preparation of an attack are imperative for success and to reduce casualties on our part."

All four armies of the front were to participate in the upcoming offensive. In addition, from June 11 (24), Brusilov was transferred to the 3rd Army and the 78th Infantry Division of the Western Front, he reinforced the 3rd Army with the 4th Cavalry and 46th Army Corps of the 8th Army. It was entrusted with the task of capturing the Galuzia, Gorodok region and at the same time delivering an auxiliary attack on Ozarichi (35 km northwest of Pinsk) to assist the troops of the 4th Army of the Western Front, which were to advance in the Baranovichi direction. The 8th Army launched two attacks: one, the main one, on Kovel, and the other, auxiliary, on Vladimir-Volynsky. The 11th Army advanced on Brody and part of its forces on Poritsk. The 7th Army was ordered to reach the line Brezzhany, Podhajtsy, Monasterzhiska, and the 9th Army - to the line Galich, Stanislav. The 5th Army Corps and the 78th Infantry Division were in the front reserve.

According to Brusilov's plan, the Southwestern Front, as before, concentrated its main efforts in the Kovel direction. The main attack was again assigned to the 8th Army. Therefore, incoming reinforcements went to strengthen it. In addition to the previously arrived 5th Siberian and 23rd Corps, it included the 1st Turkestan and 1st Army Corps. Excluding the troops transferred to the 3rd Army, and two corps (8th and 32nd), included in the 11th Army, the 8th Russian Army on the eve of the offensive had the 5th Cavalry, 5th Siberian, 1st Turkestan, 30th, 1st, 39th, 23rd and 40th Army Corps, and only eight buildings. It continued to be the most powerful army on the front. Its commander decided to conduct the main attack with the forces of the 1st Turkestan Corps, together with units of the 5th Cavalry Corps, and the auxiliary attack - with the 30th Corps. In his reserve he had the 5th Siberian Corps. The remaining troops (1st, 39th, 23rd and 40th corps) were ordered from the beginning of the operation, without getting involved in serious battles, to pin down the enemy in their sectors and be ready to launch a vigorous offensive

Preparations for the offensive took place in an atmosphere of only relative calm. From June 9 (22), the enemy continued to attack in the Kovel and Vladimir-Volyn directions, but their actions were not persistent and were carried out scatteredly. In Bukovina, the enemy continued to retreat to the mountain passes. In other sectors of the front, troops stood on the defensive. But on June 16 (29), the enemy intensified its pressure from Kovel, and on June 17 (30) - from Vladimir-Volynsky. The troops of the 8th Army repelled new enemy attacks. The situation was more complicated in the 11th Army zone, where the Austrians also resumed attacks on June 16 (29). Their goal was to break through the defenses, force Russian troops to retreat to the Styr River, create a threat to the left flank of the 8th Army and thereby disrupt the upcoming offensive of the Southwestern Front. The enemy's multi-day attacks were unsuccessful. They were repelled with great damage to the enemy. By June 21 (July 4), the troops of the 11th Army stopped the Austrian advance and forced them to go on the defensive. But the Russian forces were also exhausted. As a result, Brusilov allowed the commander of the 11th Army to stick to defensive actions for now and not to participate in the planned offensive of the front forces.

On the Southwestern Front, energetic preparations for the offensive were underway in difficult conditions; A different picture was observed on the Northern and Western fronts. Commanders Kuropatkin and Evert complained more about the difficulties than prepared their troops for the offensive. Headquarters, convinced of the futility of its hopes for an offensive on the Western Front, finally decided to transfer its main efforts to the Southwestern Front.

Preparations for the offensive took place in an atmosphere of only relative calm. From June 9 (22), the enemy continued to attack in the Kovel and Vladimir-Volyn directions, but their actions were not persistent and were carried out scatteredly. In Bukovina, the enemy continued to retreat to the mountain passes. In other sectors of the front, troops stood on the defensive. But on June 16 (29), the enemy intensified its pressure from Kovel, and on June 17 (30) - from Vladimir-Volynsky. The troops of the 8th Army repelled new enemy attacks. The situation was more complicated in the 11th Army zone, where the Austrians also resumed attacks on June 16 (29). Their goal was to break through the defenses, force Russian troops to retreat to the Styr River, create a threat to the left flank of the 8th Army and thereby disrupt the upcoming offensive of the Southwestern Front. The enemy's multi-day attacks were unsuccessful. They were repelled with great damage to the enemy. By June 21 (July 4), the troops of the 11th Army stopped the Austrian advance and forced them to go on the defensive. But the Russian forces were also exhausted. As a result of this, Brusilov allowed the commander of the 11th Army to stick to defensive actions for now and not to participate in the planned offensive of the front forces.

Meanwhile, preparations for a new operation on the Southwestern Front were completed, and Brusilov ordered the start of a general offensive on June 21 (July 3). After powerful artillery preparation, the troops broke through the enemy’s defenses and a few days later reached the Stokhod River.

The offensive of the Southwestern Front resumed at the appointed time. It was carried out by all armies except the 11th. The most significant events, as before, took place on the right wing of the front. As a result of three days of fighting, formations of the 3rd and 8th armies broke through the enemy's defenses and defeated him. The Austo-German troops began to retreat in disarray. On June 24, Brusilov issued a directive that provided for the capture of Kovel by the joint efforts of the troops of the 3rd and 8th armies. The directive read:

The 3rd Army, relentlessly pursuing the defeated enemy, firmly established itself on Stokhod and, to assist the 8th Army in capturing Kovel, attack this point from the north and east. Provide the right flank of your advancing units with a barrier in the northern direction...

). The right flank and center of the 8th Army, as stated at Stokhod, should capture Kovel. In the Vladimir-Volyn direction, stay defensive.

). Other armies are to carry out the tasks previously specified to them.

The new Russian offensive extremely complicated the position of the Austrian troops. However, attempts to cross the Stokhod River on the shoulders of the retreating enemy did not bring success. The Austro-German command was in great alarm. However, the attempt to cross the Stokhod River on the shoulders of the retreating enemy was unsuccessful. The Austro-Germans managed to destroy the crossings in advance and, with their counterattacks, prevented the Russians from crossing to the western bank of the river. Overcoming Stokhod required preparing an attack with strong artillery fire and concentrating fresh reserves.

June was followed by a directive from the Headquarters, which set the immediate task of the right-flank armies of the Southwestern Front to force the crossing of Stokhod and capture the Kovel region. At the same time, they had to act in the rear of the Pinsk enemy group in order to force it to retreat. The Russian high command decided to immediately begin transporting guard troops to the area of ​​Lutsk, Rozhishche with the aim of forming a new army behind the left flank of the 3rd Army for a joint deep envelopment of the German troops in the direction of Brest, Kobrin, Pruzhany. The Western Front received the task of holding back the enemy forces in front of it by threatening a vigorous attack or continuing the operation in the Baranovichi direction. The choice of method for solving this problem was left to the discretion of the front commander-in-chief. With the start of the maneuver towards Brest, Kobrin, Pruzhany, he was charged with strengthening the troops of the Guard and the 3rd Army at the expense of other armies in order to give decisiveness, strength and energy to the planned strike. The Northern Front was also ordered to go on the offensive.

At the beginning of July, the Guard troops, together with the 5th Cavalry, 1st and 30th Army Corps, formed the Special Army under the command of General Bezobrazov. She received an offensive zone between the 3rd and 8th armies. Its task was to attack Kovel from the south. From the north and east, the attack of this city was to be led by the 3rd Army, which was simultaneously tasked with advancing to the rear of the enemy group. The 8th Army was entrusted with the capture of Vladimir-Volynsky, the 11th Army - the attack on Brody, Lvov, the 7th and 9th Armies - the capture of the line Galich, Stanislav.

