Personnel composition and management of the General Staff in the period (1941-1945).
During the Great Patriotic War, the General Staff was the main worker body of the Supreme Commandment rate on strategic planning and management of the armed forces on the fronts. Chiefs of the General Staff were:
Shaposhnikov B.M. (August 1941 - May 1942),
Vasilevsky A.M. (June 1942 - February 1945),
Antonov A.I. (From February 1945).
The general headquarters were figuratively called the "brain of the army", and very high demands were always presented to the personality of his boss. The Head of the General Staff must have extensive military knowledge, analytical mind and extensive staff experience. For the acquisition of experience, many years are required. Therefore, staying in the post of chief of the General Staff for 8-10 years was considered a normal case.
Special place among all Soviet chiefs of the General Staff, Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov was held by Boris Mikhailovich, a personnel officer of the Tsarist Army, a perfectly educated person, who has served in the headquarters for a long time. Incomplete abilities and deep military-theoretical preparation received by Boris Mikhailovich at the Academy of General Staff, helped him to reach the rank of Colonel even in the royal army. From April 1918 his service began in the Red Army. Commander of the Moscow, Volga, Leningrad Military District; Head and Military Commissar of the MV Military Academy Frunze; Deputy People's Commissar of the Defense of the USSR - this is not the full all-service list of Shaposhnikova B.M., who received the title of Marshal Soviet Union in May 1940
He was deserved called the "Patriarch of the General Staff". The legendary General Staff - Boris Shaposhnikov - a major tactic and strategist, a military thinker - the creator of the Soviet school of the General stakeholders. Shaposhnikov B.M. There was a significant contribution to the theory and practice of the construction of the Armed Forces of the USSR, in their strengthening and improvement, in the preparation of military personnel. In 1923, he published a major scientific study of tactics and the organization of cavalry - "CONNITI", and in a year - the book "On Vistula", summarizing the combat experience of the First World and Civil Wars.
In 1927-1929 It comes out of his three-volume work "The Brain of the Army", dedicated to the work of the General Staff, the Economic and Political Affairs of War. In this fundamental work, Boris Mikhailovich defined the basic provisions on the nature of the future war, revealed the features of the leadership of the army in the war and gave a clear idea of \u200b\u200bthe role, functions and structure of the General Staff as the authority of the Supreme Command on the management of the armed forces. The emergence of labor "The Army's Brain" caused great interest, both among the command composition of the Red Army, and received a high marks on the pages of military press abroad. As the head of the General Staff of Shaposhnikov, purposefully sought to implement ideas expressed by him, consistently solving issues related to centralization in the leadership of the Armed Forces, fought for the implementation of a clear regulation of the staff at all levels.
Back in the late 1930s, Boris Mikhailovich, perfectly disassembling operational and strategic matters, became one of the main advisers of Stalin on military issues, being in 1937-1940. Head of the General Staff. However, a campaign plan with Finland, prepared by the General Staff, and the not only of the troops of the Leningrad Military District in the upcoming war, but also additional reserves, subjected to sharp criticism of Stalin, as the overestimate possibilities of the Finnish army. As a result, Shaposhnikov was filmed from the post of head of the General Staff, and the war started soon with the Finns showed that the General Staff was right. Thus, before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the general estabol was served by General Metskov K.A. And Zhukov G.K., who came to the highest army posts recently. Errors in their activities were the inevitable consequence of the lack of experience in leadership by troops across the country. At the same time, it is impossible to forget that the shadow of terror was obribimically hung over each top commander. Neither the shaposhnikov, nor the beetles and no one ever decide to argue with Stalin on fundamental issues, remembering the one that getting into the basement on Lubyanka is very easy.
According to Stalin I.V. On the first day of war, June 22, a group of responsible workers was sent to help the headquarters of the headquarters, including the headquarters of the General Staff of the General Army of Zhukov G.K., His First Deputy Lieutenant General Vatutina N.F., and also Marshal Shaposhnikova B.M. Since July 1941, Shaposhnikov - Head of the Western Direction Staff, then again - the head of the General Staff and a member of the VGK rate. Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov headed the General Headquarters of the Red Army in the most difficult period of the Great Patriotic War, from July 20, 1941 to May 11, 1942
In the General Staff Shaposhnikov B.M. I quickly spent a number of organizational events that improved the work of the VGK rate. General Staff under his leadership became the center of operational and strategic planning, a genuine organizer of the military actions of the Army and Fleet. Gradually, and far from immediately the general headquarters immediately - the most important management body - gained a role inherent in him, becoming workers (and in fact - intellectual) bodies.
The most important issues of strategic planning were discussed pre-at the rate in a narrow circle of persons - Stalin I.V., Shaposhnikov B.M., Zhukov G.K., Vasilevsky A.M., Kuznetsov N.G. Usually, first planned a fundamental solution, which was then considered by the Central Committee of the Party or GKO. Only after that, the General Staff began planning in detail and prepare a campaign or strategic operation. At this stage, the commander of the fronts and specialists were involved in strategic planning - the head of the rear Khrulev L.V., Commander of the Artillery of the Red Army of Voronov N.N., Commander of the Aviation Novikov L.A., Commander of the Armored Armor of Fedorenko Ya.N. other.
"Staff work," said Shaposhnikov more than once, it should help the commander to organize a fight; headquarters - the first body, with the help of which the commander is implementing its decisions ... In modern conditions, without a clearly incomplete headquarters, it is impossible to think about the good managing the troops. " Under the guidance of Boris Mikhailovich, the provision was developed, which was regulated by the work of frontal departments and managements of the General Staff, which significantly ensured the reliable execution of the tasks of the bet. Shaposhnikov paid primary attention to improving the strategic leadership by the troops, the establishment of uninterrupted management of them in all units, took energetic measures to improve the activities of front-line, armies and military headquarters.
With his immediate leadership, it was promptly tightening reserves from the depths of the country, clarifying the combat composition of the troops of the current army after the violent strikes of the enemy. In the current difficult situation of the first months of war, Boris Mikhailovich made a lot for the army and the country. With his direct participation, the plan of the Smolensky battle was developed, counteroffensions near Moscow, a number of most important operations during the battle for Leningrad, planning and preparation of the overall offensive in the winter of 1942. "The main severity of the leadership of the General Stabbed was on the shoulders of Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov. Despite severe illness, He managed to perform all necessary work In the General Staff and, moreover, not a small role played in the bet. The heart squeezed whenever we saw our boss: he was unusually attached, shook, but never complained. And his ability to maintain an excerpt, cavulusity is simply struck, "from the memories of the general of the army, Shtemenko S.M.
The man of great charm, a few, with an external restraint and the desire, keeps away from the political scene, Boris Mikhailovich treated with truly fatherly warmth to his young employees: "If we didn't get so, he did not scare, did not even raise the voice, but only asked With ukriznaya:
What are you, darling?
The word "dove" he had a favorite. Depending on the intonation and stress, it determined the position of the Marshal, "- recalled Shtemenko S.M.
"The deep knowledge and erudition of it in different fields of military are sometimes shocked. In my opinion, this often used the Supreme Commander. At the meetings at the rate, he, before making his conclusion on some question, offered to express Shaposhnikov. And the one Using his many years of experience in the General Staff, as a rule, put forward argued proposals, "wrote Admiral Kuznetsov N.G. Boris Mikhailovich possessed an amazing ability to memorize the details, the interlocutor had the impression that he knew the work of the classics of Military art Carl von Clausevitz "On War" - by heart. His great diligence and ability to work with people had a huge impact on the formation of personal staff workers. His politeness in relations with subordinates, modesty and large tact, as well as discipline and limiting validity, personal authority - all this brought up a sense of responsibility and high culture of behavior with him.
Shaposhnikov B.M. He enjoyed great respect I. Stalin. Vasilevsky A.V. I wrote so about this: "When my first trips were held together with Boris Mikhailovich to the Kremlin, the first meetings with the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and personally with Stalin, I had the opportunity to make sure that Shaposhnikov used special respect there. Stalin called him only By name and patronymic. Only he was alone to smoke in his office, and in a conversation he never increased his voice, if he did not share the point of view to the question under discussion. But this is a purely external side of their relationship. The main thing is that that the proposals of Shaposhnikov, always deeply thought out and deeply argued, as a rule, did not meet any particular objections. "
Stressful work by the head of the General Staff, frequent inappropriate - as a result of the extreme overwork at the end of November 1941, led to the disease Boris Mikhailovich, he had to interrupt work for almost two weeks. By mid-March, the General Staff completed all justifications and calculations on the plan of operations for the spring and the beginning of the summer of 1942. The main idea of \u200b\u200bthe plan: active strategic defense, accumulation of reserves, and then the transition to a decisive offensive. Boris Mikhailovich reported plan to the Supreme Commander, then the work on the plan continued. Stalin agreed with the proposals and findings of the head of the General Staff. At the same time, the Supreme Commander was envisaged on a number of areas of private offensive operations.
Although Shaposhnikov did not consider such a solution as optimal, but did not consider it possible to defend her opinion further. He was guided by the Rule: The Head of the General Staff has extensive information, but the Supreme Commander assesses the situation with higher, most authoritative positions. In particular, Stalin gave Tymoshenko to the development of an operation in order to defeat the Kharkiv grouping of the enemy in cash and the means of the south-west direction. Shaposhnikov, taking into account the riskiness of the offensive from the operational bag, which was the Barvenkovsky ledge for troops Southwestern frontintended for this operation, contributed to refrain from its implementation. However, his opinion was not taken into account. The offensive of the South-Western Front turned out to be unsuccessful. As a result, the situation, and the ratio of forces in the south changed sharply in favor of the Germans, and they changed exactly where the enemy outlined his summer offensive. This ensured him the success of a breakthrough to Stalingrad and the Caucasus.
Shaposhnikov B.M. He was sick, and hard work could not not affect his health - in the spring of 1942, his illness aggravated. Boris Mikhailovich appealed to the GKO with a request to translate it to another section of the work. The post of head of the General Staff Shaposhnikov changed his deputy - General of the Army Vasilevsky A.M. Boris Mikhailovich still remained deputy addict of defense, and from June 1943 - Head of the Higher Military Academy named after Voroshilov. On behalf of GKO led the development of new charters and instructions. In a short time, the Commission, which Shaposhnikov B.M. He headed, examined the projects of the new combat charter of infantry, field charter, combat charters of the delivery of troops. On March 26, 1945, not surviving 45 days before the victory, Shaposhnikov died.
Vasilevsky Alexander Mikhailovich was born on September 18, 1895 in the village of Novaya Golchik not far from Kineshma on the Volga in a large family of the Orthodox priest. Alexander Vasilevsky began his education in the Spiritual School in Kineshma, which ended in 1909, then continued to education in the spiritual seminary in Kostroma. Being a well-known Soviet warlord, Alexander Mikhailovich was forced to renounced parents from "classo alien elements" and long years did not even correspond with his father. Perhaps Alexander would be a priest, although he dreamed of becoming an agronomist, but the First World War began. "In his youth, it is very difficult to solve the task of which expensive to go. And in this sense, I always sympathize with those who choose the road. I, in the end, became a military. And I am grateful to fate that it came out exactly that way, and I think in life I was In place. But the passion for the land did not disappear. I think every person, one way or another, is experiencing this feeling. I love the smell of melt earth, green leaves and first grass ... ", - remembered Marshal Vasilevsky A.M.
Putting out the external exam for the fourth course of the seminary and submitting a petition to allow him to go to the front to him, he receives a direction to the Alekseev military school, which at that time was preparing accelerated issues. This School, created in 1864 in Lefortovo, was first called the Moscow Infantry Junker, and in 1906, by decree of Nikolai II, was renamed in honor of the birth of the heir to the throne. "By rank" it was considered the third - after Pavlovsky and Alexandrovsky, - and they studied in it mostly children of the differences. Four months later, a release was made at an accelerated course of military time. In the fall and in the winter of 1915, in dirt and cold, there were fights with the Austro-Hungarian army. They lived directly in the trenches: the dugouts were digging on two or three people, slept in the overcoats, underwing one sex and covered with another. By the spring, his company becomes the best in the shelf on discipline and combat capability. Two years on advanced, without holidays and a normal rest, in battles and campaigns there was a true nature of the warrior. During World War I, Alexander Vasilevsky commanded Rota, a battalion, he served until the title of headquarters. He had authority from progressive officers.
In the Red Army, Alexander Mikhailovich from May 1919 to November 1919 - Assistant commander of the platoon, commander of the company, for two months - the battalion commander: from January 1920 to April 1923 - Assistant commander of the regiment; By September - temporarily acting commander of the regiment, in December 1924 - Head of the Division School and May 1931 - the commander of the rifle regiment. From 1931 to 1936 Alexander Mikhailovich was a school of staff in the defense addict and the headquarters of the Volga Military District. In the autumn of 1936, Colonel Vasilevsky was sent to just that the Created Academy of General Staff. Uncommon ability allowed him to successfully complete the General Staff Academy and lead the department of operational training in the General Staff. Of the 137 comrades of Vasilevsky on the Academy - the best of the best, - the selection of which the Central Committee of the Party was specially selected, finished the Academy of only 30, the rest were repressed.
From October 4, 1937, Vasilevsky A.M. He began service at the General Staff, under the start of Shaposhnikova Boris Mikhailovich. A great life success for the future Marshal was a meeting with Shaposhnikov B.M., who possessed the richest erudition, excellently trained memory, worked, according to his own recognition, to exhaustion. Outstanding theoretical knowledge happily combined with his practical experience. Being a professional, Boris Mikhailovich did not like fearlessness, top skols, people of arrogant and narcissists. Employees in the General Staff invited only those who graduated with honors by the military academies. He conquered subordinate politeness, excerpt, respecting their opinions. By virtue of these reasons, the relatively small team of the General Staff as a whole successfully fulfilled its mission in the most difficult conditions of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. In addition, Shaposhnikov used rare trust I. Stalin, who highly appreciated the professional qualities of the largest General strategy.