The general offensive of the Southwestern Front resumed on July 15 (28). The troops of the 3rd, Special and 8th armies managed to achieve only partial successes. The enemy concentrated large reserves and offered fierce resistance to the Russians. By this time, Brusilov had finally lost hope for active military operations on the Northern and Western fronts. It was useless to expect to achieve tangible strategic results with one front alone. “Therefore,” he wrote, “I continued the fighting at the front no longer with the same intensity, trying to save people as much as possible, but only to the extent that turned out to be necessary to pin down as many enemy troops as possible, indirectly helping these our allies - the Italians and to the French."

The fighting became protracted at the turn of the Stokhod River. Some success took place only in the center and on the left wing, where the cities of Brody, Galich, and Stanislav were liberated. Austro-Hungarian troops left Bukovina. By the beginning of September, the front had stabilized along the line of the Stokhod River, Kiselin, Zlochev, Brezzhany, Galich, Stanislav, Delatyn, Vorokhta, Seletin. Overcoming Stokhod required preparing an attack and concentrating fresh reserves. Although the general offensive of the Southwestern Front resumed on July 15, it was no longer as successful as the previous one. Only partial success was achieved. The enemy managed to concentrate large reserves in the Southwestern Front and offered fierce resistance.

Summing up, A.A. Brusilov writes:

“In general, from May 22 to July 30, the armies entrusted to me captured a total of 8,255 officers, 370,153 soldiers; 490 guns, 144 machine guns and 367 bomb throwers and mortars; about 400 charging boxes; about 100 searchlights and a huge number of rifles, cartridges, shells and various other military spoils. By this time, the operation of the armies of the Southwestern Front to capture the winter, extremely fortified enemy position, considered by our enemies to be certainly impregnable, had ended." By this time, Brusilov had finally lost hope for active military operations on the Northern and Western fronts. It was not possible to expect to achieve tangible strategic results only with the forces of one front.

“Therefore,” the general later wrote, “I continued the fighting at the front no longer with the same intensity, trying to save people as much as possible, but only to the extent that turned out to be necessary to pin down as many enemy troops as possible, indirectly helping these our allies - the Italians and the French."

The fighting became protracted. The battles were fought with varying degrees of success. By mid-September the front had stabilized. The offensive operation of the troops of the Southwestern Front, which lasted more than 100 days, has ended.

2 Consequences of the Brusilov breakthrough

The offensive operation of the Southwestern Front in the summer of 1916 was of great military and political significance. It led to the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian troops in Galicia and Bukovina. The enemy lost up to 1.5 million people killed, wounded and captured, 581 guns, 1,795 machine guns. Russian losses amounted to about 500 thousand people. To eliminate the breakthrough, the military command of the Central Powers was forced to withdraw 30.5 infantry and 3.5 cavalry divisions from the Western and Italian fronts. This eased the position of the French at Verdun. Italy also sighed lightly, as Austrian troops were forced to stop their attacks in Tretino. Russia sacrificed itself for the sake of its allies, writes an English military historian, and it is unfair to forget that the allies are Russia’s unpaid debtors for this.” So, in 1916, the Russian army again came to the aid of the allied forces, but on a larger scale, launching a major offensive in the southwestern strategic direction.

“Russia sacrificed itself for the sake of its allies,” writes the English military historian, “and it is unfair to forget that the allies are Russia’s unpaid debtors for this.”

An important consequence of the Brusilov breakthrough was that it had a decisive influence on changing the position of Romania. Previously, the ruling circles of this country hesitated, wondering which coalition to join. The victories of the Russian Southwestern Front put an end to these hesitations, and on August 4 (17) political and military conventions were signed between the Entente powers and Romania. Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Entente seriously complicated the position of the Central Powers.

The grandiose success of the Brusilov offensive did not, however, bring decisive strategic results. A significant reason for this was poor coordination of the actions of the fronts by the high command. Brusilov blamed chief of staff Alekseev first of all for the fact that the success of the offensive of the Southwestern Front was not further developed. Under a different commander-in-chief, perhaps General Evert, for his indecisiveness (he not only sabotaged his main task - to attack, but also did not prevent the enemy from transferring forces from the Western Front to the Southwestern Front) would have been immediately removed and replaced. Kuropatkin, according to Brusilov, did not deserve any position in the active army at all.

An important consequence of the Brusilov breakthrough was that it had a decisive influence on changing Romania’s position in the war. Until that time, the ruling circles of this country pursued a policy of neutrality. They hesitated, waiting for the most opportune moment that would allow them to more advantageously join one coalition or another. The victories of the Russian Southwestern Front in the summer of 1916 put an end to these hesitations. On August 4 (17), political and military conventions were signed between the Entente powers and Romania. The next day, Germany and Turkey declared war on it, and on August 19 (September 1) - Bulgaria.

The headquarters sent 35 infantry and 11 cavalry divisions to help the Romanians and extended the battle front of its armies by 500 km. To the left of the Southwestern Front, right up to the Black Sea coast, a new operational formation was deployed - the Romanian Front, which included Russian and Romanian troops. The Romanian King Charles was nominally considered the commander-in-chief of the front. In fact, the leadership of the troops was concentrated in the hands of his deputy, Russian General D.G. Shcherbachev.

Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Entente seriously complicated the position of the Central Powers. It was necessary to create a new strategic front of struggle. And this inevitably entailed a weakening of the already limited forces on the main fronts - Western and Eastern. “The Brusilov offensive,” noted German military historians, “turned out to be the most severe shock that had previously befallen the Austro-Hungarian army. Shackled on almost its entire front by the Russian offensive, it now found itself face to face with a new enemy - Romania, which, seemed ready, advancing through Transylvania and further into the heart of Hungary, to deal a mortal blow to the Habsburg Empire."

The offensive of the Russian Southwestern Front in the summer of 1916 is one of the most striking and instructive operations of the First World War. Its enormous significance in the history of military art is not denied by foreign authors. They pay tribute to Brusilov's leadership talent. The fighting qualities of the Russian soldier are also highly appreciated, who showed himself capable of breaking through the German-Austrian front in several sectors, despite extreme poverty in technical means of combat, and throwing the enemy back tens of kilometers. And this happened at a time when on the Western Front the troops of both sides, abundantly supplied with numerous military equipment, advanced literally meters during their offensive operations, unable to solve the problems of a breakthrough. The term “Brusilov’s offensive” associated with the name of the Russian commander has become firmly established in scientific works and reference publications. Despite its incompleteness, the offensive operation of the Southwestern Front in the summer of 1916 represents an outstanding achievement of military art. She discovered a new form of breaking through a fortified front, which was one of the best for that time. The experience of the operation was widely used by domestic military science in developing the theory of breaking through fortified zones. Brusilov's ideas found their concrete embodiment and further development in the largest strategic operations of the Russian Armed Forces during the Second World War. The 1916 campaign did not fully justify the strategic assumptions laid down in the unified plan of the allied command. The simultaneous attack did not work out. The Allies violated their commitments made at Chantilly and did not support the offensive on the Russian front in a timely manner. Only at the end of June they began an operation on the river. Somme. Erich von Falkenhayn wrote that in Galicia the most dangerous moment of the Russian offensive had already been experienced when the first shot was fired on the Somme. The contradictions between the Entente countries seriously hampered the unity of action in the military field. Nevertheless, the overall outcome of the campaign was in favor of the Allies. They wrested the strategic initiative from the hands of the Austro-German command. Two events played a decisive role in this - the Brusilov offensive and the operation on the river. Somme.

In the book “My Memoirs” A.A. Brusilov writes: “In conclusion, I will say that with this method of government, Russia obviously could not win the war, which we irrefutably proved in practice, and yet happiness was so close and so possible "Just think that if in July the Western and Northern Fronts had attacked the Germans with all their might, they (the Germans) would certainly have been crushed, but they should have just followed the example and method of the Southwestern Front, and not on one section of each front." .