Shaposhnikov presented Vasilevsky I.V. Stalin. His recommendation, multiplied by the talent and performance of Alexander Mikhailovich himself, sharply raised his authority in the eyes of the leader. After the bloody Soviet-Finnish war, Vasilevsky (according to the general instructions of Stalin) develops a draft of the new border and leads the commission for its implementation for two months - negotiates with the Finnish side. It was he who goes to Berlin as a military expert in the delegation of the chairman of the Sovnarkom V.M. Molotov for negotiations with Hitler and German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. Vasilevsky was the chief executor of the plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in case of aggression in the West and the East.
At the end of July 1941, Alexander Mikhailovich is appointed by the head of operational management and deputy chief of the General Staff. The first two months of war, he literally did not leave the General Staff, slept there, four to five hours a day. "A distinctive feature of Alexander Mikhailovich was always confidence in subordinate, deep respect for people, careful attitude towards their dignity. He subtly understood how difficult it was to maintain the organization and clarity in the critical situation of the beginning of the war unfavorable for us, and tried to rally the team, create such a worker The situation, when the pressure of power would not be felt at all, but only a strong shoulder of an older, more experienced comrade, for which, if necessary, can be reminiscent. For warmth, mentality, sincerity, we all paid him in the same way. Vasilevsky enjoyed the General Staff, not only the highest authority but also universal love, "I recalled the Vasilevsky S.M. Shtemenko ("General Staff during the war years").
Becoming the second for its role in the General Staff, Vasilevsky together with B.M. Shaposhnikov, replacing G.K. Zhukov at the post of head of the General Staff, daily, and sometimes several times a day, participated in the consideration of all important issues of hostilities, enhance the combat power of the Armed Forces. Alexander Mikhailovich, with the participation of the eight General strategists, prepared all the necessary information about the situation at the fronts, represented recommendations on the distribution of incoming forces and means for troops on the advanced, proposals for the permutation and nomination of military personnel. General Staff, most of the war was in Moscow on Kirov Street. The bomb shelter for the operative workers of the headquarters was the metro station "Kirovskaya". For passengers, she was closed - the train took place without stopping. The hall of the station from the rut was fenced off and was divided into work premises. Here, during an air alarm, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Politburo members who were in Moscow were descended. "The work of the bet was based in a special way. The Supreme Commander for the development of one or another operational-strategic decision or to consider other important problems of the armed struggle caused responsible persons who had a direct attitude to the question under consideration. There could be members and not members of the rate, but necessarily Members of the Politburo, industry leaders called from the front of the Commanders. All that was developed here with mutual consultations and discussions, immediately was issued in the front-rate directives. This form of work was effective, "Marshal Vasilevsky recalled A.M.
During the battle near Moscow, Alexander Mikhailovich became Lieutenant General, received the first easy wound, was closest to the commander of the front of Moscow Zhukov. At the most critical moments of defense, Vasilevsky softened, as the anger of the Supreme on Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev. According to the memories of KM Simonova "Alexander Mikhailovich combined the steady will and amazing sensitivity, delicacy and soulfulness." June 24, 1942, in the hardest time for the country and the Red Army, Alexander Mikhailovich became the head of the General Staff, and from October 15, 1942 - at the same time Deputy People's Commissar of the Defense of the USSR. He performed a huge amount of work chief of the General Staff and at the same time representative of the rates on the fronts. Military statistics were calculated that for 34 military months of finding the head of the General Staff Alexander Mikhailovich 22 months worked at the fronts, coordinating their actions in the most important strategic operations, and only 12 months in Moscow.
Zhukov GK So writes in his memoirs about Vasilevsky AM: "Alexander Mikhailovich was not mistaken in the assessment of the operational and strategic situation. Therefore, it was his I.V. Stalin sent to the responsible sections of the Soviet-German front as a representative of the rate. During the war in the whole The fullness turned on the talent of Vasilevsky as a large-scale military commanders and a deep military thinker. In cases where I.V. Stalin did not agree with the opinion of Alexander Mikhailovich, Vasilevsky knew how to convince the Supreme to convince Vasilevsky, that in this situation a different solution, which he offers , not to accept. " Front trips did not always end safely. On the day of the liberation of Sevastopol, Vasilevsky decided to see the city in glory. There were many cars on it. One after the other they were lucky soldiers and ammunition. I got to the mekenziev mountains. And suddenly under the wheels of the car - an explosion. They rushed for mine. There was a blow to such power that the engine was thrown to the side. Alexandra Mikhailovich wounded in his head.
Zhukov GK and Vasilevsky A.M. Preparing a plan for counteroffensive, surroundings and defeat the largest mirchite grouping near Stalingrad, and then successfully implemented it. On A.M. Vasilevsky bid placed coordination of the actions of all three fronts of the Stalingrad direction during counterattacking. With this mission, he, as a representative of the bet, will stay on the Stalingrad Front to the Great Victory on the Volga. However, after the end of the Stalingrad battle, the voltage in the activities of Vasilevsky did not fall. A.M. Vasilevsky continued to break between the leadership of the General Staff and business trips to the front. February 16, 1943 A.M. Vasilevsky was awarded the title of Marshal Soviet Union. On behalf of the bet, Alexander Mikhailovich coordinated the actions of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts in the Kursk battle. In the Kursk battle against Vasilevsky, the best military strategist of Wehrmacht fought - Field Marshal Manstein.
Then Vasilevsky A.M. He led the planning and conduct of operations on the liberation of Donbass, Northern Tavria, Krivorozhsky-Nikopolsky operation, operations to liberate the Crimea, the Belarusian operation. In the Operation "Bagration", he coordinated the actions of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic Fronts. For exemplary execution of tasks to leadership by these operations, Alexander Mikhailovich, July 29, 1944, was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union with the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the "Golden Star" medal. After the death of General I.D. From February 1945, Chernyakhovsky has commanded the 3rd Belarusian front in the East Prussian operation that ended with the famous Königsberg storm. For four days, from 6 to 9 April, the front troops mastered this "absolutely impregnable bastion of the German spirit." April 25, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, with the active participation of the Baltic Fleet, took the port and fortress Pillau - the last reference point of Germany in the Zemric Peninsula.
In July 1945 A.M. Vasilevsky was appointed commander-in-chief of Soviet troops in the Far East. In just 24 days, the Soviet and Mongolian troops were able to defeat the Million Kwantung Army in Manchuria. The second medal "Golden Star" Vasilevsky A.M. He was awarded on September 8, 1945 for the skillful leadership of the Soviet troops in the Far East during the war with Japan.
In relation to Stalin Vasilevsky A.M. It believed that he was a man "outstanding, with a sophisticated, controversial. For the situation on it, it was a special responsibility. This responsibility he was deeply realized. However, this does not mean that he did not make mistakes. At first, he clearly overestimated his strength And knowledge in the leadership of war, the main issues of the extremely complex front situation tried to solve it alone, which often led to an even greater complication of the situation and severe losses. " As a man of strong will, but with an extremely unbalanced and hard character, Stalin at that time serious failures at the front often went out of himself, tearing anger sometimes on people who were hard to blame. But it is necessary to frankly say: its mistakes made in the early years of the war, Stalin not only survived deeply, but also managed to make the right conclusions from them. Starting from the Stalingrad operation, his attitude to everyone who participated in the development of strategically important decisions has changed dramatically for the better. To Stalin argue, however, a few were solved. But he himself, listening to very hot spores, caught the truth and knew how to change it already seemed to decide. We must say straight: the bet was holding a hand on the pulse of war constantly.
In March 1946, Alexander Mikhailovich again headed the General Staff, in 1949-1953. Vasilevsky - Minister of Armed Forces of the USSR. In 1953-1956 He was the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, but on March 15, 1956 he was liberated from his office for a personal request, but already in August 1956 again appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for military science. In December 1957, he was "dismissed on illness with the right of wearing military uniform," and in January 1959 he was returned to the personnel of the Armed Forces and was appointed general inspector of the General Inspectors of the USSR MO (at December 5, 1977). Died by A.M. Vasilevsky on December 5, 1977. Vasilevsky A.M. was buried On Red Square in Moscow at the Kremlin Wall. As a farewell in life for today's youth, his words sound: "Young people I have to say about the main value in human life. Motherland is the main wealth. Appreciate and take care of this wealth. Think not about what you can give your homeland. Think about that you can give homeland. This is the main key to a good meaningful life. "
Alektemy Innokentievich Antomnov was born on September 15, 1896 in the city of Grodno, in the family of an officer of the 26th artillery brigade. The Antonov family was an ordinary family of a battery commander with a small income. In 1915, Alexey entered the University of St. Petersburg, but soon because of the material difficulties was forced to interrupt their studies and go to work at the plant.
In 1916, Alexei Antonov calls for the army and send to Pavlovsk military school. Upon completion of the course of the newly created ensign, they are appointed in the Life Guard.
By participating in battles in the fields of the First World War, the young officer A. Antonov was injured and awarded the Order of St. Anne IV degree with the inscription "for courage." After recovery, the soldiers elect him assistant regimental adjutant.
In May 1918, the ensign of Antonov was fired to the reserve. He studied at the evening courses of the Forest Institute, he worked in the food committee of Petrograd, and in April 1919 he was called in the Red Army. From now on, Alexey Innokentievich dedicated his whole life to the ministry of his homeland in the ranks of her armed forces. He began the service in the post of assistant headquarters of the 1st Moscow Working Division, fought on the southern front. After severe fighting in June 1919, the remnants of this division were transferred to the 15th Inzen Rifle Division. In this Division, A.I.ANTONOV served until August 1928, occupying various staff positions. For an active part in the forcing of Sivas, he was awarded the honorary weapon of the revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, and in 1923 he was awarded an honorary certificate.
In 1928, the young commander enters the Academy named after M.V. Fruneze, after which he was appointed by the head of the 46th Rifle Division headquarters in the city of Korosten. In 1933, he graduated from the Executive Faculty of the same Academy and again left for the previous position. In October 1934, A.I. Antonov became the head of the headquarters of the Mogilev-Yampol Stolongon, and in August 1935 - the head of the Operational Department of the Headquarters of the Kharkov Military District.
In October 1936, the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army opens. Among the first listeners of this school were A.M. Vasilevsky, L.A. Govorov, I.Kh. Bagramyan, N.F. Vatutin and A.I. Antonov.
At the end of the Academy in 1937, Alexey Innokentievich was appointed headquarters of the Moscow Military District.
At the end of 1938, A.I. Antonova prescribe a senior teacher, and after a while - Deputy Head of the Department total tactics War Academy named after M.V. Frunze. In February 1940, he was awarded the scientist of the associate professor, and in June of the same year, the military rank of Major General. In March 1941, A.I. Antonov was appointed deputy chief of the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District.
The Great began Patriotic War. In August 1941, Major General A.I. Antonov appointed headquarters of the South Front. By this time, the front troops were intense defensive battles. During these battles, the headquarters of the South Front was prepared and the Rostov offensive operation was held in November, as a result of which the 1st German tank army was defeated. Rostov-on-Don was liberated, and the enemy was discarded from this city by 60 - 80 kilometers. For successful actions in the Rostov operation A.I. Antonov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, he was awarded the Military rank of Lieutenant General. From July 1942, Alexey Innokentievich was consistently headed by the headquarters of the North Caucasian Front, the Black Sea group of troops and the Transcaucasian front. The troops of these fronts, showing exceptional resistance, stopped the enemy, not allowing him to master the Black Sea coast and break through in the Transcaucasus. For the flexible and skillful leadership of the troops, Lieutenant-General A.I.ANTONOV was awarded the second Order of the Red Banner. In December 1942, by order of the Supreme Command, Alexei Innokentievich is appointed by the first deputy chief of the General Staff and the head of operational management. From this time began active work A.I. Antonova in this supreme managing the Red Army.
Work in the General Staff is complex and multifaceted. Its functions included the collection and processing of operational-strategic information on the situation that addressed on the fronts, the preparation of operational settlements and proposals for the use of the Armed Forces, the direct development of plans for military campaigns and strategic operations on theaters of hostilities. Based on the Rate Decisions and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the General Staff prepared directives by the commander of fronts, fleets and types of armed forces and their headquarters, prepared orders of the People's Commissar of Defense, carried out control over their execution, followed the preparation of strategic reserves and their right use.
The general headquarters also entrusted the task of summarizing the advanced combat experience of associations, compounds and parts. The General Staff was developed by the most important provisions in the field of military theory, prepared proposals and applications for the production of military equipment and weapons. He was also responsible for coordinating the fighting of partisan formations with the compounds of the Red Army.
In January 1943, General A.I. Antonov as a representative of the bet was sent to Bryansk, and then to the Voronezh and Central Fronts. The Voronezh-Kastornian operation, during which Alexey Innokentievich was engaged in coordinating the actions of the troops, was successfully completed. The cities of Voronezh and Kursk were liberated. According to A.M. Vasilevsky Lieutenant General A.I. Antonov was awarded the Order of Suvorov I degree. At the end of this trip, Alexey Innokentyevich began to be at the rate several times a day. He thoroughly analyzed the information received from the front, he heard many generals and officers, coordinated the most important issues with the command of the fronts and reported suggestions by the Supreme Commander. In April 1943 A.I. Antonov is assigned to the military rank of Colonel-General, and in May he is exempt from the duties of the head of operational management, remaining the first deputy head of the General Staff.
The first large strategic operation, in the planning of which A.I. Antonov was directly involved, there was a Kursk battle. For the organization and preparation of this battle, he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War I degree. A preparing opponent with a powerful offensive in the Kursk arc, the Soviet Supreme Commander decided to oppose deeply echelonized, irresistible defense, exemplify the German troops, and then the counteroffensive to complete their defeat. As a result, the Red Army inflicted the enemy such a defeat, from which fascist Germany could no longer be reconciled. A solid foundation was created for wide offensive operations on the entire front for the purposes of complete expulsion of the enemy from the Soviet territory.
For a brilliantly planned and successfully carried out operation on a Kursk arc in August 1943, A.I.ANTONOVA was awarded the military rank of the army general. An important in the life of Alexei Innokentievich became the Belarusian operation. In the course of its preparation and fully revealed its outstanding organizational abilities and strategic dating. On May 20, 1944, the General submitted a plan for consideration by the plan of this operation, which received the code name "Bagration". A huge work was carried out on hidden concentration of troops and military equipment, measures for disinformation of the enemy. The beginning of the offensive was a complete surprise for the Hitler's troops.
As a result of powerful blows of four fronts, Soviet troops defeated the Army Group "Center", liberated Belarus, part of Lithuania and Latvia, entered into the territory of Poland and approached the borders of East Prussia, advanced by 550 - 600 kilometers and expanding the front of the offensive by more than 1000 kilometers. For the organization and carrying out this operation, Alexey Innokentievich again was awarded the Order of Suvorov I degree.
The Belarusian operation has further strengthened the business relationship of A.I. Antonova with the Supreme Commander. It is during this period that I.V. Stalin increasingly and more often instructs Alexey Innokentievich responsible tasks, carefully listens to him, especially on operational issues. Much more often, the Supreme Commander began to contact him and on numerous issues of relationship with the allies. Famous aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev wrote: "Antonov was very close to Stalin, who was considered with his opinion, fell to him clearly sympathy and confidence, held a long hours with him, discussed the situation on the fronts and planned future operations."
Commander of the troops who came to the bet before going to the Supreme Commander, went to A.I. Antonov and consulted with him on their plans and all issues of combat training. Representatives of the bet, sending their reports I.V. Stalin, certainly addressed their copy of "Comrade Antonov", knowing that the general would take on these reports everything necessary and on time.
In the second half of 1944 it became clear that it was A.I. Antonova will be entrusted to lead the group of Soviet military experts at the upcoming conference of the heads of three governments. The Crimean Conference began its work on February 4, 1945 with the discussion of military issues. The heads of governments of the USSR, the USA and the UK reviewed the situation on the European fronts. The report on the situation on the Soviet-German front was made by General Army A.I. Antonov. During the negotiations, it was charged to coordinate the actions of the allies strategic aviation. In February 1945, Alexey Innokentievich was awarded the Order of Lenin. Presenting it to this award, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky wrote: "General of the Army of Antonov A.I., being the first deputy head. General Staff, in fact, from the spring of 1943 he carries all the severity of the work of the beginning. General Staff at the bid of the Supreme Command and is completely coping with it. Excellent manages the work of the entire central device NPO. " After the death of I.D. Chernyakhovsky Commander of the 3rd Belarusian Front was appointed A.M. Vasilevsky, and A.I. Antonov became the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. At the same time, it was included in the BGK bet. The Berlin map and the regions adjacent to him appeared on the table from Alexei Innokentievich in the summer of 1944, during the period of the Belarusian operation. And on April 1, 1945, his report on the overall plan of the Berlin Operation was heard at the rate. For ten days, Soviet troops surrounded the Berlin grouping of the enemy and joined the Elbe River with allies troops. On May 8, 1945, Germany signed an act of unconditional surrender, and in a few days, Soviet troops defeated the grouping of the German-fascist army in Czechoslovakia. On June 4, 1945, "For the skillful fulfillment of the tasks of the Supreme Commander in conducting a large-scale combat operations" General of the Army A.I. Antonov was awarded the highest communal order of "victory".
In the first days of June 1945, the General Staff under the leadership of A.I. Antonova, together with A.M. Vasilevsky completed the development of the War Plan with Japan. At the Potsdam Conference, the general informed about this military representatives of the United States and Great Britain. August 7, I.V. Stalin and A.I. Antonov signed an order about the start of hostilities against Japan in the morning on August 9. In difficult conditions of this war theater, the Red Army inflicted a crushing blow to the Japanese armed forces. Soviet troops were completely liberated by Manchuria, Liaodan Peninsula, North Korea, south part Sakhalin Islands and Kuril Islands. Immediately at the end of the war in Europe, the General Staff was engaged in the development of a plan for demobilization of high-age warriors from the army and fleet and the fastest return of them home and involve the country's restoration activities. During 1945, all fronts and many army, hulls and individual parts were disbanded, the number of military schools was reduced. In March 1946, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky again joined the post of chief of the General Staff, and the army general A.I. Antonov became his first deputy. It was for him that he was all responsibility for the execution of the law on demobilization and a number of other organizational events.
During 1945-1948, more than 8 million people were demobilized, the personnel troops were organizationally reduced to the Military District. At the end of 1948, the General is appointed by the first deputy, and since 1950, the commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. Now at the heart of the life and activities of the troops were not fighting and battles, but combat training in peace times. It was required to deal with the preparation of commanders and headquarters of tactical and operational link, to study new military equipment and weapons. In the autumn of 1953 in the Transcaucasian Military District under the direction of the general of the army A.I. Antonov was held major maneuvers, on which the personnel showed exceptional physical endurance, moral exposure and military skills. In 1949, the NATO military-political unit was created. The so-called "Cold War" began. In response, on May 14, 1955, the Soviet Union and its allies signed an agreement on friendship, cooperation and military assistance in Warsaw. A year before the establishment of the organization of the Warsaw Agreement, General Army A.I. Antonov again was appointed First Deputy Head of the General Staff and a member of the collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense. And with the signing of the Agreement, he was elected by the Secretary General of the Political Advisory Committee and was appointed headquarters of the united armed forces. Being in this post, Alexey Innokentievich has time to develop issues of operational, organizational and military-scientific nature, conducting measures for technical equipment for troops, their combat and operational training. In a short time, the control apparatus for the armies of the countries of the Warsaw contract was established, the training of troops with joint actions in the modern war was organized. The tireless chief of the united armed forces personally participated in many teachings of the troops of the Allied countries, helping our friends and sharing their invaluable experience. Since 1946, for 16 years, A.I. Antonov was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. He often met with his voters, relative to their requests, suggestions and requests.
general Headquarters War of Patriotic
TASS-Dossier / Valery Korneev.
Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov was born on September 8, 1955 in the city of Kazan (Tatarskaya ASSR, now - Republic of Tatarstan), in the work family.
Enrolled in 1971 to the Kazan Suvorov Military School, graduated from 1973
In 1977 he graduated from the Kazan Higher Tank Team School. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR (now - the branch of the military training and scientific center of the land forces "The Community Academy of Armed Forces of the Russian Armed Forces of the Russian Federation", the VUNS "OVA of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation"), in 1987 - the Military Academy of Armored Forces. Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky in Moscow (in 1998, it was part of the VUNS SV "OVA of the Russian Armed Forces"), in 1997 - Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
In 1977-1984 He commanded the platoon, Rota, then a battalion in the 80th tank regiment of the 90th Guards Tank Division of the Northern Group of Troops, stationed in the Polish People's Republic (now - Republic of Poland).
In 1984-1987 - Head of the Staff of the battalion in the Far Eastern Military District.
In the period from 1987 to 1993. - Head of Staff - Deputy Commander of the Tank Regiment, hereinafter - the commander of the tank regiment, the head of the headquarters - Deputy Commander of the 144th Guards Motor Storeline Division in the Baltic Military District (Tallinn, now Estonia).
From 1993 to 1995 - the commander of the 144th division of the Guards Motorized Relocker Division in the North-Western Group of Troops. In 1994, he led the conclusion of the division to the Moscow Military District (Yeland, Smolensk Region), where it was transformed into the 4944 storage base of weapons and equipment (BHWT).
In the period from 1997 to 1998 He served as first deputy commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army in the Moscow Military District (Smolensk).
In 1998-2003 - Deputy Commander of the Army, Headquarters, First Deputy Commander of the Army, then the Commander of the 58th Commercial Army in the North Caucasus Military District.
From March 2003 to April 2005 - Head of Staff - First Deputy Commander of the Troops of the Far Eastern Military District (Khabarovsk).
In April 2005 - December 2006 - Head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training and Service of Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
From December 2006 to December 2007 - Head of Staff - First Deputy Commander of the North Caucasus Military District.
From December 11, 2007 to February 5, 2009 served as commander of the Leningrad Military District (headquarters in St. Petersburg).
In the period from February 5, 2009 to December 23, 2010 - Commander of the Moscow Military District. On December 23, 2010, he was appointed Deputy Head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, in this position he served on April 26, 2012 in 2009-2012. He commanded parades in honor of the Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. On Red Square in Moscow.
From November 9, 2012 on n. in. - Head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. Replaced the General Army of Nikolai Makarov at this post.
In November 2012, he entered the Security Council of the Russian Federation.
In 2014, in connection with the events in Ukraine included in the US sanctions lists (March 17), the EU (March 21), Switzerland (April 2) and Australia (June 19).
He was awarded orders "For the service of the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" III degree (2014), "For military merit", "For merits to the fatherland" IV degree, the Order of Honor, "For the service of the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" III degree, medals. Also awarded the Order of Friendship of Peoples (Belarus, 2010) and the Order of the Nicaragua Army (2013).
years of life: 5.5.1923-24.8.1991title assignment date: 25.3.1983
In the Warm Kombat, Pom. nach headquarters shelf; In 1979-84 1st Deputy Head of the General Staff, in 1984-88 Head of the General Staff, since 1988 Advisor M. S. Gorbachev. Offered his GCCP services; After his failure, she committed suicide in the Kremlin Cabinet, condemning the GCCP as a "adventure" suicide note.
years of life: 2.12.1897-21.9.1982
title assignment date: 11.3.1955
In the Second World War - Head of the headquarters of the fronts, commander; In 1943-45 com. 1st Baltic, from April 1945 - 3-Belarusian Front, Army General (1943). After the war, commander Pribvo (1946-54), deputy. Minister Defense, head of the rear (1958-68).
years of life: 27.6.1910-17.2.1984
title assignment date: 15.4.1968
In the Second World War - Nonfast Division, Comda, Comkor, Major General (1943); 1950-1953 - Nach. General Staff Air Force, 1963-78 - head of PVA.
years of life: 29.3.1899-23.12.1953
title assignment date: 9.7.1945; Lained 26.6.1953
People's Commissar of the USSR (1938-45), General Commissioner of the State Security (1941). The title of Marshal was assigned when replacing its own titles of GB in general. Minister of Internal Affairs (March-June 1953). 26.6.1953 Arrested. According to official data, a court of a special jurisprudence and is shot.
years of life: 21.8.1904-19.10.1964
title assignment date: 11.3.1955
In the Second World War - Head of the headquarters of Fronts, Commander, Colonel-General (1944). 1st deputy. Glavkom post. (1954-55), Head of the Air Defense (1955-62), the head of the RVSN (1962-63), the Head of the General Staff (1963-64). Died in a plane crash.
years of life: 1.12.1890-9.11.1938
title assignment date: 20.11.1935
In GW Promadarm, commanded armies and fronts in the Far East: the head of the Army of the Far Eastern Republic (1921-22), the main military adviser in China (1924-27), whom. Special Far Eastern Army (1929-38). After a collision with Japan on Lake Hassan, he was arrested on a denunciation and soon died in prison; Already posthumously "sentenced" to the death penalty. It is not known whether the title was delayed. Rehabilitated in 1956
years of life: 19.12.1906-10.11.1982
title assignment date: 7.5.1976
In the Second World War - Commissioner Shelf, Front, Major General (1944); In the 1950s. Navy political enforcement, in 1960-64 and 1977-82 - Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Sun; In 1964-82 - 1st ser., General Secreth. (1966) CPSS Central Committee. The title of Marshal got like chairman of the USSR Defense Council. Cavalier of the Order "Victory" (in 1989 decree canceled).
years of life: 25.4.1883-26.10.1973
title assignment date: 20.11.1935
In GW and after her - commander of the 1st equestrian army. Cavalry Inspector RKKKA (1924-37); Leaded cavalry with breaks up to 1954. Com. Moscow's troops in (1937-39), deputy. and 1st deputy. Commissar of Defense (1939-Saint. 1941). In the Second World War, he commanded fronts and armies, was a member of the bet, from 1942 translated into rear posts.
years of life: 11.6.1895-24.2.1975
title assignment date: 3.11.1947; deprived of title 11/26/1958
Party leader. In the hearty member of the Military Council of Fronts, Army General (1944). In 1947-49 - minister of Armed Forces of the USSR, in 1953-55 - Minister of Defense, in 1955-58 - Chairman of the CM of the USSR. Displaced N. S. Khrushchev and lowered in rank (Colonel-General retired).
years of life: 30.9.1895-5.12.1977
title assignment date: 16.2.1943
In 1942-45 head of the General Staff. Developed a lot of brilliant operations. In 1945, the commander of the 3rd Belarusian Front, then the Commander in War with Japan. In 1949-53 - Minister of Armed Forces and Military Minister of the USSR. Twice Cavalier Order Victory.
years of life:4.2.1881-2.12.1969
title assignment date: 20.11.1935
Professional revolutionary, Participant of Oct. revolutions, in the GW commander; In 1925-34 drug addiction, people's Defense (1934-40) USSR. A consistent supporter and apologue of Stalin, lost his confidence after the Finnish war. In the Second World War, he commanded fronts (until 1942), was a member of the TGK rate, then removed from the real leadership by the troops (the head of the partisan movement, 1942-43). After the war - Union Control Commission in Hungary. In 1953-60 before Presidium of the USSR Sun.
years of life:22.2.1897-19.3.1955
title assignment date: 18.6.1944
From 1942 to the end of the war - commander of the Leningrad Front. After the war, he commanded the air defense (1948-52, 1954-55). Cavalier of the Order "Victory".
years of life: 30. (according to other data 29.) 7.1900-29.7.1980
title assignment date: 6.5.1961
Before the war (1940-1941) - the head of the GRU, in the Second World War, Commander of the Bryansky and Voronezh Fronts, Colonel-General (1943); in 1958-62 - head of Glavpora.
years of life: 26.2.1910-13.5.1988
title assignment date: 28.10.1967
In the Second World War, commanded the Azov and Danube military fleets, Vice-Admiral (1944), in 1948-55 in the Black Sea Fleet. In 1956-85 the head of the Navy - Deputy. Minister of Defense of the USSR. Creator of the Ocean Fleet of the USSR, the author of the classical labor "Sea Power of the State" and other works.