Nevertheless, the Brusilov breakthrough played a decisive role. He marked the beginning of a turning point in the course of the war, and contributed - together with the offensive of the French and British on the Somme River - to the interception of the military initiative. The German command was forced to switch to strategic defense from the end of 1916.

As already noted, the Brusilov breakthrough saved the Italians from defeat and eased the position of the French. The entire Eastern Front of the Austro-German troops from Polesie to the Romanian border was defeated. Thus, a major strategic prerequisite was created for the decisive defeat of the Austro-German coalition, which greatly contributed to the final victory of the Entente in 1918. The offensive of the Russian Southwestern Front is one of the most striking and instructive operations of the First World War. Foreign authors pay tribute to the military leadership talent of A.A. Brusilov. Despite its incompleteness, the offensive operation of the Southwestern Front in the summer of 1916 represents an outstanding achievement of military art.

Brusilov himself subsequently, not without reason, asserted: “No matter what they say, one cannot but admit that the preparation for this operation was exemplary, which required the manifestation of the full effort of commanders of all levels. Everything was thought out and everything was done in a timely manner.” Regarding the Russian army, the general wrote: “In 1916, it was still strong and, of course, combat-ready, for it defeated a much stronger enemy and achieved successes that no army had had before that time.” For the operation, the commander of the Southwestern Front A.A. Brusilov received the St. George weapon, decorated with diamonds.

Conclusion

The Brusilov breakthrough showed the full power of the Russian army and became an example of Russian military art. This breakthrough had a significant impact on the outcome of the war and the activities of the peoples who became victims of the war. As already noted, the Brusilov breakthrough saved the Italians from defeat and eased the position of the French. The entire Eastern Front of the Austro-German troops from Polesie to the Romanian border was defeated.

The offensive of the Russian Southwestern Front in the summer of 1916 is one of the most striking and instructive operations of the First World War. Its enormous significance in the history of military art is not denied by foreign authors. They pay tribute to Brusilov's leadership talent. The fighting qualities of the Russian soldier are also highly appreciated, who showed himself capable of breaking through the German-Austrian front in several sectors, despite extreme poverty in technical means of combat, and throwing the enemy back tens of kilometers. And this happened at a time when on the Western Front the troops of both sides, abundantly supplied with numerous military equipment, advanced literally meters during their offensive operations, unable to solve the problems of a breakthrough. The term “Brusilov’s offensive” associated with the name of the Russian commander has become firmly established in scientific works and reference publications.

Thus, a major strategic precondition was created for the decisive defeat of the Austro-German coalition, which greatly contributed to the final victory of the Entente in 1918.

The breakthrough also showed the whole world the power of the Russian army, despite the deplorable state of the country and supplies. The immeasurable heroism and courage of the warriors was shown.

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Appendix No. 1

Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov

Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov (August 19 (31), 1853, Tiflis, - March 17, 1926, Moscow). From the nobles. In 1872 he graduated from the junior special class of the Corps of Pages; not allowed to transfer to a senior special class based on academic results. Participant in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878. After graduating from the Officers' Cavalry School (1883), he taught there (in 1902-1806 he was the head of the school). In 1906-1912 he commanded the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division, commander of the 14th Army Corps; cavalry general (1912). During the First World War in 1914-1916, commander of the 8th Army; Adjutant General (1915). From March 17, 1916, Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front; in May - August he led the offensive, which later received the name "Brusilovsky breakthrough" - one of the largest operations on the Russian-German front. He believed in the inevitable predetermination of events (he was interested in the occult and mysticism; he was strongly influenced by the ideas of the founder of the Theosophical Society, H. P. Blavatsky).

In March 1917, to a request from General M.V. Alekseev about Brusilov’s opinion on the need for the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II, he answered (by telegram): “... At this moment, the only outcome that can save the situation and make it possible to continue to fight the external enemy... - to renounce the throne in favor of the sovereign's heir, the prince, under the regency of Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich... It is necessary to hurry so that the fire that has flared up is quickly extinguished, otherwise it will entail innumerable catastrophic consequences. By this act, the dynasty itself in the person of the rightful heir will be saved" (" Abdication of Nicholas II", 2nd edition, M., 1990, p. 238).

After the February Revolution, he was a supporter of continuing the war to a victorious end. He spoke on April 20 at the opening of the congress of delegates of the Southwestern Front (Kamenets-Podolsk), stated that “... the war gave us the freedom that we value so much... But in order for this war to be worthy of the freedom it achieved, would consolidate it... this war must be victorious." On April 24, in a telegram to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief M.V. Alekseev, referring to the successful experience of his offensive in 1916, he insisted on conducting an offensive on the Southwestern Front. On April 26, he made a sharp protest to the Minister of War A.I. Guchkov against the appointment of commissars of the Provisional Government at the headquarters of the fronts and armies: “I am confident that in wartime the commander-in-chief and commander in the theater of military operations must enjoy the full confidence of the government and the people and have full power... .” and that “such a measure will in all respects have a detrimental effect on the combat operations of the troops” (Central State Military Historical Archive, f. 2003, op. 1, d. 65, l. 475). On May 22, he was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief. A supporter of the formation of new military units on a volunteer basis, on May 23 he approved the “Plan for the Formation of Revolutionary Battalions from Home Front Volunteers.” In June, he accepted the honorary title offered to him as the supreme chairman of all front-line committees for their formation. While preparing an offensive on the Russian-German front, he discussed in correspondence with Minister of War A.F. Kerensky the question of the procedure for demobilizing the Russian army if necessary. On the eve of the offensive, which began on June 16, he turned to the Allied command with a request to support the Russian armies with the Allied offensive on other fronts. After the events of July 3-5 in Petrograd, he wrote to Kerensky: “Since the government has entered into a decisive struggle against Bolshevism, it must put an end to the nest of Bolshevism in Kronstadt. demands... it is necessary... to bombard Kronstadt..." (Central State Military Historical Archive, f. 15234, op. 1, d. 40, l. 39). After the failure of the offensive on the Southwestern Front, together with Kerensky, on July 9, he signed an order to suppress calls for non-execution of military orders, without stopping at the use of weapons, on July 10, he banned meetings and rallies in the area of ​​​​combat operations under the threat of armed dispersal, on July 12, he forbade military committees to discuss combat orders and interfere with them. In a telegram to the Minister of War he wrote: “... only the use of the death penalty will stop the decay of the army and save freedom and the Motherland” (Rech, 1917, July 18). After a meeting at Headquarters on July 16, which discussed the situation at the front, Brusilov was removed from office on July 19; remained at the disposal of the Provisional Government and, with Kerensky’s permission, left for Moscow.

On August 10, he participated in the Moscow Meeting of Public Figures; became a member of the commission that drafted the resolution; at the evening meeting on August 8, he stated the need to “...throw the army out of politics.” In September, honorary chairman of the board of the Society for Strengthening the Orthodox Christian Religion in the Military and Popular Environment.

After the October Revolution he lived in Moscow. In 1920, after the outbreak of the Soviet-Polish War, he enlisted in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA).

Appendix No. 2

Breakthrough cards and battle fragment.

History of mankind. Russia Khoroshevsky Andrey Yurievich

Brusilovsky breakthrough (1916)

Brusilovsky breakthrough (1916)

A large and successful offensive operation organized on the Southwestern Front by General Brusilov. During it, Russian troops managed to break through the defenses of the Austro-German army on a wide front.