years of life:17.10.1903-26.4.1976
title assignment date: 11.3.1955
In the Second World War - Commander of the Guards Army, Colonel-General (1943). GSC command of a group of troops in Germany (1953-57), Ground troops (1957-60), Warsaw Agreement ABS (1960-67), USSR Defense Minister (1967-76).
years of life: 25.10.1883-23.2.1939
title assignment date: 20.11.1935
In GW Promadarm and Complert. Com. By the troops of Belarusian in (1927-31), head of the headquarters of the RKKKA (1931-1937; from 1935 General Staff). Arrested in the summer of 1938, shot; It is not known whether the title was delayed. Rehabilitated in 1956
years of life: 14.10.1892-19.11.1970
title assignment date: 11.3.1955
In the Second World War, the fronts (including Western in 1941, Stalingrad in 1942), graduated from the war as the commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, the Army General (1943). After the war commanding Carpathian, West Siberian and North Caucasian IN.
years of life: 1.12.1896-18.6.1974
title assignment date: 18.1.1943
The largest commander of the Second World War. Head of the General Staff (1941), commander of the fronts, a member of the BGK bet, deputy commander-in-chief.In 1955-57 - Minister of Defense of the USSR. Twice Cavalier Order Victory.
years of life: 17.8.1898-31.1.1972
title assignment date: 8.5.1959
In the Second World War - Head of the Fronts Staff, Army General (29.5.1945). In 1953-57 the commander of Leningradsky V., then the troops in Germany (1957-60) and the Head of the General Staff (1960-63, 1964-71).
years of life: 22.8.1894-11.10.1967
title assignment date: 3.3.1955; From 25.5.1945 wearing the title of "Admiral Fleet", equivalent to the rank of church of the Soviet Union
In 1938-50 deputy. Commissar Navy; In 1941-43 and 1946-50. Chapters. Navy headquarters, then deputy. GSC commission NMF, deputy. Minister of Marine Fleet. Author of historical and fiction writings, editor of the sea atlas, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
years of life: 28.12.1897-21.5.1973
title assignment date: 20.2.1944
In the city commander of armies and fronts, Since 1944 - 1st Ukrainian front. In 1946-50 and 1955-56, the head of the land forces; In 1956-60, the head of the ABS of the Warsaw Agreement. Cavalier of the Order "Victory".
years of life: 21.12.1904-30.8.1976
title assignment date: 15.4.1968
In the Second World War - Comda, Comkor, Lieutenant-General (1944), had two combat gold stars. In 1957-65, the commander of Siberian, Kiev, in 1965-69 commander of the group of troops in Germany.
years of life: 29.4.1903-9.2.1972
title assignment date: 28.5.1962
In the Second World War - Commander, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel-General (1944); after the war - commander of Moscow V. (1960-63), Head of RVSN (1963-72).
years of life: 24.7.1904-6.12.1974
title assignment date:3.3.1955; 25.5.1945-3.2.1948 and 11.5.1953-3.3.1955 Wore the title of "Admiral Fleet", equal to the title of Marshal Soviet Union; 17.2.1956 Reduced to Vice Admiral; 26.7.1988 posthumously restored
In 1939-46 Narcar Navy, a member of the Supreme Command Rate: Played an extremely important role in the Second World War. In 1948, it was devoted to the court on a fabricated charge and translated into the Pacific Fleet. In 1953 Naval Minister, in 1953-56 head of the Navy. From 1956 again in the opal.
years of life: 11.11.1890-24. (according to other data 29.) 8.1950
title assignment date: 7.5.1940; deprived of title 19.2.1942; posthumously restored 28.9.1957
In GW, the head of artillery 1st equestrian, in 1937-41 head (main) Artillery Department of the Red Army. Then commanded front and armies; For the absence of Defense Kerch devoted to the court, he was lowered to the gen. Major, excluded from the party and deprived of awards. After the war he served in Volga in; Arrested with a number of generals in 1947 and shot. Rehabilitated in 1956
years of life: 5.7.1921-28.5.2013
title assignment date: 14.1.1977
In the Great Patriotic War - Head of the Tank Brigade headquarters, 1969-71 - Commander Troops in Germany; 1971-77 - Head of the General Staff; 1977-89 - head of ABS of the Warsaw Treaty.
years of life: 13.2.1917-16.9.1990
title assignment date: 25.3.1983
In the Warm Tank Combat and Combridge; In 1968-71 com. Clically, in 1971-72 Commander of the group of troops in Germany. In 1972-88 head of Rear Sun USSR.
years of life: 23.11.1898-31.3.1967
title assignment date: 10.9.1944
In the city commanding armies 2nd Ukrainian front. In 1957-67, the USSR Defense Minister. Cavalier of the Order "Victory".
years of life: 7.6.1897-30.12.1968
title assignment date: 26.10.1944
In Finnish war, took the Vyborg; One of the three of the first Soviet army generals (1940). In 1940-January 1941, the Head of the General Staff, in June-September 1941 in conclusion; After the liberation commanded the Volkhov Front (1941-1944, with a break). From February 1944 to the end of the Second World War commander of the Karelian Front, Then the 1st Far Eastern Front against Japan. Cavalier of the Order "Victory".
years of life: 11.5.1902-17.6.1985
title assignment date: 11.3.1955
In the Great Patriotic War and the first years after her - commander, Colonel-General (1943). In 1953-60 Moscow commander. In 1960-62, the head of the RVSN, in 1962-83 the main inspector of the USSR MO.
years of life: 30.10.1917-23.1.1994
title assignment date: 14.1.1977
In the Second World War Division Engineer. C 1968 In the General Staff of the USSR, in 1977-84 head of the General Staff - 1st Deputy Minister of Defense.
years of life: 15.1.1917-1.2.2014
title assignment date: 25.3.1983
In Kombat, in 1972-76, the Commander of Dalvo, in 1980-85 head of Land Forces.
years of life: 21.12.1896-3.8.1968
title assignment date: 29.6.1944
In 1937-40 was in conclusion. In the Securities Commander Fronts, the participant of Stalingrad and Kursk battles. In 1944. com. 1m, then 2nd Belarusian front. In 1949-56 in the Polish army; He had the title of Marshal Poland, was the Minister of Nats. Poland defense. Cavalier of the Order "Victory".
years of life: 1.7.1911-31.8.2012
title assignment date: 17.2.1978
In the world com. Front troop troops, Colonel (1943); In 1965-84 the commander of Leningradsky V., in 1967-84 1st Deputy Minister of Defense, in 1984-87 the USSR Defense Minister; Having lost position after the scandalous landing of the aircraft M. Rust in the center of Moscow. The oldest of the now living marshals, the cavalier of the Russian Order of Zhukov.
years of life: 21.7.1897-10.5.1968
title assignment date: 3.7.1946
In the Second World War - Head of the headquarters of the fronts, which commanded Zhukov, Army General (1943). After the war - commander Troops in Germany (1946-49), Head of the General Staff (1952-60).
In 1941, the General Headquarters of the Red Army headed by G.K. Zhukov conducted her work in parallel in several directions.
Events continued to strengthen RKKK, the increase in its combat power, primarily due to the receipt of new samples of weapons and military equipment into the troops.
Tanks. In this regard, much attention was paid to the creation of major formations of tank troops and equipping them with new combat equipment. After the February Conference of the WCP (b) of 1941, the case on the creation of large tank compounds went faster. New mechanized corps began to deploy. For their weapons in the first half of the same year, 1500 tanks of new designs were made. All of them entered the troops, but due to the lack of time they were not as required. The human factor also played a considerable role - many military officers were not solved to launch new samples of tanks in intensive operation without a team over, and such a team did not receive.
Artillery. By the beginning of the war, the leadership of artillery was carried out by the main artillery department of the Red Army, which was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Sandpiper. His deputy was Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov. On June 14, 1941, Colonel-General of Artillery ND Colonel-General was appointed Head Yakovlev. Directly in the troops there were chiefs of artillery of the districts, armies, buildings, divisions. Military artillery was divided into a regimental, divisional and corps. The RCG artillery was also escaped, which consisted of cannon and warm regiments, individual high-power divisions and anti-tank artillery brigades. In the cannon artillery shelf there were 48,122-mm cannons and 152 mm of warm guns, in a cannon shelf of high power - 24 152-mm guns. The Gaubic Artillery Regiment had 48,12-mm Gaubitz, and a high-power Gabichic regiment - 24,152-mm warmness. In armament of individual high-power divisions, there were five 210 mm guns, or 280-mm Mortira, or 305-mm warm.
Characteristics of the staffing of mechanized buildings of Western border military districts on June 22, 1941By June 1941, experienced samples of reactive mortar plants, future Katyush were manufactured. But their mass production has not yet been established. There were also no specialists who could effectively manage this new weapon.
With anti-tank artillery in the Red Army there was a large lag. Only in April 1941, the Soviet command launched the formation of artillery brigades of the RGC. On staff in each brigade there was no 120 anti-tank guns and 4800 anti-tank mines.
Cavalry. Despite the addiction to the cavalry of individual Soviet military leaders, its share in the structure of the ground forces to the beginning of the war declined noticeably, and it was only 5% of their total numbers. The cavalry institute consisted of 13 divisions, eight of which were part of four cavalry buildings. In the cavalry division there were four cavalry and one tank regiment (almost 7.5 thousand personnel, 64 tanks, 18 armored vehicles, 132 guns and mortars). If necessary, the cavalry division could fight hastily, as a common handicap.
Engineering troops. The main engineering department was engaged in engineering services, which until March 12, 1941 was led by Major General of Engineering Forces A.F. Khrenov, and from March 20 - Major General of Engineering Forces L.Z. Kotlyar. Engineering parts were deployed in the troops, but their technical support was very weak. Basically, the calculation was made on the shovel, ax and remedial building materials. The sappers were almost not engaged in the mining and demining of the location in peacetime. Since 1940, in almost 1940, almost all engineering parts of the border military districts were constantly involved in the construction of fortified areas at the new border of the USSR and combat training were not engaged.
Communication. All issues of strategic communications and supply of troops with associations were assigned to the Office of the Red Army's Communications, which since July 1940 was headed by Major General N.I. Hapic. By that time, front-line, army, cabinet and divisional kits, but not all of them were sufficient to be developed and entered into troops. In addition, many commanders did not trust radio communications, and also did not know how to use it from the point of view of secure management.
Air defense. To solve the objectives of the anti-air defense, a strategic scale in 1940, the main management of the Cart Air Force was created. His chief was initially Lieutenant D.T. Kozlov, and from March 19, 1941 - Colonel-General G.M. Stern. On June 14, 1941, Colonel-General Artillery N.N. was appointed for this post. Voronov.
To solve the defense tasks, the entire territory of the USSR was divided into air defense zones in accordance with the borders of military districts. Zones were headed by the assistants of commander of the Civil Conducts. To solve specific tasks in submission of the Main Directorate of Air Defense Forces Countries, there were anti-aircraft artillery forces, searchlights, aeright parts, as well as fighter aviation compounds.
To solve the challenges of air defense, 39 shelves of fighter aviation were allocated, which remained organizationally in subordination of commander of the District Air Force. In this regard, the assistant commander of the military district on air defense, in whose subordination was part of the anti-aircraft artillery, all the questions of the use of aviation for the air defense targets should be coordinated with the Commander of the Air Force.
The military air defense air defense was equipped with anti-aircraft guns and machine guns, but there were few rifle and tank joints, and in practice they could not provide a reliable cover of the entire concentration area of \u200b\u200btroops.
Aviation.Aviation was equipped mainly by airplanes outdated structures. New combat vehicles were very small. So, armored attack aircraft design A.S. Ilyushina IL-2, created in 1939, began to come to the troops only in 1941. Fighter Design A.S. Yakovleva Yak-1, adopted for mass production in 1940, began to flow into the troops also in 1941.
The head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Air Force from April 1941 was Lieutenant General P.F. Zhigarev, who from November 1937 to September 1938 commanded the group of Soviet pilots, "Volunteers" in China.
Flight and technical and combat characteristics of Soviet aircraftThen, as a result of mass cleansing among the highest commanders of the Air Force, he made a fast career and in December 1940 became the first deputy commander of the RKKA Air Force.
There was an increase in the total number of personnel of the Red Army. On June 22, 5 million people were already under the gun as part of the Armed Forces of the USSR. From this number, the land forces was 80.6%, air force - 8.6%, the navy - 7.3%, air defense troops - 3.3%. In addition, numerous reserves were prepared. At the same time, the level of specialization of reservists was not very high. They proceeded from the fact that only in collective farms work more than 1.4 million tractorists and drivers of cars, which could be quickly transplanting to combat cars if necessary. Throughout the country in the system of Osoaviahima, pilots, radists, parachutists, infantry shooters were prepared.
Intelligence of the likely enemy. Barely entered into a new position, G.K. Zhukov called the head of the intelligence department of Lieutenant General F.I. Golikova. That arrived exactly at the appointed time and entered the office of the Chief of the General Staff with a large folder in his hands. Well-posed voice began to confidently report ...
In recent months, before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet intelligence worked quite actively. On January 12, 1941, in an intelligence summary No. 2 of the border troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, it was reported that on December 9, the district of the city of Sanok visited the Commander-in-Chief of the German Land Army General Field Marshal Walter von Braukich, who made a review of troops and fortifications in this area. In the same summary, the arrival of new German units was reported to the cross-border strip, the construction of a barracks for personnel, concrete firepoints, loading and unloading sites on railway and airfields.
Following this, frequent cases of violation of the Germans of the State Border of the USSR are noted. Thus, the head of the border troops of the NKVD BSSR on January 24, 1941 in his report also announces the deployment of the Army's headquarters in Warsaw, and the headquarters of the Army Corps, the eight headquarters of infantry and one cavalry divisions, 28 infantry, seven artillery, three cavalry and One tank regiments, two aviation schools.
F. I. Golikov - Head of the RKKK intelligence departmentIt was reported below: "From the moment of conclusion of the Convention on January 1, 1941, 187 different conflicts and incidents arose on the border with Germany ... For the reporting period, 87 cases of disruption of the border with German aircraft were recorded ... Three German aircraft after the flight across the border were landed ... which were subsequently released to Germany.
One German plane March 17, 1940 at the section of the 10th Option of the August border detachment as a result of the use of weapons was shot down. "
In connection with the need to maximize the agent-operational work of state security bodies and the increased volume of this work, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on February 3, 1941 adopts a special decision on the Drug Advisor of the USSR internal affairs on two addicts: People's Commissariat of Interior (NKVD) and People's Commissariat Commissariat of State Security (NKGB). The NKGB assumes the tasks of conducting intelligence work abroad and the struggle against the subversive, spyware, sabotage, terrorist activities of foreign intelligence within the USSR. It is also entrusted to lead to the operational development and elimination of remnants of all kinds of anti-Soviet parties and counter-revolutionary formations among various sectors of the USSR population, in the system of industry, transport, communications, agriculture, etc., as well as to protect the leaders of the party and government. The organization of republican, regional, regional and district bodies of the NKGB and NKVD was prescribed to the same resolution.
On February 8, 1941, the following decree of the Central Committee of the CSP (b) and SCS of the USSR on the transfer of a special department from the NKVD of the USSR to maintain the People's Commissariat of the Defense of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of the USSR NCM. "To entrust the Special Departments of the NGO and NKVMF (third management) of the task: to combat counter-revolution, espionage, sabotage, sabotage and all kinds of anti-Soviet manifestations in the Red Army and Navy; Identification and informing of the People's Commissar of Defense and the People's Commissar of the Navy on all the shortcomings and the state of the parts of the army and the fleet and on all available compromising materials and information on military personnel of the Army and Fleet. "
The same document was determined that "all the appointments of the operational composition of the third organizations of the NGO and NKVMF, starting with the Opera Compact Regiment and the unity in the fleet corresponding to it, are made by the orders of the People's Commissars of the Defense and Navy." So in the structure of the Red Army and the Navy, powerful punitive organs, possessing huge powers and not accountable commander and commanders of the formations under which they acted. It was determined that the head of the 3rd corps department is subject to the head of the 3rd district department (front) and the commander of the district (front), and the head of the 3rd division branch is the head of the 3rd branch of the corps and the commander of the case.
On February 7, 1941, the 2nd office of the NKGB of the USSR reported the propagating rumors among the diplomatic corps in Moscow about the preparing attack of Germany in the USSR. It was stated that the purpose of the German attack was the southern regions of the USSR, rich in bread, coal and oil.
Around 8 of February, the same information was confirmed by the Agent of the Berlin Residency of the NKGB of the USSR "Corsican", and on March 9, 1941, a telegraph report from the military attache to the head of the reconnaissance department of the General Staff of the Red Army, from Belgrade. It has been reported that "the German General Staff refused to attack the English islands, the nearest task was delivered - the seizure of Ukraine and Baku, which should be carried out in April-May of the current year, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are now prepared for this.
In March 1941, two more secret messages were received from Berlin from the Corsican Nickname agent. The first reported on the preparation of German Air Force to military actions against the USSR.
In the second, once again confirmed about the plans of Germany regarding the war against the USSR. In this case, it was stated that the main purpose of the aggressor could be bread in Ukraine and oil areas Baku. The head of the General Staff of the Ground Forces of Germany General F. Galder about the low combat capability of the Red Army was also applied. Both of these messages were reported by I.V. Stalina, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria.
On March 24, 1941, a message was received by the Berlin Residency of the USSR NKGB on the preparation of the General Staff of Aviation to military actions against the USSR. And in this document emphasizes that "the photographs of the Soviet cities and other facilities, in particular the city of Kiev, regularly enter aviation headquarters.
Among the officers of the aviation headquarters there is an opinion that a military performance against the USSR is allegedly timed at the end of April or the beginning of May. These terms are associated with the intention of the Germans to preserve the harvest for themselves, hoping that the Soviet troops during the retreat would not be able to set fire to the green bread. "
On March 31, 1941, the head of foreign exploration of the USSR NKGB reported by the People's Commissar of the USSR Defense on the promotion of German troops to the border of the Soviet Union. It was said about the transition of specific compounds and parts of the German army. In particular, he reported that "in the border points of the Governor-General against the Brest Region, the German authorities were invited to free all schools and additionally prepare premises for the arrival of the expected military units of the German army."
In early April 1941, the head of the foreign exploration of the NKGB of the USSR told the higher authorities that, according to his task, in Berlin, an agent named "Starshina" met with another agent named "Corsican". At the same time, "Starshina", referring to other sources, reported on the full preparation and development of the German attack plan to the Soviet Union. According to information, "the operational plan of the army consists in a lightning sudden strike to Ukraine and move to the East. From East Prussia is simultaneously applied to the north. The German troops, moving in the northern direction, must be connected to the army coming from the south, they cut off the Soviet troops, which are between these lines, whiching their flanks. Centers remain without attention following the example of Polish and French campaigns. "
S. K. Tymoshenko and G. K. Zhukov on the exercises (spring 1941)On April 5, 1941, the Office of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR reports the construction of the Germans of airfields and landing sites in the strips border with the USSR. From the summer of 1940 to May 1941, 100 airfields and 50 landing sites were built on the territory of Poland. Directly on the territory of Germany itself during this time, 250 airfields and 150 landing sites were built.
On April 10, the head of foreign exploration of the NKGB of the USSR reports to the intelligence management of the Red Army, specific data on the concentration of German troops on the Soviet border and the transfer of new compounds and parts there. At the same time, the plans of German aggression against the USSR reports the Agent of the Berlin Residency "YUNA".
April 21, 1941 in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and NGO of the USSR received the next message of the NKVD of the USSR signed by the People's Commissar of the internal affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria on obtaining new reconnaissance data on the concentration of German troops on the Soviet-German border by the border units of the NKVD.
At the end of April 1941, a regular message was received from the agent who worked in Germany under the name "Starshit" from Berlin under the name "
"A source operating at the headquarters of the German army reports:
1. According to information received from the Communications officer between the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the headum of the German Aviation Gregor, the question of the performance of Germany against the Soviet Union was finally decided, and began to be expected from day to day. Ribbentrop, who has not yet been a supporter of the speeches against the USSR, knowing the firm determination of Hitler in this matter, took the position of supporters of the attack on the USSR.
2. According to information obtained at the headquarters of aviation, the last days Activities in collaboration between the German and Finnish general headquarters, expressed in the joint development of operational plans against the USSR ...
The reports of the German Aviation Commission, who visited the USSR, and the Air Attachment in Moscow, Ashbrenner produced an oppressive impression at the aviation headquarters. However, they are counting on the fact that, although Soviet aviation is able to inflict a serious blow to German territory, nevertheless the German army will quickly reduce the resistance of the Soviet troops, reaching the reference points of Soviet aviation and paralyzing them.
3. According to the information received from the Labrandt, which is a referent in Russian cases with a foreign policy department, the message of Gregor is confirmed that the question of a speech against the Soviet Union is considered solved. "
In order to this report it is indicated that it was reported by I.V. Stalina, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Berii Chief of the 1st Department of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin on April 30, 1941, but resolutions none of the named persons on the document is contained.
On the same day, April 30, 1941, a disturbing message from Warsaw was received. It was indicated: "In the agent data received from different sources, in recent days it has been established that military preparations in Warsaw and on the territory of the Governor's General are open and about the upcoming war between Germany and the Soviet Union German officers and soldiers speak completely frankly as The case is already resolved. War allegedly should begin after the end of spring field works ...
From April 10 to April 20, the German troops moved through Warsaw to the East continuously, both during the night and during the day ... on the railways in the eastern direction there are compounds, loaded mainly by heavy artillery, cargo machines and parts of aircraft. From mid-April, the streets of Warsaw appeared in large numbers of trucks and cars of the Red Cross.
The German authorities in Warsaw are given a disposal to bring urgently in order all bomb shelters, darken all windows, create in every house the sanitary squads of the Red Cross. Mobilized and selected for the army all cars of individuals and civilian institutions, including German. Since the beginning of April, all schools and courses are closed, and their premises are busy under the military hospitals. "
This message was also reported by I.V. Stalina, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria.
On May 6, 1941, the head of the intelligence department of the General Staff of the Red Army F.I. Golikov made a special message "On the grouping of German troops in the East and Southeast on May 5, 1941." In this message, it was directly indicated in many paragraphs on the preparation of Germany to war against the USSR. In the conclusions it was said: "For two months, the number of German divisions in the cross-border zone against the USSR increased by 37 divisions (from 70 to 107). Of these, the number of tank divisions has increased from 6 to 12 divisions. With the Romanian and Hungarian armies, this will be about 130 divisions. "
On May 30, 1941, the Chief of Intelligence Department of the Red Army, the telegraph report from Tokyo was received. It reported:
"Berlin informs his father that the German speech against the USSR will begin in the second half of June. From 95% confident that the war will begin. Indirect evidence that I see for this currently these:
The Technical Department of the German Air Force in my city received instructions to return soon. OTT demanded that he did not send any important messages across the USSR. Transport rubber through the USSR is reduced to a minimum.
Causes for the German speech: The existence of a powerful red army does not allow Germany to expand the war in Africa, because Germany should keep a large army in Eastern Europe. In order to eliminate all the danger from the USSR, the Red Army must be removed possible rather. So stated Ott. "
Under the message stood a signature: "Ramzay (Zorge)." But on this message, the resolution of someone from the leaders of the Soviet state is absent.
May 31, 1941 on the Table of Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of Arch Republic of Kiev Zhukov was a special message of the reconnaissance department of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 660569 of the following content:
During the second half of May, the main German command at the expense of the forces released in the Balkans produced:
1. Restoration of the Western group to combat England.
2. Increased forces against the USSR.
3. Focusing reserves of the chief command.
The total distribution of the German Armed Forces is as follows:
- against England (on all fronts) - 122-126 divisions;
- against the USSR - 120-122 divisions;
- Reserve - 44-48 divisions.
Specific distribution of German forces against England:
- in the West - 75-80 divisions;
- In Norway - 17 divisions, of which 6 are located in the northern part of Norway and can be used against the USSR ...
Distribution in the directions of German forces against the USSR Next:
a) in East Prussia - 23-24 divisions, including 18-19 infantry, 3 motorized, 2 tank and 7 cavalry regiments;
b) in the Warsaw direction against the recovery - 30 divisions, including 24 infantry, 4 tanks, one motorized, one cavalry and 8 cavalry regiments;
c) in the Lublin-Krakow district against cork - 35-36 divisions, including 24-25 infantry, 6 tank, 5 motorized and 5 cavalry regiments;
d) in Slovakia (zbrov area, prests, virtsov) - 5 mining divisions;
e) in the Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;
e) in Moldova and Northern Dobrudzha - 17 divisions, including 10 infantry, 4 motorized, one mountain and two tank divisions;
g) in the Danzig region, Poznan, Thorn - 6 infantry divisions and one cavalry regiment.
The reserves of the chief command are concentrated:
a) in the center of the country - 16-17 divisions;
b) in the Breslau region, Moravska-Ostrava, Kattatovice - 6-8 divisions;
c) in the center of Romania (Bucharest and west of him) - 11 divisions ... "
This document includes: "Reading Zhukov 11.6.41."
On June 2, the concentration of large formations of the German and Romanian armies on the border from the USSR in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comes certificates from the Deputy People's Commissar of the Interior of Ukraine and the Commissioner CPP (b) and the USSR SCA in Moldova. Then, the reference of the Deputy Complex of the Interior of Ukraine on Germany's military events on the border from the USSR receive almost every day. On June 11, an agent of the Berlin Residency of the NKGB of the USSR, acting under the name "Starshin", is reported in the near future. In the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on June 12, on the NKVD of the USSR, a message is made to enhance the German side of intelligence activities on the border from the USSR and in border areas. In accordance with this message from January 1 to June 10, 1941, 2080 border violators were detained from Germany.
June 16 from the NKGB agents working in Berlin under the nicknames "Old man", "Starshina" and "Corsican", reports about the timing of the German attack on the Soviet Union in the coming days. At the same time, the structural divisions of the NKGB and the NKVD of the USSR in parallel with the reports on the state of affairs on the border continue to engage in routine paper.
On June 19, the NKGB of Belarus sends a special message about military mobilization preparations of fascist Germany to the War against the USSR in the NKGB. This message contains extensive information about the redeployment and dislocation of German troops to the Soviet border. It is said about focusing in the border areas of a large number of compounds, parts, combat aircraft, artillery guns, boats and cars.
On this day, the NKGB "Tit", who worked in Rome, reports that the military actions of Germany against the USSR will begin between 20 and 25 June 1941.
On June 20, 1941, a telegraph report came to the chief of intelligence management of the Red Army from Sofia. It said literally as follows: "The source said today that a military clash is expected on 21 or 22 June, which in Poland there are 100 German divisions, in Romania - 40, in Finland - 5, in Hungary - 10 and in Slovakia - 7. Total 60 Motorized divisions. The courier who came by the aircraft from Bucharest says that in Romania mobilization is over and every moment military actions are expected. Currently, there are 10 thousand German troops in Bulgaria. "
In this message, the resolution is also absent.
On the same day (June 20, 1941), telegraph report also comes to the head of the RKKE intelligence department from Tokyo from Zorge. In it, the intelligence writes: "The German ambassador to Tokyo Ott told me that the war between Germany and the USSR is inevitable. The German military superiority makes it possible to defeat the last large European army as well as it was done at the very beginning (war), because the strategic defensive positions of the USSR are still not more unique than it was in the defense of Poland.
Inste told me that the Japanese General Staff is already discussing the question of the position that will be occupied in the event of war.
The proposal for the Japanese American negotiations and the questions of the internal struggle between Matsuoka, on the one hand, and Hiranum - on the other hand, they stalled because everyone expects to solve the issue of the relations of the USSR and Germany. "
This report was obtained by the 9th branch of 17 hours on June 21, 1941, but the resolution is also missing.