The First World War was a difficult test for Russia. A technically backward power had great difficulty transferring its economy to a war footing. The war was perhaps the most important cause of both revolutions of 1917. But the situation on the fronts could have turned out completely differently; the morale of the Russian soldier would not have been so low by the beginning of 1917 if the front commanders had supported their most talented colleague from the Southwestern Front. Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov became one of the few Russian generals of that time who showed his best side. And foreign authors recognize Brusilov’s outstanding merit. It was this Russian military leader who managed to find the antidote to trench warfare, which the British, French and Germans were looking for so unsuccessfully at the same time.

A. A. Brusilov was appointed to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front (SWF) on March 16 (29), 1916. The general was one of the most honored military leaders in the Russian army. He had 46 years of military service experience behind him (including participation in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878, training the command staff of the Russian cavalry, and leading large formations). Since the beginning of the First World War, Brusilov commanded the troops of the 8th Army. As a commander during the battles of the initial period of the war, in the Battle of Galicia (1914), in the campaign of 1915, the talent and best qualities of Brusilov the commander were revealed: originality of thinking, courage of judgment, independence and responsibility in leading a large operational unit, activity and initiative.

By the beginning of 1916, the warring parties had mobilized almost all their human and material resources. The armies have already suffered colossal losses, but neither side has achieved any serious successes that would open up prospects for a successful conclusion to the war. The situation at the fronts was reminiscent of the initial position of the warring armies before the start of the war. In military history, this situation is usually called a positional deadlock. The opposing armies created a continuous front of deeply layered defense. The presence of numerous artillery and the high density of defending troops made the defense difficult to overcome. The absence of open flanks and vulnerable joints doomed attempts at a breakthrough, and especially maneuver, to failure. The extremely significant losses during the breakout attempts were also proof that operational art and tactics did not correspond to the real conditions of the war. But the war continued. Both the Entente (England, France, Russia and other countries) and the states of the German bloc (Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, etc.) were determined to wage the war to a victorious end. Plans were put forward and options for military operations were sought. However, one thing was clear to everyone: any offensive with decisive goals must begin with a breakthrough of defensive positions, looking for a way out of the positional impasse. But no one has yet been able to find such a way out.

Numerical (and economic) superiority was on the side of the Entente: on the Western Front, 139 Anglo-French divisions were opposed by 105 German divisions. On the Eastern Front, 128 Russian divisions operated against 87 Austro-German divisions.

As for the Russian army, in general its supply has improved somewhat. The troops began to receive rifles in significant quantities (albeit of different systems) with a large supply of ammunition. More machine guns. Hand grenades appeared. Worn out guns were replaced with new ones. More and more artillery shells arrived. The army, however, lacked heavy (siege) artillery, had very few aircraft and no tanks at all. The troops also needed gunpowder, toluene, barbed wire, cars, motorcycles and much more.

At the beginning of 1916, the German command decided to go on the defensive on the Eastern Front, and on the Western Front to take France out of the war with an offensive.

The Allies also adopted a joint strategic plan. Its foundations were determined at the allied conference in Chantilly. A document was adopted that defined the methods of action of each of the coalition armies and included the following proposals: 1. the French army had to staunchly defend its territory so that the German offensive would break up against its organized defense; 2. the British army was to concentrate the largest part of its forces on the Franco-German front; 3. The Russian army was asked to exert effective pressure on the enemy in order to prevent him from withdrawing his troops from the Russian front, and also to begin preparations for going on the offensive.

The strategic plan for conducting combat operations by the Russian army was discussed on April 1–2 (14–15), 1916 at Headquarters in Mogilev. Nicholas II himself presided. Based on the general tasks agreed upon with the allies, it was decided that the troops of the Western (commander - A.E. Evert) and Northern (commander A.N. Kuropatkin) fronts should prepare for mid-May and conduct offensive operations. The main blow (in the direction of Vilno) was to be delivered by the Western Front. According to the plan of the Headquarters, the Southwestern Front was assigned a auxiliary role; it was tasked with conducting defensive battles and pinning down the enemy. The explanation was simple: this front is not capable of advancing, since it is weakened by the failures of 1915, and the Headquarters has neither the strength, nor the means, nor the time to strengthen it. All reserves were allocated to the Western and Northern fronts. (By the way, the Allies objected to active actions on Russia’s Southwestern Front, since an offensive here could lead to increased Russian influence in the Balkans.)

Brusilovsky breakthrough. Austro-Hungarian soldiers surrender to Russian troops on the Romanian border

A. A. Brusilov at a meeting at Headquarters insisted on changing the tasks of his front. Having completely agreed with the decision on the tasks of other fronts, Brusilov, with all conviction and determination, convinced his colleagues of the need for an offensive in the southwest. He was objected to by the chief of staff of the Headquarters Alekseev (until 1915 - the chief of staff of the Southwestern Front), the former commander of the Southwestern Front N.I. Ivanov, and Kuropatkin. (However, Evert and Kuropatkin did not believe in the success of their fronts either.) But Brusilov managed to obtain permission to attack, albeit with partial, passive tasks and relying only on his own strength.

Brusilov's front had four armies: the 8th with the commander General A. M. Kaledin; 11th Army under the command of General V.V. Sakharov; 7th Army of General D. G. Shcherbachev and 9th Army of General P. A. Lechitsky. The latter, due to illness, was temporarily replaced by General A. M. Krylov. The front forces had 573 thousand bayonets and 60 thousand sabers, 1770 light and 168 heavy guns. Russian troops outnumbered the enemy in manpower and light artillery by 1.3 times; in heavy they were inferior by 3.2 times.

Having abandoned the breakthrough methods used at that time (on a narrow section of the front with superior forces concentrated in a chosen direction), the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front put forward a new idea - breaking through the enemy’s fortified positions by delivering simultaneous crushing strikes by all armies of a given front. At the same time, the greatest possible amount of forces and resources should have been concentrated on the main direction. This form of breakthrough made it impossible for the enemy to determine the location of the main attack; the enemy, therefore, could not freely maneuver his reserves. Therefore, the attacking side was able to fully apply the principle of surprise and pin down the enemy’s forces along the entire front and for the entire duration of the operation. The successful solution of the task of the Southwestern Front in the operation was initially associated not with superiority over the enemy in forces and means, but with the massing of forces and means in selected directions, achieving surprise (deceiving the enemy, operational camouflage, operational support measures), and skillful maneuver of forces and means.

Initially, Brusilov’s plans were approved only by Sakharov and Krylov, and a little later by Shcherbachev. Kaledin persisted the longest, whose army was to act at the forefront of the main attack. But Alexey Alekseevich managed to convince this general too. Soon after the meeting (April 6 (19), 1916), Brusilov sent out “Instructions” to the army, in which he outlined in detail the nature and methods of preparing for the offensive.

1. “The attack should be carried out, if possible, on the entire front, regardless of the forces available for this. Only a persistent attack with all forces, on the widest possible front, can really pin down the enemy and prevent him from transferring his reserves.

2. Conducting an attack on the entire front must be expressed in each army, in each corps, outlining, preparing and organizing the broadest attack on a certain section of the enemy’s fortified position.”

The main role in the offensive of the Southwestern Front was assigned to the 8th Army, which was closest to the Western Front and, therefore, capable of providing Evert with the most effective assistance. Other armies were supposed to make this task as easy as possible, drawing off a significant part of the enemy’s forces. Brusilov entrusted the development of plans for individual operations to army commanders, giving them the opportunity to take the initiative.

Preparations for the operation were carried out secretly. The entire area where the troops were located was studied with the help of infantry and aviation reconnaissance. All enemy fortified positions were photographed from airplanes; photographs are enlarged and expanded into plans. Each army chose a site for attack, where troops were secretly pulled up, and they were located in the immediate rear. Hasty trench work began, carried out only at night. In some places, the Russian trenches approached the Austrian ones at a distance of 200–300 steps. Artillery was quietly transported to pre-designated positions. The infantry in the rear trained in overcoming barbed wire and other obstacles. Particular attention was paid to the continuous communication of infantry with artillery.