On the evening of June 20, the next intelligence summary of the NKGB of the USSR No. 1510 on the military preparations of Germany to attack the Soviet Union was drawn up. It contains the concentration of the German troops at the border from the USSR and the preparation of the fascist troops to military actions. In particular, it says that in some homes Klaipeda installed machine guns and anti-aircraft guns, that in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Kostomold, the forest was harvested for the bridges of the West Bug, that in the Radom district from 100 settlements, the population was evicted in the rear, which German intelligence sends its agents in USSR for a short time - three or four days. These activities cannot be regarded otherwise as direct preparation for aggression, which should happen in the coming days.
As a result of the analysis of all these documents, it is possible to draw conclusions that Soviet intelligence in Germany and its allies worked quite successfully. Information on Hitler's decision to attack the USSR and the beginning of the preparation of this action began to enter the Soviet Union more than a year before the start of aggression.
Simultaneously with the exploration on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and GRU, the reconnaissance and Western military districts, which constantly reported in fairly in detail about the preparation of Germany and its allies to the war against the USSR. Moreover, as they approach the fatal date, these reports became increasingly frequent and more specific. From their content in the intentions of Germany did not have to doubt. The events that were conducted on the other side of the border were no longer reverse, but inevitably they should have poured into the military operation of a strategic scale. It concerned the separation of the local population from the border strip, saturation of this strip by the troops, clearing the cross-border strip from mine and other engineering barriers, mobilizing vehicles, deploying field hospitals, warehousing a large number of artillery shells on the soil and much more.
The Higher Soviet leadership and the Command of the Red Army had information about the composition and dislocation of troops of the border military union of the Soviet Union by the Fascist Command, which were obtained and summarized in early February 1941, almost 5 months before the start of aggression, and practically corresponded to reality.
However, the fact that many reconnaissance reports there are no signatures of the highest leaders of the country and the highest ranks of the country's military leadership, indicates that they either did not communicate to these individuals or were ignored by these persons. The first actually excludes the practice of the work of the Soviet officials of the machine of that time. The second is possible in two cases: first, distrust of information sources; Secondly, the stubborn reluctance of the country's top leadership to give up the vision of the upcoming course of events developed by him.
As is known, from the General Staff in the troops in the last peace months, orders of only general nature were received. No specific reaction to the Soviet government and the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense on the situation, developing at the borders of the USSR, was not marked. Moreover, the Soviet leadership and General Staff constantly warned the local command "not to succumb to provocations", which adversely affected the combat readiness of the troops of the state border cover. Apparently, the interaction and interconformation between the NKGB bodies, the NKVD and the headquarters of the Red Army were poorly adjusted.
Although it should be recognized that the activities of the NKVD, aimed at enhancing the protection of the border, were conducted. Thus, the head of the border troops of the NKVD of the Belarusian district in order to enhance the protection of the state border on June 20, 1941 issued a special order. In accordance with this order, "Calculation of people's settlement to build service should be established so that all people carry all people on the border from 23.00 to 5.00, with the exception of returned from the outfits. On some of the most vulnerable flank directions, set for ten days of posts under the command of the assistant head of the head.
Thus, it is an opinion that the Soviet leadership deliberately ignored the intelligent information from various sources from various sources on the preparation of Germany to war against the USSR. Separate researchers suggest that it was a special line of behavior of the highest Soviet leadership, a strongly sought to delay the beginning of the war in order to prepare the country and the Red Army. Others argue that in the 1940s - early 1941, the Soviet leadership more occupied internal problemsArced into new territories attached to the USSR in 1939-1940 than the issues of external threat. In recent years, there are also the authors who write that the behavior of the Soviet government on the eve of the war, and in particular the position I.V. Stalin, was the manifestation of the hatred of the leader to their people.
Of course, all this is only subjective conclusions of various researchers. What do the facts say? Before me, an extract from the instructions of the Second Bureau of the French Army's General Staff of May 15, 1941. It contains:
"Currently, the USSR is the only European power, which, having powerful armed forces, is not drawn into the global conflict. In addition, the volume of Soviet economic resources is so large that Europe in the face of the continuing sea blockade can be provided with raw materials and food from this reserve.
It seems that so far the USSR, following the tactics of survival, seeks to use the exhaustion of the forces of both warring parties to strengthen their own position ... However, the turn of events over the past two months makes it think that the USSR will not be able to fulfill its plans in their original form and probably will be drawn in war earlier than it believes.
Indeed, according to numerous reports obtained recently, the seizure of Southern Russia and the overthrow of the Soviet regime is now part of the plan developed by the "axis" countries ...
According to other reports, Russia, concerned that it was alone in the face of Germany, the funds of which are not yet touched, seeks to win the time to keep their dangerous neighbor. Russians satisfy all the requirements of Germany economic nature ... "
On the same day, the Memorandum of the German Foreign Ministry of German-Soviet relations is adopted. It notes that, "as in the past, complexity arose in connection with the implementation of German obligations on the supply of the USSR, especially in the field of arms." The German side is recognized: "We will continue to adhere to the delivery time. However, the failure to comply with Germany will begin to affect only 1941 after August 1941, since until then Russia is obliged to make supplies in advance. " The following indicated: "The provision with the supply of Soviet raw materials is still a satisfactory picture. In April, the following most important types of raw materials were supplied:
grains - 208,000 tons;
oil - 90,000 tons;
cotton - 8300 tons;
non-ferrous metals - 6340 tons of copper, tin and nickel ...
General supplies in the current year are calculated:
grains - 632,000 tons;
oil - 232,000 tons;
cotton - 23,500 tons;
manganese ore - 50,000 tons;
phosphates - 67,000 tons;
platinum - 900 kilograms. "
Of course, these deliveries stopped with the beginning of hostilities. But there are numerous evidence that the compositions with the Soviet raw materials followed the territory of Germany back at the beginning of June 22, 1941. Some of them were captured by German troops in the border areas in the first days of the Great Patriotic War.
Thus, reconnaissance information on the preparation of Germany to war against the USSR was more than enough. G. K. Zhukov in his memoirs "Memories and Reflections" also writes that this information was known to the General Staff, and immediately admits: "In the period of the crown of a dangerous military situation, we, the military, probably did not do everything to convince I. IN. Stalin in the inevitability of war with Germany in the very near future and prove the need to enter the life of urgent measures provided for by the operational mobilization plan. Of course, these events would not guarantee complete success in the reflection of enemy natiska, since the forces of the parties were far from equal. But our troops could enter the battle more organized and, therefore, to strike significantly large losses. This is confirmed by successful defensive actions of parts and compounds in the districts of Vladimir-Volynsky, Rava-Russian, Mix and in the sections of the South Front. "
Below G.K. Zhukov writes: "Now there are different versions about whether we knew or not the specific date of the beginning of the war.
I can not say for sure, truthfully was informed by I.V. Stalin, maybe he received personally, but I did not report.
True, he once told me:
- One person gives us very important information about the intentions of the German government, but we have some doubts ...
Perhaps it was about R. Zorga, which I learned about after the war.
Could military leadership independently and in a timely manner to open the exit of enemy troops directly into the source areas, where did they start their invasion of June 22? In those conditions, it was extremely difficult.
In addition, as it became known from the trophy cards and documents, the command of German troops made focusing actually on the borders at the very last moment, and its armored troops, which were at considerable removal, were transferred to the original areas on the night of June 22. "
The nearest deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army was the head of operational management. On the eve of the war, this position was held by Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin. It was a relatively young general (born in 1901), which in 1929 graduated from the M. Military Academy in 1929. Frunze and year studied at the Academy of General Staff, from which he was released early in 1937 in connection with the arrests of many military leaders.
He held the position of headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District during the liberation campaign of Soviet troops to Western Ukraine, and since 1940 he headed the operational department of the General Staff. According to the memories of many contemporaries, N.F. Vatutin was a competent and thinking person who can solve volumetric and complex tasks. He had some experience of planning hostilities in the framework of the completed operations of the Soviet-Finnish war and actions of the military district's troops during the liberation campaign. But this experience was clearly not enough to solve problems in the scale of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.
Unfortunately, even from the events did not always be made correct conclusions that could promptly and authoritatively orient the highest leadership. So, in connection with this, some documents from the military archive.
On March 20, 1941, the head of the intelligence department General F. Golikov presented a report by the management that contained information of exceptional importance. In this document, there were options for the possible directions of the strikes of the German fascist troops when attacking the Soviet Union. As it turned out, they consistently reflected the development of the Hitler's command of the Barbaross plan, and in one of the options, essentially, was reflected the essence of this plan.
... According to our military attache dated March 14, it was further referred to in the report, the German Major stated: "We are heading to the east, in the USSR. We will take bread, coal, oil from the USSR. Then we will be invincible and we can continue the war with England and America. "
N. F. Vatutin - Head of the Operational Department of the General Staff (1939-1941)However, the conclusions from the information given in the report substantially removed all their meaning. At the end of his report, General F.I. Golikov wrote:
"one. Based on all the above statements and possible options for action in the spring of this year, I believe that the most possible start of action against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after conclusion with it honorable for Germany.
2. Rumors and documents talking about the inevitability of this year of war against the USSR must be regarded as disinformation emanating from English and even, maybe German intelligence. "
So, F.I. Golikov served as the head of the intelligence department and the Deputy Head of the General Staff since July 1940. His report was preparing for the country's top leadership and was under the vulture of "exceptional importance". Such reports are usually prepared very carefully and cannot be based on the words of some "German Major". They require collecting and analyzing dozens, or even hundreds of various sources of information, and, as other military leaders are evidenced, such information was, including from military attache in Berlin, residents of agent intelligence in the countries of the Allies of Germany.
Now about the agent of the most intelligence management department of the General Staff (now the main intelligence management). This body exists mainly to keep military intelligence in the interests of the country's security and carefully study the likely enemy. The arrival of German troops into the territory of Poland created ideal conditions for organizing intelligence work in this country. Czechoslovakia, occupied by Germany, was also a good field for the activities of Soviet military intelligence. Hungary has been considered for many years Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as a likely enemy, which required the extensive agent network there. The Soviet Union has just recently completed the war with Finland and did not have reason to trust it with its government. Romania was also offended by the rejection of Moldova and Bessarabia and therefore demanded permanent care. And it does not have to doubt that the reconnaissance department of the General Staff had its agent in these countries and received appropriate information from it. You have to doubt the quality of this agent, information and the correctness of the reaction to it F.I. Golikova and G.K. Zhukov.
Secondly, from January 14, 1941 G.K. Zhukov already worked at the General Staff (Decree of Politburo No. P25 / 85 dated 14.01.41 on the appointment of the head of the General Staff and the commander of the military districts), he entered the course of the case, acquainted with his deputies, heads of departments and departments. Twice - January 29 and 30, - He along with the People's Commissar of Defense was at the reception of I.V. Stalin. In alarming information from the Soviet-German border, he received constantly, knew about the unaware of the Red Army to war with Germany and in early February gave an indication of the head of the Operational Department of the General Staff, Lieutenant General G.K. By March 22, Malandina prepare a refined operational plan in case of an attack of Germany to the Soviet Union. Then, February 12, together with the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko and the head of organizational and mobilization management of Major General Quratovikov G.K. Zhukov represented I.V. Stalin mobilization plan, which was approved almost without amendments. Thus, it turns out that the General Staff is thoroughly prepared for the reflection of fascist aggression.
The meeting on which the report of the Chief of Intelligence Department of the Red Army was held on March 20, 1941, when G.K. For almost two months, Zhukov had been at the post of chief of the General Staff and did a certain work on improving the combat capability of the Red Army. In the same meeting, of course, was also the drug defense S.K. Tymoshenko. Deputy Head of the General Staff F.I. Golikov reports the leadership of the country, in the root divergers with the conclusions of his direct supervisors, and S.K. Tymoshenko and G.K. The beetles do not react to it. To admit this situation, knowing the cool character G.K. Zhukov is absolutely impossible.
In front of me, the capital labor of the Colonel-General retired Yuri Alexandrovich Gorkykov "The Kremlin, the Rate, General Staff", which the author developed for seven years, being a consultant to the historical and archival and memorial center of the General Staff. In the appendix, he gives an extract from the magazines visiting I.V. Stalin in his Kremlin office, starting in 1935. From this magazine it follows that S.K. Tymoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, k.A. Meretkov and P.V. Levers (Head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force) were at the reception at I.V. Stalin on February 2 and consisted within almost two hours.
Next time they, as well as S.M. Buddan and Chetverikov visited this high office on February 12 to approve the mobilization plan.
February 22 at the meeting of I.V. Stalin except S.K. Tymoshenko, G.K. Zhukova, S.M. Budenny, K.A. Metskova, P.V. Levchagova also attended G.I. Kulik (Head of the Main Department of Artillery of the Red Army) and the famous pilot test, General M.M. Gromov (Head of the Flight Research Institute), as well as all members of the RCP Politburo (b). This meeting took place from 17.15 to 21.00.
February 25 at the reception to I.V. Stalin again invited S.K. Tymoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, k.A. Meretkov, P.V. Levers, as well as Deputy Head of the Headquarters of the Main Directorate of the RPC, General F.A. Astakhov. The presence at the meeting at the head of the state of the two leading military pilots speaks either special tasks for this type of armed forces, or about any important information received from airflow. Discussion of these issues took almost two hours.
March 1 at the reception to I.V. Stalina again invited S.K. Tymoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, k.A. Meretkov, P.V. Levers, G.I. Kulik, as well as the first deputy commander of the Air Force of the Republic of Redek, General P.F. Zhigarev and member of the Defense Industry Council at SCC of the USSR P.N. Goremykin. Meeting takes 2 hours 45 minutes.
March 8 at the meeting to I.V. Stalin at 20.05 arrived S.K. Tymoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, S.M. Weekly, p.v. Levers and set up to 23 hours.
The following meeting with Military U.V. Stalin took place on March 17, 1941, and attended S.K. Tymoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, k.A. Meretkov, P.V. Levers, P.F. Zhigarev. Sent from 15.15 to 23.10, but, it can be seen, finally did not agree. Therefore, the next day to the head of state were invited by S.K. Tymoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, P.V. Levers and G.I. The kulik, which were in the office I.V. Stalin from 19.05 to 21.10, and as a result of this meeting, a resolution of the Politburo was adopted by mobilization fees No. 28/155, prepared on March 3, 1941.