Brusilov himself, his chief of staff, General Klembovsky, and staff officers were almost constantly in position, monitoring the progress of work. Brusilov demanded the same from army commanders.

On May 9, the royal family visited the positions. Brusilov had a rather interesting conversation with Empress Alexandra Feodorovna. Having summoned the general to her carriage, the Empress, who was probably reasonably suspected of having connections with Germany, tried to find out from Brusilov the date of the start of the offensive, but he answered evasively, saying that the information was so secret that he himself did not remember it.

While the Russian army was preparing for offensive operations, the superior forces of the Austrians suddenly attacked the Italian army units in the Trentino area. Having suffered heavy losses, the Italians began to retreat. Soon the Italian command turned to the Russian Headquarters with persistent requests for help. Therefore, on May 18, the troops received a directive in which the start of the offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front was postponed to an earlier date, namely to May 22 (June 4). The offensive of the Western Front troops was supposed to begin a week later. This greatly upset Brusilov, who attributed the success of the operation to the joint actions of the fronts. Brusilov asked Alekseev to set a single date for both fronts, but his requests were not heard.

A powerful artillery cannonade at dawn on May 22 marked the beginning of the operation on the Southwestern Front. The fire was very effective because it was directed not at areas, but at targets. Artillery preparation lasted almost a day, and in some areas up to 48 hours, after which the formations went on the attack. The troops of the 9th Army were the first to go forward (May 22). Wave after wave of Russian infantry chains rolled through the wire barriers scattered by shells. The 9th Army occupied the enemy's forward fortified zone and captured more than 11 thousand soldiers and officers. The interaction between artillery and infantry was well organized. For the first time, infantry escort batteries were allocated in battle and a consistent concentration of fire was used to support the attack. Multiple false transfers of fire ensured the surprise and success of the infantry attack. The infantry units and subunits that made up the combat sectors were built in the form of waves - chains - and attacked in rolling waves. The first wave captured the first and second trenches, and subsequent waves captured the third trench and artillery positions.

On May 23, the 8th Army went on the offensive. By the end of that day, the corps of her strike group had broken through the first line of the Austrian defense and began to pursue the enemy, who was hastily retreating to Lutsk. On May 25, this city was taken by Russian troops. On the left wing of the front, formations of the 7th Army also broke through the enemy’s defenses. The first results exceeded all expectations. In three days, the troops of the Southwestern Front broke through the enemy’s defenses in a zone of 8-10 km and advanced 25-35 km in depth. By noon on May 24, 900 officers, more than 40 thousand soldiers were captured, 77 guns, 134 machine guns and 49 bomb throwers were captured.

With fresh corps approaching from the Headquarters reserve, Brusilov issued a directive to increase the force of the strike. The main role was still assigned to the 8th Army, which was supposed to attack Kovel. The 11th Army advanced to Zlochev, the 7th to Stanislav, and the 9th to Kolomyia. The attack on Kovel met not only the interests of the front, but also the strategic goals of the campaign in general. It was supposed to contribute to the unification of the efforts of the Southwestern and Western fronts and lead to the defeat of significant enemy forces. However, this plan was not destined to come true. Citing rainy weather and incomplete concentration, Evert delayed the offensive, and Headquarters approved this decision. The enemy used this. The Germans transferred several divisions to the Eastern Front, and “the Kovel hole... began to gradually be filled with fresh German troops.”

Brusilov had to order to stop the general offensive on his front and move to a strong defense of the captured lines. By June 12 (25), there was a lull on the Southwestern Front. Brusilov sadly recalled how his “neighbors” and the high command let him down: “I was slowly sent reinforcements from inactive fronts, but the enemy did not yawn, and since he took advantage of the opportunity to more quickly rebuild troops, their number increased with much greater progression than mine, and in numbers, despite the enormous losses in prisoners, killed and wounded, the enemy began to significantly exceed the forces of my front.”

However, soon Headquarters gave the order to Brusilov to continue the offensive. On the Southwestern Front, energetic preparations were underway for the resumption of the attack. At the same time, commanders Kuropatkin and Evert constantly complained about difficulties. Headquarters, convinced of the futility of its hopes for an offensive on the Western Front, finally decided to transfer its main efforts to the Southwestern Front. Brusilov ordered a general offensive to begin on June 21 (July 3). After powerful artillery preparation, the troops broke through the enemy’s defenses and a few days later reached the Stokhod River. The new Russian offensive extremely complicated the position of the Austrian troops. However, attempts to cross Stokhod on the shoulders of the retreating enemy did not bring success. The Austro-Germans managed to destroy the crossings in advance and, with their counterattacks, prevented the Russians from crossing to the western bank of the river.

Overcoming Stokhod required preparing an attack and concentrating fresh reserves. The general offensive of the Southwestern Front resumed on July 15 (28). But it was no longer as successful as the previous one. Only partial success was achieved. The enemy managed to concentrate large reserves in the Southwestern Front and offered fierce resistance.

By this time, Brusilov had finally lost hope for active military operations on the Northern and Western fronts. It was not possible to expect to achieve tangible strategic results using only one front. “Therefore,” the general later wrote, “I continued the fighting at the front no longer with the same intensity, trying to save people as much as possible, but only to the extent that turned out to be necessary to pin down as many enemy troops as possible, indirectly helping these our allies - the Italians and the French."

The fighting became protracted. By mid-September the front had stabilized. The offensive operation of the troops of the Southwestern Front, which lasted more than 100 days, has ended.

As a result of the operation, a significant part of the Austro-German armies opposing the Southwestern Front was defeated. The Austro-Germans lost up to 1.5 million people killed, wounded and prisoners. The losses of Russian troops amounted to 500 thousand people. The troops of the Southwestern Front advanced to a depth of 80 to 150 km. 25 thousand square meters were captured. km of territory, including all of Bukovina and part of Eastern Galicia. To eliminate the breakthrough, the enemy command was forced to withdraw 30 infantry and 35 cavalry divisions from the Western and Italian fronts. The Brusilov breakthrough had a decisive influence on the change in Romania's position. On August 4 (17), political and military conventions were signed between the Entente powers and Romania. Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Entente seriously complicated the position of the Central Powers. (However, according to some historians, it also fettered the actions of the Russians on the Southwestern Front. Soon the Romanian troops demanded urgent help from the allies.)

For the operation, the commander of the Southwestern Front, A. A. Brusilov, received the St. George weapon, decorated with diamonds.

The success of Brusilov's offensive did not bring, however, decisive strategic results. Brusilov blamed, first of all, the chief of staff of the headquarters, Alekseev, for the fact that the offensive of the Southwestern Front did not receive further development. “Just think that if in July the Western and Northern Fronts had attacked the Germans with all their might, they would certainly have been crushed, but they should have just followed the example and method of the Southwestern Front, and not on one section of each front,” – noted the general.

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Briefly speaking, this is one of the most curious episodes of Russian military history. And an important event In this article we will recall the main events associated with this heroic attack.

Brief background

The first two years of the war were not particularly successful for the Russian army.

The defeats forced the Russians to retreat for several months, resulting in the loss of a significant amount of imperial territory. By 1916, the enemy had advanced quite far to the east, occupying part of the territories that belong to Ukraine today. To rectify the situation and inflict a painful blow on the enemy, which would throw him west of the front line, the operation, which later received the name “Brusilovsky breakthrough,” was called upon. Briefly describing its course, paying attention to all significant events, is not so easy. However, let's try.

Brusilov breakthrough: summary

On the eve of this famous event, the entire enemy defense line was photographed from reconnaissance aircraft. This made it possible to put

specific tasks for each Russian regiment and battery. An important maneuver was covert command and control of troops and uniform training of troops. This ensured the surprise of the offensive along the entire front line for enemy commanders. To ensure successful attacks, all trenches were close to the edge of the enemy’s defense at a distance of up to a hundred steps. It was planned that the Russian army would begin its offensive on June 15 (the year was 1916). The Brusilov breakthrough actually began even earlier. The southwestern front, due to changes in the enemy camp, started artillery fire on June 4. The multiple false transfers of fire ensured the widespread success of Russian batteries and the constant advance of the infantry. And although the enemy had at his disposal quite strong positional fortifications made of reinforced concrete and wire barriers, which the Austro-Hungarian military leaders considered impregnable, the maneuvers used by the Russian army already quickly produced excellent results.

On the very first day of Brusilov’s offensive, in a number of sectors it was possible to capture some enemy positions. In the next two days the breakthrough was completely completed. As a result, more than 200 thousand enemy officers and soldiers were captured. Such a significant success of the armies of the South-Western dandy came as a complete surprise not only to the enemy, but also to the Russian supreme commanders. To further develop the success, it was necessary to urgently replenish the reserves of the front. However, there were no such reserves in stock.

The slowness of the command led to the fact that the regrouping of forces took place only in July 1916. And this significantly slowed down his further success.

Brusilov breakthrough: briefly about the results

As a result of the breakthrough, Russian troops defeated the Austro-Hungarian troops and managed to advance an average of 100 km into enemy territories. Now Brusilov’s armies occupied almost all of Volyn, Bukovina and a significant part of Galicia. An important result of this operation, as well as the battle of the Somme (Western Front), was that the strategic initiative in this war finally passed to the Entente states.

Brusilovsky breakthrough (Lutsk breakthrough, 4th Battle of Galicia) - front-line offensive operation of the South-Western Front of the Russian Army under the command of General A. A. Brusilov during the First World War, carried out May 22 - September 7 (old style), 1916, during which a heavy defeat was inflicted on the armies of Austria-Hungary and Germany and occupied Bukovina and Eastern Galicia. The largest battle of the First World War in terms of total losses.

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Subtitles

Brusilov's breakthrough June 4 - September 20, 1916 World War I In 1916, the Russians launched a summer offensive to help the French and British on the western front. After the Verdun massacre, the French needed immediate help, but the initial Russian efforts failed to divert German troops to the eastern front. General Alexei Brusilov developed a radical new plan that would avoid the loss of surprise. The armies under his command attacked. They had to attack along the entire front, 480 kilometers wide: from the Pripyat swamps to the Romanian border. So the Austro-Hungarian and German defenders could not concentrate their defenses or counterattack . The artillery bombardments were short and precise, rather than long, so that the enemy did not have time to bring up reserves or evacuate the trenches. Although all of Brusilov's ideas were initially ignored, serious defeats by Austria-Hungary forced the Italians to ask for a diversionary offensive. Brusilov's large-scale attack strategy was approved and the offensive began on June 4. Units of the Austro-Hungarian army were scattered along the entire front and were taken by surprise. Many sectors had defensive trenches, built in 5 lines, which were fully supplied, thereby giving the Austro-Hungarian army confidence in their defense. Russian bombardments, as predicted, took the Austro-Hungarian troops by surprise and the Russian troops advanced greatly inland, capturing many enemy soldiers who surrendered or tried to escape, as well as being well fortified. The offensive was also facilitated by innovations in Russian attack aircraft, which attacked weak points in the Austrian positions. This tactic was later used by Germany on the Western Front. South of the Pripyat swamps, the Russian Eighth Army captured the city of Lutsk within days, defeating the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army. Although the Austro-Hungarian army under the leadership of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was vastly superior to the Russians, the latter had the advantage of a successful bombardment, and they captured thousands of prisoners daily. On June 15, the situation for Austria-Hungary became critical, it was retreating. The Austrian commander Conrad von Hötzendorff turned for help to the German commander Eric von Falkenheim, who transferred 4 divisions from near Verdun. Conrad also removed divisions with weapons from the Trentino region (Italy) to correct the situation. Offensive ended in the fall, when Russian resources were exhausted, but it proved successful for Russia in the First World War: Russia gained the territories of the Central Powers and forced Germany to abandon their own offensive. The cost of the offensive was from 500 thousand to 1 million Russian soldiers: dead, wounded or missing persons Meanwhile, the Brusilov breakthrough became the worst crisis for the Austro-Hungarian Empire: Many Slavic units left the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russians captured many Austrian weapons and prisoners 1-1.8 million Austro-Hungarians were killed, wounded or captured , as well as another 350 thousand German losses.

Question about the name of the operation

An outstanding role in organizing the offensive of the Southwestern Front (Lutsk breakthrough) was played by Major General M.V. Khanzhin. In preparation for the operation, the commander of the Southwestern Front, General A. A. Brusilov, decided to make one breakthrough at the front of each of his four armies. Although this scattered the Russian forces, the enemy also lost the opportunity to timely transfer reserves to the direction of the main attack. The main attack of the Southwestern Front on Lutsk and further on Kovel was delivered by the strong right-flank 8th Army (commander General A.M. Kaledin), auxiliary attacks were carried out by the 11th Army (General V.V. Sakharov) on Brody, 7th (General D. G. Shcherbachev) - to Galich, 9th (General P. A. Lechitsky) - to Chernivtsi and Kolomyia. Army commanders were given freedom to choose breakthrough sites.

By the beginning of the offensive, the four armies of the Southwestern Front numbered 534 thousand bayonets and 60 thousand sabers, 1770 light and 168 heavy guns. Against them were four Austro-Hungarian armies and one German, with a total number of 448 thousand bayonets and 38 thousand sabers, 1301 light and 545 heavy guns.

In the directions of attacks of the Russian armies, superiority over the enemy was created in manpower (2 - 2.5 times) and in artillery (1.5 - 1.7 times). The offensive was preceded by thorough reconnaissance, training of troops, and the equipment of engineering bridgeheads, which brought the Russian positions closer to the Austrian ones.

In turn, on the southern flank of the Eastern Front against Brusilov’s armies, the Austro-German allies created a powerful, deeply echeloned defense. It consisted of 3 lanes, spaced 5 km or more from each other. The strongest was the first of 2 - 3 lines of trenches, with a total length of 1.5 - 2 km. Its basis was made up of support nodes, in the gaps there were continuous trenches, the approaches to which were shot from the flanks, and at all heights there were pillboxes. Cut-off positions went deeper from some nodes, so that even in the event of a breakthrough, the attackers ended up in a “bag”. The trenches had canopies, dugouts, shelters dug deep into the ground, with reinforced concrete vaults or ceilings made of logs and earth up to 2 m thick, capable of withstanding any shells. Concrete caps were installed for machine gunners. In front of the trenches there were wire barriers (2 - 3 stripes of 4 - 16 rows), in some areas current was passed through them, bombs were hung, and mines were laid. The two rear zones were less well equipped (1 - 2 lines of trenches). And between the stripes and lines of trenches, artificial obstacles were installed - abatis, wolf pits, slingshots.

The Austro-German command believed that the Russian armies could not break through such a defense without significant reinforcement, and therefore Brusilov’s offensive was a complete surprise to them.

...the main blow was intended for the Western Front, and Brusilov’s armies were only making a demonstration. The headquarters kept the secret well. There, in the direction of Vilna, large forces were assembled, artillery and technical means unprecedented in our country. For several months the troops prepared bridgeheads for the offensive. Finally, everything was ready, and the success of the southern armies, diverting the attention and reserves of the enemy, promised good luck for the western ones.