And now we read in Kiev Zhukov about the report of the head of the Chief Intelligence Department of the General Staff by the leadership of the country of March 20, 1941. Before that S.K. Tymoshenko and G.K. The beetles spent in the office I.V. Stalin at various meetings a total of more than 30 hours each. Is it really not enough to discuss the issues of the defense of the country and the combat readiness of the Red Army?
V. D. Sokolovsky - Deputy Head of the General StaffSo, according to the memories of GK. Zhukov, at the meeting on March 20, on the basis of only the report of General F.I. Golikova The threat of an attack of fascist Germany in the USSR in 1941 was scattered. But then in the same labor, Georgy Konstantinovich writes: "May 6, 1941 I.V. Stalina sent a note People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov: "Naval attache in Berlin Captain 1 rank of Vorontsov calls that, by the words of one German officer from Hitler's bet, the Germans are preparing the invasion of the USSR through Finland, Baltic States and Romania. At the same time, powerful aviation raids are planned for Moscow and Leningrad and disembarking parachute landing in border centers ... I guess, it was stated in the note that the information is false and specially directed along this channel in order to check how the USSR will react to it.
And come back to the monograph Yu.A. Gorkyk. According to her, S.K. Tymoshenko, G.K. Zhukov and other senior military leaders advised U I.V. Stalin 5, 9, 10, 14, 20, 21, 23, 28, 29 April. The last meeting discussed the note by the People's Commissariat of Defense on the combat readiness of Western border military districts. And again stands up quite by lawsuit: what did the highest warlords speak with the head of state for many hours, if not about the increasing threat of war? Why then, according to the records GK. Zhukova, "... Voltage grew up. And the closer the threat of war was coming, the leadership of the Defense People's Commissariat worked. The leading composition of the People's Commissariat and the General Staff, especially Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko, at the time worked for 18-19 hours a day. Often, the drug addict remained in his office until the morning. "
Work, judging by the records Yu.A. Gorky, and in fact he was intense. In May 1941, S.K. Tymoshenko and G.K. Zhukov are advised by I.V. Stalin 10, 12, 14, 19, 23rd. On May 24, in addition to the Commissar of the Defense and Head of the General Staff Commander, members of the Military Council and the Commander of the Western Special, Kiev special, Baltic, Odessa military districts, are invited to the Meeting. This meeting lasts more than three hours.
In early June 1941, 3, 6, 9 and 11th, U I.V. Stalin at the meeting were S.K. Tymoshenko and G.K. Zhukov, as well as the head of the Operational Department of the General Staff General General N.F. Vatutin. The presence of the latter talks about the preparation of the most important operational documents that are probably related to bringing troops into combat readiness.
But again we open the memoirs G.K. Zhukov and read: "June 13 S.K. Tymoshenko in my presence called I.V. Stalin and asked for permission to give an indication of bringing the troops of border districts into combat readiness and deploying the first echelons by cover plans.
- Think, - answered I.V. Stalin.
The next day we were again in I.V. Stalin and reported to him about the disturbing sentiments in the districts and the need to bring troops to complete combat readiness.
- Do you propose to hold mobilization in the country, raise the troops now and move them to the Western borders? The same war! Do you understand it is both or not?! "
If you believe G.K. Zhukov, I.V. Stalin and June 14 decisively rejected the proposal of the Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff on bringing troops into combat readiness.
But according to Yu.A. Gorky, in the period from 11 to 19 June, neither S.S. Tymoshenko, G.K. The heads of the head of state were not. But it is known that at the end of the first half of June 1941, the nomination of military compounds located in the inner areas of Western border military districts, closer to the state border, was launched. Some of these compounds were moved along the railway, and their large amount was put forward by the emerging order of night transitions.
Also in mid-May 1941, a gradual transformation on the railway and partially moved by the campaign order of individual rifle buildings and divisions from the internal military districts: Ural, Volga, Kharkov and North-Urals, on the line of Western Dvina and Dnipro. In the first half of June, the transfer of six divisions from the Trans-Baikal Military District on the Right-Bank Ukraine to the areas of Shepetovka, Bendicov and Berdicheva began.
Planning hostilities. By June 22, 1941, preparing for the reflection of fascist aggression, the Soviet leadership launched on the Western border from the Baltic to the Black Sea of \u200b\u200bthe Troops of three military districts and part of the forces of the Odessa Military District, which in the event of the beginning of the war should have been transformed into fronts and a separate army. To bring the whole mass of troops to complete combat readiness and use, in order to defeat the enemy, the development of mobilization and operational plans was carried out.
Mobilization plan for 1938-1939 (from November 29, 1937 - MP-22), developed by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR under the leadership of B.M. Shaposhnikova, provided for war in the case of an additional call for the growth of rifle troops 1.7 times, tank brigades 2.25 times, an increase in the number of guns and tanks by 50%, as well as an increase in Air Force up to 155 airframes. Special Nadezhda placed on tank troops. It was envisaged that eight of 20 light tank brigades will be derived from BT tanks. They were to be reduced to four tank corps. The remaining six brigades of BT tanks and the same brigade T-26 tanks remained separate. In addition to the three available motorized rifle brigades, the formation of another brigade was envisaged in order to be subsequent in each tank building on one such brigade.
Mobilization plan adopted in the USSR in 1938, began to recycle B.M. Shaposhnikov in connection with the change in the territory of the USSR in 1939-1940, the reorganization of the Red Army, the experience of the Soviet-Finnish and the beginning of World War II. But it did not have time to complete this work to end. This is evidenced by acts of transferring the People's Commissariat of Defense to K.E. Voroshilov and General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov new addict S.K. Tymoshenko and Head of the General Staff K.A. Meretkov in the summer of 1940. They indicated: "Mobplan does not have any NPO reception, and the army cannot be composed of unmobilized." And further: "In connection with the conduct of organizational events, unlocking parts and the change in the boundaries of military districts, the current Mobgplan is in the root of violated and requires full processing. Currently, the army has no mobilization plan. "
But B.M. Shaposhnikov together with his post conveyed to KA Meretkov has a practically ready-made mobilization plan, which Cyril Afanasyevich is just left to approve. The new version of the mobilization plan The General Staff of the Red Army was prepared by September 1940. But then it turned out that he had to be linked to other documents, so the processing of the mobilization plan was delayed until February 1941.
However, this plan has not received approval by the country's political leadership. He had opponents and in the highest military circles, who considered it necessary to have a much larger number of large mechanized compounds. Therefore, the general staff had to go for work again.
The draft of the new mobilization plan was presented by S.K. Tymoshenko and K.A. Meretskov for consideration by the USSR government on February 12, 1941, when at the head of the General Staff already stood G.K. Zhukov. The presented project was almost immediately approved by I.V. Stalin.
Based on the experience of the beginning of the First World War, the Soviet leadership believed that from declaring war to the real start of military operations would be considerable. Based on this, it was assumed to carry out the deformity of the poerachelo within one month. The first echelon on the first or third day after the announcement of the war was supposed to mobilize the parts and compounds of the army of covering the state border of the border military districts, which constituted 25-30% of the combat compounds and contained in peacetime in reinforced composition. In the same echelon, the military readiness of the Air Force, air defense troops and fortified areas were brought into combat readiness. In the second echelon, on the fourth-seventh day of the war, it was envisaged to mobilize the remaining combat compounds, parts of combat support, army rear parts and institutions. In the third echelon, on the eighth-fifteenth day of the war, it was necessary to deploy front-line rear, repair bases, front-line spare parts. In the fourth echelon, the sixteenth-thirtieth day was planned to deploy spare parts and stationary hospitals.
The deployment of rifle, tank, cavalry and motorized divisions of the border military districts contained in the enhanced composition (70-80% of the states of wartime) was supposed to be carried out in two echelon. The first echelon (permanent personnel composition) was to be prepared for a speech after two to four hours from the date of receipt of the order, and the tank parts are six hours later. The second echelon was supposed to be prepared for the performance of third days.
For the deployment of new compounds and parts, stocks in troops and warehouses were created in advance. As of June 22, 1941, all border compounds were provided with small-carrying machine guns 100%, automata, large-caliber machine guns, anti-aircraft guns - by 30%, artillery tools of all systems - by 75-96%, with tanks of all kinds - by 60% , Including heavy - by 13%, average (T-34 and T-36) - by 7%, lungs - by 133%. The provision of Air Force with aircraft was about 80%, including combat aviation - 67%.
Thus, the predecessors of G.K. Zhukov managed to develop such an important document as a mobilization plan for war. George Konstantinovich remained only to bring this plan to performers and ensure its implementation. But here it begins incomprehensible.
After that, directives were immediately sent to the development of private mobilization plans to the headquarters of military districts, directives were immediately sent to the mobilization tasks, the calendar deadlines for the implementation of basic measures and the final deadlines for the development of district mobilization plans (June 1, 1941). In military districts, meetings of military councils took place on these directives, whose decrees were immediately brought to the troops.
But here the strangest thing begins. Due to the fact that the mobilization plan later changed repeatedly and clarified, the troops constantly not approved the final directive, and the military headquarters did not have time to work out. Frequent changes in the directorous documents also led to the fact that many of them were simply not worked out. There were other reasons for delays in the development of mobilization documents. So, it is known that the meeting of the Military Council of the Western Special Military District was late compared with the calendar periods for twenty days, and the Directive in the troops was sent only on March 26, 1941. This directive, the development of the district mobilization plan was moved away until June 15, 1941.
But to develop a mobilization plan - only part of the case. It was necessary to ensure its execution, and here it was no matter. Employees of the military enrolls of border districts poorly knew the mobilization capabilities of their districts, as a result of which many scarce specialists could not promptly arrive in the troops. The District Air Force also had low combat readiness - were not equipped with a personnel and military equipment 12 airlines and 8 airbases.
Not the best was the condition of mechanized buildings. So, in the Western Special Military District, only one of the mechanized buildings was equipped with tanks by 79%, the remaining five - by 15-25%. Due to the lack of necessary military equipment, 26, 31 and 38th tank divisions, as well as the 210th motorized division, armed with 76 mm and 45-mm cannons in order to continue to act as anti-tank compounds.
The combat readiness and combat training of a number of parts of the Western Special Military District were unsatisfactory. District Air Force received unsatisfactory assessment during the inspection check in the fall of 1940. During the re-verification of the District Air Force by the head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force, Lieutenant General P.F. Zhigarev in March - April 1941 was again noted by low combat readiness, poor weapons content, insufficient level of flight preparation of the personnel of aviation regiments.
In the Baltic Special Military District, the case was even worse. The deployment of the district to the states of military time was supposed to be carried out at the expense of local resources, but for this was required to create a network of military commissariats in the Baltic republics, then it was necessary to determine the presence of these resources at the enterprises of the national economy and only then to paint them through connections and parts. And this is despite the fact that in May 1941, a universal military duty defined by law in September 1940 has not yet been introduced.
In a number of military districts, poor combat readiness of the forces and air defense was noted. So, the FFA Office Commission led by Colonel-General G.M. The stern on the results of the inspection indicated that "the combat readiness of the air defense of Leningrad is in an unsatisfactory condition ... The combat readiness of the 3rd and 4th divisions of the FFOs of the Kiev Special Military District is in an unsatisfactory condition. Parts of Kiev for night defense are almost not prepared ... The combat training of the 4th air defense division, as well as the air defense system in Lviv as a whole is in unsatisfactory state. "
The second extremely important document developed by the General Staff was considerations on the basics of the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in the West and East for 1940 and 1941 of September 18, 1940. They indicated that in the Western borders, the most likely opponent of the USSR will be Germany, with which Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland can also speak in the Union. In total, according to the developers of this document, "taking into account the above probable opponents, against the Soviet Union in the West may be deployed: Germany - 173 infantry divisions, 10,000 tanks, 13,000 aircraft; Finland - 15 infantry divisions, 400 aircraft; Romania - 30 infantry divisions, 250 tanks, 1100 aircraft; Hungary - 15 infantry divisions, 300 tanks, 500 aircraft. Total - 253 infantry divisions, 10,550 tanks, 15 100 aircraft. "
To combat the said opponent of the defense addict and the head of the General Staff offered the main forces of the Red Army in the West to deploy "or south of Brest-Litovsk, so that a powerful blow in the direction of Lublin and Krakow and then on the Breslav (Bratislav) at the very first stage of war Cut from Germany from the Balkan countries, to deprive it of the most important economic bases and decisively influence the Balkan countries in matters of participation in the war; Or north of Brest-Litovsk with the task of defeating the main forces of the German army within Eastern Prussia and master the latter. "
A.M. Vasilevsky in his book "The whole life" writes that he began work on considerations since mid-April 1940. At the same time, he admits that "the main thing was already fulfilled by that time. During all recent years, the preparation of the plan directly led B.M. Shaposhnikov, and General Staff by that time completed its development for submission and approval in the Command PC. "
K.A. Meretskov in terms of covering the state border, developed by its predecessor, a lot of flaws were found. Their elimination was engaged in N.F. Vatutin, G.K. Malandin and A.M. Vasilevsky. The latter writes that this project and the strategic deployment plan of the Red Army troops reported directly by I.V. Stalin on September 18, 1940 in the presence of some members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party. From the People's Commissariat of Defense, the plan was represented by S.K. Tymoshenko, K.A. Metskov and N.F. Vatutin. The General Staff believed that the main blow of the enemy could be applied to one of the two options: to the south or north of Brest-Litovsk (Brest). Thus, to put the final point in this question was I.V. Stalin.
When considering this plan, as A.M. writes Vasilevsky, referring to the testimony of KA Metskova (Kirill Afanasyevich himself writes about it), I.V. Stalin expressed the opinion that the main blow in the event of war, German troops will apply in Ukraine. Therefore, the General Staff was instructed to develop a new plan, providing for the concentration of the main grouping of Soviet troops in the south-west direction.