Circumstances preceding the start of the operation

The Entente managed to agree on the coordination of its actions on the European fronts. This coordination was required in order to take advantage of the Entente's advantage in terms of manpower. With timely coordinated strikes on all fronts, the Entente allies hoped to achieve simultaneous advantage in all strategic directions, break through the enemy’s defenses and, having defeated the Austro-German armed forces in a maneuver struggle, win a final victory in an overly protracted war. The general offensive was planned for the first half of summer - June - July. Moreover, everyone had to attack - the French, British and Belgians on the Western (French) Front, the Italians - on the Italian Front, the united group of allies - on the Thessaloniki Front and, finally, the Russians - on the Eastern (Russian) Front.

On May 11, 1916, the commander of the Southwestern Front, General A. A. Brusilov, received a telegram from General M. V. Alekseev, the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters, in which, on behalf of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Nicholas II, the question was raised about the possibility of an offensive in the near future due to the need pull back part of the enemy forces from the Italian front, where Italian troops suffered a severe defeat. A. A. Brusilov responded by announcing the readiness of all front armies for an offensive on May 19, provided that the Western Front under the command of A. E. Evert simultaneously launched an offensive in order to pin down the troops located against it. In a subsequent conversation via direct wire, M.V. Alekseev said that A.E. Evert would be able to launch an offensive only on June 1, while the date for the offensive of A.A. Brusilov’s armies was agreed upon - May 22.

On the evening of May 21, a few hours before the start of the planned artillery barrage, in a conversation over a direct wire, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief General M.V. Alekseev informed A.A. Brusilov that Supreme Commander-in-Chief Nicholas II wants to change the method of simultaneous fire prepared by A.A. Brusilov offensive on different sectors of the front and arrange only one strike sector, shifting the previously agreed date of the offensive by several days. A. A. Brusilov categorically refused and offered to replace himself. General M.V. Alekseev replied that Supreme Commander-in-Chief Nicholas II was already asleep, and he would tell him the contents of the conversation only on the morning of May 22. Thus, the pre-offensive artillery preparation began at dawn on May 22 (old style) 1916, even before Supreme Commander-in-Chief Nicholas II woke up. The presented conflict of opinions may be one of the reasons for the refusal of Emperor Nicholas II, which followed after the completion of the Brusilov breakthrough, to approve the proposal of the St. George Duma at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to award A. A. Brusilov with the Order of St. George, 2nd degree.

Balance of power

Progress of the operation

First stage

The greatest success at the first stage was achieved by the 8th Army of Cavalry General A. M. Kaledin, which, having broken through the front, occupied Lutsk on June 7, and by June 15 completely defeated the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. 45 thousand prisoners, 66 guns, and many other trophies were captured. Units of the 32nd Corps, operating south of Lutsk, took the city of Dubno. The breakthrough of Kaledin's army reached 80 km along the front and 65 in depth.

At the same time, the Western Front postponed the delivery of the main attack prescribed to it by Headquarters. With the consent of the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General M.V. Alekseev, General Evert postponed the date of the offensive of the Western Front until June 17. A private attack by the 1st Grenadier Corps on a wide sector of the front on June 15 was unsuccessful, and Evert began a new regrouping of forces, which is why the offensive of the Western Front was postponed to the beginning of July.

June 9 M.V. Alekseev gave a directive on the further offensive of the 8th Army from Lutsk towards the river. San with the aim of cutting off the Austro-Hungarian armies from the German Eastern Front. However, on June 10, Brusilov announced that he refused to carry out this directive, worried about the stretched right flank and fearing to break away from the Polar Front armies. Ultimately, long negotiations ended with Alekseev’s agreement to the preliminary occupation of the Kovel-Vladimir-Volynsk line. Such a directive to the armies was given to A.A. Brusilov on May 31, but already on June 15 he ordered the 8th Army to stop attacks again and only in the evening he ordered the offensive to continue, but only towards Kovel, and in the Vladimir-Volyn and Sokal directions to stop advancing and weaken the troops .

Giving the 8th Army more and more new directives - now of an offensive, now of a defensive nature, to develop an attack now on Kovel, now on Lvov - Brusilov lost the strategic initiative in the main direction of his front. Finally, the Headquarters decided on the direction of the main attack of the Southwestern Front and set a task for it: not to change the direction of the main attack to Lvov, but to continue to advance to the northwest, to Kovel, to meet Evert’s troops, aimed at Baranovichi and Brest. For these purposes, on June 25, two corps and the 3rd Army from the Western Front were transferred to Brusilov.

By June 25, relative calm had established in the center and on the right flank of the Southwestern Front, while on the left the 9th Army continued its successful offensive.

In July, the Russian Headquarters transferred the guard and strategic reserve of the Transbaikal Cossacks to the south, creating the Special Army of General V.M. Bezobrazov. The Southwestern Front was given the following tasks: the 3rd, Special and 8th armies must defeat the enemy group defending Kovel and take the city; The 11th Army advances on Brody and Lvov; The 7th Army - to Monastyriska, the 9th Army, which moved forward, turns north to Stanislav (Ivano-Frankivsk).

On July 28, the Southwestern Front launched a new offensive. After massive artillery barrage, the strike group (3rd, Special and 8th armies) launched a breakthrough. The enemy stubbornly resisted. Attacks gave way to counterattacks. The special army won a victory near the towns of Selets and Trysten, the 8th defeated the enemy at Koshev and took the town. Torchin. 17 thousand prisoners and 86 guns were captured. As a result of three days of fierce battles, the armies advanced 10 km and reached the Stokhod River not only in its lower, but also in its upper reaches. Ludendorff wrote: “The Eastern Front was going through difficult days.” But the attacks of the heavily fortified marshy defile on Stokhod ended in failure; they failed to break through the German defenses and take Kovel.

In the center of the Southwestern Front, the 11th and 7th Armies, with the support of the 9th Army (which hit the enemy in the flank and rear), defeated the Austro-German troops opposing them and broke through the front. To contain the Russian advance, the Austro-German command transferred everything it could to Galicia: even two Turkish divisions were transferred from the Thessaloniki Front. But, plugging the holes, the enemy introduced new formations into the battle separately, and they were beaten in turn. Unable to withstand the blow of the Russian armies, the Austro-Germans began to retreat. The 11th Army took Brody and, pursuing the enemy, reached the approaches to Lvov, the 7th Army captured the cities of Galich and Monastyriska. On the left flank of the front, the 9th Army of General P. A. Lechitsky achieved significant success, occupying Bukovina and taking Stanislav on August 11.

Attempts to continue the offensive in the Kovel direction continued in August and September. However, the offensive impulse of the Russian armies fizzled out due to the increased resistance of the Austro-German troops, as well as increased losses and fatigue of personnel. Brusilov threw troops into new senseless attacks, ignoring Headquarters’ proposals to move the direction south, to the area of ​​the 7th and 9th armies. This led to huge losses in parts of the Russian army. So almost the entire guard died in the Pripyat swamps. Military historian A. A. Kersnovsky called these battles the “Kovel Massacre” .

Results

As a result of the Brusilov breakthrough, the Southwestern Front defeated the Austro-Hungarian army, while the fronts advanced from 80 to 120 km deep into enemy territory. Brusilov's troops occupied almost all of Volyn, almost all of Bukovina and part of Galicia.

According to Russian data, Austria-Hungary and Germany lost more than 1.5 million killed, wounded and missing (killed and died from wounds - 300 thousand, prisoners more than 500 thousand), the Russians captured 581 guns, 1795 machine guns, 448 bomb throwers and mortars.

According to official German data, Austria-Hungary's losses amounted to 616 thousand killed, wounded, captured and missing (more than 327 thousand prisoners), German losses amounted to 148 thousand people, including about 20 thousand prisoners. The huge losses suffered by the Austro-Hungarian army undermined its combat effectiveness. It was the Southwestern Front that broke the Austrian military machine (from now on the Austrians will not be able to advance even in Italy without German support).

According to historian Anton Antonovich Kersnovsky, the losses of Austria-Hungary and Germany amounted to more than 1.2 million, of which about 420 thousand were prisoners. Russian losses amounted to up to 750 thousand, the total losses exceeded the original composition of the Southwestern Army.

Although the Germans ironically called the Brusilov breakthrough a broad reconnaissance without the concentration of the necessary fist, nevertheless, the blow dealt to the Austrians, and the state of the armies of these latter, as a consequence of the breakthrough, made a stunning impression on the Germans.

According to official Russian data, the troops of the Southwestern Front lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers killed, wounded and missing, of which 62 thousand were killed and died from wounds, 380 thousand were wounded and sick, 40 were missing in action. thousand.

According to German data, the losses of the troops of the Southwestern Front amounted to about 800 thousand people.

Another figure of 980,000 people lost by the armies of the general. A. A. Brusilova, was indicated by the French military representative at the Petrograd Conference in February 1917, General. N.-J. de Castelnau in a report to the French War Ministry dated February 25, 1917. Obviously, this is the official figure that was given to the French by Russian colleagues at the highest level - first of all, the acting Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General. V. I. Gurko.

To repel the Russian offensive, the Central Powers transferred 31 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions (more than 400 thousand bayonets and sabers) from the Western, Italian and Thessaloniki fronts, which eased the position of the Allies in the Battle of the Somme and saved the defeated Italian army from defeat. Under the influence of the Russian victory, Romania decided to enter the war on the side of the Entente.

The result of the Brusilov breakthrough and the operation on the Somme was the final transfer of strategic initiative from the Central Powers to the Entente. The Allies managed to achieve such interaction that for two months (July-August) Germany had to send its limited strategic reserves to both the Western and Eastern Fronts.

IN first part In the post we looked at why exactly A. A. Brusilov became the main hero of the First World War in Soviet historiography (well, modern Russian has simply inherited from the Soviet tradition of glorifying not the most outstanding of Russian military leaders, but who made the “right” choice in the troubled years of the Civil War) .
A in the second part, I propose to look into how “victorious” the so-called “Brusilovsky breakthrough” was and whether it was perceived as such by his contemporaries.

In the First World War, Russia generally had little to boast about. On those fronts where the Russian army opposed the German one, there were no significant successes at all.
Yes, sacrificing the armies of Samsonov and Renenkampf in the Masurian marshes of East Prussia in August-September 1914, Russia, fulfilling its “allied duty,” saved France from imminent defeat and thwarted the brilliant “Schlieffen Plan,” as a result of which Germany was never able to avoid what it feared most - a protracted war on two fronts.

Yes, in the same 1914, when the patriotic enthusiasm had not yet dried up, and the war was called the Second Patriotic War, the Russian army, acting against the Austro-Venus army, occupied a significant part of Galicia.

But everything changed decisively in 1915, when the troops of the Central Powers broke through the front line along its entire length and advanced quite deeply into Russian territory.
All!
Until the offensive operation of the Southwestern Front (“Brusilovsky breakthrough”), which began on June 4 and ended on October 27, 1916 (new style dates), and even after that, the Russian army no longer carried out any offensive operations.

Exception is, perhaps, only the successful actions of the Russian army in Transcaucasia against the Turks.
But, firstly, victories over the Turks had become so commonplace by this time that no one in Russian society perceived them as a serious success (well, yes, Kars and Ardahan were taken again, they were also taken in the lost Crimean War, so what? what's the point?). And secondly, the Russian armies in Transcaucasia were commanded by none other than N. N. Yudenich , unlike A.A. Brusilov, during the Civil War he made the “wrong” choice, and therefore is known not for his victories, but for the fact that he tried to “strangle revolutionary Petrograd.”

However, Let's return to the "Brusilovsky breakthrough".

Let's take a look at map of the offensive operation of the Southwestern Front in 1916:

Somehow it’s hard to believe that this offensive operation, as is now commonly believed, inflicted a “mortal wound” on Austria-Hungary and brought the Central Powers to the brink of defeat. To be convinced of this, just look at the general map of the First World War and the line of the Eastern Front as of the summer-autumn of 1916 (I won’t give it here, there are already a lot of maps).

About the losses of the parties

According to Brusilov's estimates , during the offensive operation he led enemy losses amounted toabout 2 million people (over 1.5 million killed and wounded and 450 thousand prisoners).

But these numbers are completely implausible , they were simply invented by the “victorious” general to justify the failure of his operation.
In fact, according to German and Austrian military statistics, which are still more trustworthy than the memoirs of a renegade general, for the period from the end of May 1916 to the end of the year in the offensive zone of the Russian armies of the Southwestern Front, the enemy lost about 850 thousand people , that is, almost two and a half times less than what the “victorious” general indicates.

So what? losses on the Russian side?
Brusilov “for some reason” is silent about them. And simply because they made up, according to the Headquarters, headed by Nicholas II himself, from 1.5 to 1.65 million people, that is, twice as many as the enemy lost!

About the reasons for the initial success

The so-called “Brusilovsky breakthrough” at the beginning of the operation really looked successful (after all, the Russian armies advanced 30 - 100 km along the entire width of the 450-kilometer front).
But why was this possible?
Yes, simply because Brusilov managed to assemble a group of troops in his sector of the front that was much larger in number. The Austro-Hungarian army, already inferior in its fighting qualities to the German one, was significantly weakened in this sector of the front due to the miscalculations of the Viennese strategists, who believed that after the “catastrophe of 1915” the Russians would not come to their senses for a long time and will be able to take any serious action. Therefore, the most combat-ready Austro-Hungarian units were transferred from Galicia to Italy, where an offensive was planned in the Trentino region.
Brusilov’s calculation was based on this.
But the victorious offensive of the Russian armies under the command of Brusilov continued exactly until the most combat-ready enemy units began to arrive from the Italian and French fronts. It was here that the entire offensive choked, moreover, in its own blood.

Failure? Yes, failure.

In fact, Brusilov himself admitted that his operation did not produce any strategic results. But, of course, this is not his fault. All the blame for the failure of the operation, in the opinion of the commander of the Southwestern Front, lies with Headquarters and the commanders of other fronts (Western and Northern), who did not support his efforts.
Yes, they had to weaken their fronts opposing the Germans, who were dangerously close to Petrograd, in order to help Brusilov in his adventure!
However, admitting the failure of his operation, Brusilov notes that "all of Russia rejoiced" , having learned about the successes of his armies.

"Rejoicing Russia"

Can you imagine a “jubilant Russia” at the end of 1916?
So I can’t.
In the fall of 1916, instead of victorious euphoria, which could not have happened, the army, the rear, and the entire Russian society were gripped by despondency and dissatisfaction with those in power.
November 1 (14), 1916 leader of the Cadet Party P. N. Milyukov delivered his famous speech from the rostrum of the State Duma, in which he announced the loss of society "belief that this power can lead us to victory" . Moreover, Miliukov actually openly charged the government with national treason. And this immediately after the “victorious Brusilov breakthrough,” which allegedly inflicted a “mortal wound” on Austria-Hungary and put Russia’s opponents on the brink of imminent and inevitable defeat?

Of course, there may be many complaints against Miliukov, including about his connections with British intelligence (and quite justified), but the British were in no way interested in the defeat of Russia, their ally, who for them played the role of "cannon fodder". And the leader of the cadets himself, not without reason nicknamed “Miliukov-Dardanelles,” dreamed of “war to the bitter end.”

Moreover, despite the fact that in this famous speech of Miliukov there was not a single evidence of betrayal on the part of the Russian government, it was quite consistent with the sentiments of the majority of the Russian public. He confirmed this in his memoirs V. V. Shulgin - one of the leaders of the monarchist faction: “Miliukov’s speech was rude, but strong. And most importantly, it completely corresponded to the mood of Russia.” .