On October 5, 1940, the Strategic Deployment Plan of the Soviet Armed Forces was considered by the heads of the party and the state. During the discussions, it was recognized advisable to emphasize once again that the main grouping of Soviet troops should be deployed in the south-west direction. Based on this, it was assumed to further strengthen the composition of the troops of the Kiev Special Military District.
Improved taking into account the obtained remarks of the Deployment of the Red Army of the Western borders of the USSR, the plan was submitted for the approval of the CPSU Central Committee (b) and the Government on October 14, 1940. All questions regarding the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff should have been completed no later than December 15, 1940. From January 1, the headquarters of military districts were to develop appropriate plans.
But at the end of 1940, a new information was received on the preparation of Germany to war in the East and about the grouping of its forces and funds. Based on this, according to A.M. Vasilevsky, "General Staff and Overall, our operational management made adjustments to the operational plan for concentration and deployment of the Armed Forces developed during the fall and winter of 1940 to reflect the attack of the enemy from the West." At the same time, it was envisaged, "that our troops will enter into war in all cases fully manufactured and as part of the planned planned groups that the mobilization and concentration of troops will be produced in advance."
With the coming to the General Headquarters of Kiev Zhukov's considerations are radically changed on March 11, 1941, taking into account the increased role of the Kiev Special Military District. It is believed that "Germany is most likely to deploy its main forces in the south-east - from the saddle to Hungary, so that the blow to Berdichev, Kiev to seize Ukraine." At the same time it is assumed that "this blow apparently will be accompanied by auxiliary blow in the north - from Eastern Prussia to Dvinsk and Riga or concentric blows from the row and Brest to Volkovysk, Baranovichi."
At the same time, Georgy Konstantinovich expressed a number of significant comments on the deployment plan, spent its predecessors. M. V. Zakharov writes: "With the appointment of the general of the army of G.K. Zhukov Head of the General Staff Plan of Strategic Deployment in the spring of 1941 again became the subject of discussion and clarification. "
As can be seen, the finalization of the state border cover was carried out in February - April 1941 with the participation of the General Staff and the leadership of the headquarters of military districts (commander, head of the headquarters, a member of the Military Council, the head of the Operational Department). "At the same time, it was envisaged that the troops of the echelons of the cover to the beginning of the action of the enemy, being completely commissioned in the state of military time, turn on the prepared defensive borders along the border and together with fortified areas and border troops will be able, in case of extreme need, cover the mobilization of the troops of the second echelons of border The districts that by mobilization plan was given to this from several hours to one day. "
M.V. Zakharov writes that the latter adjustment of this document was held in May - June 1941. The document was written as before, A.M. Vasilevsky, and then adjusted by N.F. Vatutin. The idea of \u200b\u200bfocused on major efforts in Ukraine remains in force.
Considerations in the new edition signed by the drug defense S.K. Tymoshenko, Head of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov and his developer Major General A.M. Vasilevsky.
Before the start of the war, few months remain, but G.K. The beetles do not get up. On May 15, 1941, new considerations were proposed to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars on the plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, developed by his order.
In them, the head of the General Staff warned that "Germany is currently holding its army unmobilized, with unfolded reasons and has the opportunity to warn us in deployment and apply a sudden blow." Therefore, G.K. Zhukov proposed "by no means to give initiatives to the German command, to prevent the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it will be in the stage of deployment and will not have time to organize the front and interaction of troops.
To achieve this goal G.K. Zhukov offered in the first phase of the operation to carry out the defeat of the main forces of the German army, deployed south of Brest - Deblin, and ensure the exit of the Soviet troops to the 30th day of the operation by Ostrolek, r. Narev, Lovich, Lodz, Creicburg, Opels, Olomouc. Subsequently, he intended to step from the Katowice district in the northern or northwestern direction, defeat the enemy and master the territory of the former Poland and East Prussia.
As the nearest task, it was envisaged to break the German army east of p. Vistula and in the Krakow direction to reach the line of r. Narev, Vistula and master the district of Katowice. To do this, the main blow to the forces of the south-western front to be applied in the direction of Krakow, Katowice, cut off Germany from its southern allies, and the auxiliary blow to the left wing of the Western Front - in the direction of Warsaw, Demboin with the goal of making the Warsaw group and master Warsaw, and also assist South-Western Front in the defeat of the Lublin grouping. At the same time, it was planned to conduct active defense against Finland, East Prussia, Hungary, Romania and be prepared, with a favorable setting, to inflicting strikes against Romania.
So the document appeared, on the basis of which some authors later began to argue about the preparation of the USSR to aggression against Germany and its allies. This document was first published in the "Military Historical Journal" No. 2 for 1992. At the same time, the author of the publication V.N. Kiselev indicated that he was written by A.M. Vasilevsky, but not signed in bk. Zhukov nor S.K. Tymoshenko, nevertheless I.V. Stalin. Consequently, he was only one of the possible options for actions that was not approved and did not receive further development.
Time passes, and researchers began to begin to blame the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Stalin is that he incorrectly determined the direction of the main strike of the enemy. At the same time, these "researchers" do not take into account the factors that from mid-1940 almost the entire Tip of the Red Army consisted of representatives of the Kiev Special Military District, and these people, quite naturally, were accustomed to working in the interests of their region and knew its features better than others. Operational directions.
It all started with the appointment of the defense commander of the former commander Coo S.K. Tymoshenko, who immediately began to drag his colleagues to Moscow. He invited the former head of the headquarters of this district N.F. Vatutina to the position of head of the Operational Department of the General Staff, Head of the Mobilization Department of Kovo General Major N.L. Nikitina - to the position of headquarters of the Mobilization Department of the General Staff. The former commander of the mechanized brigade and the head of the auto-rotary troops QWO I.Ya. Fedorenko becomes the head of the RKKA car accident control. Former commander of the 6th Army Kovo F. Golikov becomes the head of the main intelligence department and the Deputy Head of the General Staff. Former member of the Military Council Cocus Corps Commissioner S.K. Kozhevnikov is appointed to the post of the Military Commissioner of the General Staff. After the position of headquarters headquarters instead of KA Metskova appointed Commander Coo General G.K. Zhukov, he makes his first deputy N.F. Vatutina, and at the liberated position of the head of the Operational Department of the General Staff appointed Deputy Headquarters of the Staff Coo Major General G.K. Malandine. The head of the fortified districts of Kovo Major General S.I. comes to the position of head of the fortified RKKA regions Shiryaev.
M.V. Zakharov writes: "Employees nominated for responsible work in the General Staff from the Kiev Special Military District, by virtue of their former service continued to give more important importance to the south-western direction. When evaluating the general military-strategic environment at the West Theater of the War, their attention, in our opinion, was involuntarily accounted for what "I was lucky to heart," the consciousness worked for a long time and, naturally, obscured and retiring the most significant facts and circumstances to the second plan, Without which it was impossible to reproduce a faithful picture of the events of the events. " Further, he concludes that "such a method of selection of leadersional headquarters cannot be recognized as successful. There was no reason or good reasons for a wide renewal of it in the face of the approaching war, and there were no persons with the experience of their previous activities to assess the situation from the standpoint of the interests of the command of the South-Western destination. "
Thus, in the development of the main document of the operational application of troops, the General Headquarters of the Red Army in the individual at first K.A. Metskova, and then G.K. Zhukova showed certain oscillations and dragged the time. But on the basis of these considerations, military districts, army, corps and divisions were to develop their plans.
On the basis of considerations, operational plans of covering the state border of military districts and armies were developed. Time for this work remained very little.
S. K. Tymoshenko and G. K. Zhukov in the General Staff of the Red ArmyThus, the opening plan for the state border, developed by the General Staff, was brought to the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District in early May 1941. Based on this document, the district headquarters had to develop and bring to the armies to the armies of the cover of the land border with East Prussia, which was done. The memories of the former commander of the 8th Army of General P.P. have been preserved about how it happened. Sovennikova. In particular, he writes:
"The post of the Army commander of the Army of the Border Military District obliges me to familiarize themselves primarily with the defense plan for the state border defense in order to clarify the place and role in this regard to the army entrusted to me. But, unfortunately, neither at the General Staff, nor upon arrival in Riga, at the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District, I was not informed about the presence of such a plan. Upon arrival at the headquarters of the 8th Army, in the city of Jelgava, I also did not find any instructions on this issue. I have the impression that it is hardly at this time (March 1941) such a plan existed. Only on May 28, 1941, I was called with the headquarters of the army of Major General Larionov G.A. and a member of the Military Council of the Division Commissioner Shabalov S.I. In the headquarters of the district, where the commander of the commander of the district, Colonel-General Kuznetsov, F.I. Literally, he acquired me with a defense plan.
In the headquarters of the district on this day, I met the commander of the 11th army of Lieutenant Morozov General Morozova V. I., headquarters of this army of Major General Schemer I. T., Commander of the 27th Army General Major Berzarina N. E., His Headquarters headquarters and members of the military councils of both armies. The commander of the district took the commanders of the armies separately each and, apparently, gave them similar instructions - urgently familiarize himself with the plan of defense, accept and report to him. "
Next, the commander of the 8th Army recalls that the plan was a rather collar notebook, the text in which was printed on the typewriter. Approximately one and a half or two hours after receiving the plan, not having time to familiarize himself with him, the army commander was summoned to the commander district, which in a darkened room with an eye to the eye dictated him to his decision on defense. It reduced the concentration of the main efforts of the army in the direction of Shauliai - Tauragu (125th and 90th rifle divisions) and covering the border from the Baltic Sea (M. Palanga) at the front of about 80 kilometers by the forces of one 10th rifle division of the 11th Rifle Cases. The 48th rifle division was supposed to transfer to the left flank of the army and lengthen the defense front to the left of the 125th Rifle Division, covering the main direction. The 12th mechanized case (commander - Major General N.M. Shestopalov) was displayed north of Shaulia in the second echelon of the army. However, the right to return the order to the commander of this building the commander of the 8th army was not provided. It was supposed to be used by the orders of the front commander.
After that, the working notebooks with the records according to the defense plan in the commander of the army and his headquarters were seized. It was promised that these notebooks will be immediately sent to the headquarters of the army by special mail. "Unfortunately, after that, we did not receive any instructions and even our working notebooks," the army commander admits. "Thus, a defense plan did not communicate to the troops."
It was no better about the operational planning in the troops of the Western Special Military District. So, Chief of Staff of the 10th Army General P. and Lyapin writes: "The Defense Plan of the 1941 Defense Plan and we were redone from January to the very beginning of the war, and did not finish it. Changes in the first directive on the preparation of the plan during this time were delivered three times, and all three times the plan had to redo it again. Last modified The operational directive was personally received in Minsk on May 14, in which it was ordered to finish the development of the plan and submit to the approval of the commander district. On May 18, the Deputy Head of the Operational Department of the Army Headquarters, Major Sidorenko, delivered the decision of the commander on the map, which was supposed to approve the commander of the district's troops. Major Sidorenko returned in the evening of May 19 and reported that Major General Semenov - Head of the Operational Department of the district headquarters - passed: "Mainly approved, continue the development." No written document on the approval of the plan Major Sidorenko did not bring.
We did not expect the arrival of Major Sidorenko and the instructions that he had to bring from Minsk, but continued to develop a state defense plan, and on May 20 in the evening I brought the headquarters of the district headquarters: "The plan is ready, the approval of the commander of the district commander in order to proceed to Development of executive documents. We are waiting for your challenge for the report. " But I did not wait until the beginning of the war.
In the book " Martialctions The army of the 4th Army in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War "Chief of Staff of the 4th Army of the Western Special Military District, General L.M. Sandals writes:
"In April 1941, the command of the 4th Army received a directive from the headquarters of the Western Special Military District, according to which the work plan was to develop, mobilization, concentration and deployment of troops on the territory of the district ... The army was supposed to be the basis of the 4th (Brest) cover area.
In accordance with the Directive received from the district, the Army Covering District was developed ...
The main disadvantage of the circumferential and army cover plans was their unreality. A significant part of the troops provided for the completion of cover tasks did not exist ...
The most negative impact on the organization of the 4th Army was the inclusion of half of the region No. 3 in its lane ... This was determined that in the event of the opening of hostilities of the three divisions (42, 49 and 113-th), they were forced to move on alarm to a distance of 50-75 km.
The unrealness of tasks facing the troops of the RP-4 (4th Army) was also the fact that the Brest fortified district had not yet existed, field fortifications were not built; The organization of defense at the front over 150 km in a short time forces of the three rifle divisions, a significant part of which was at the construction of a fortified district, was impracticable.
The task supplied by the 14th mechanized corpus was also unreal. Corps divisions have just received a new replenishment of the rank armament, had a noncompliament of tank weapons. It also notes the absence of the desired amount of traction for artillery, unparalleled rear unit and lack of command staff ... ".
In his memoirs, the former head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District I.Kh. Bagramyan writes that for the first time with a plan for covering the state border, he met the troops of this district at the end of January 1941.
In 1989, Milivdat issued a book A.V. Vladimir "In the Kiev direction", compiled by the experience of fighting the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. In it, the author is quite detailed, on the basis of new documents that discussed, considered this issue, made a number of competent, reasonable conclusions. On the issue of the implementation of the plan for the cover and preparation of the army troops, the author writes: "Mobilization plans in all small connections and parts were worked out. They were systematically checked by higher headquarters, refined and corrected. Posted to compounds and parts of personnel, mehtransports, horses, reasonable property at the expense of national economy resources was mainly completed (except for the 135th Rifle Division). "
But it should be noted that A.V. Vladimir writes about the mobilization plan, and not the operational plan for the cover of the state border, which, according to tasks and content, are completely different documents. The first one suggests how to collect troops, the second - how to use them to solve the charter.
To answer the second question, we take memories of the former head of the headquarters of the 15th Rifle Corps of General Major Z.Z. Rogose. This building was supposed to be the basis of a plot of defense No. 1 of the cover of the 5th Army. Z.Z. Rogose writes that the commander, headquarters of the corps, and all the division teams who have understood the combat missions that have understood the combat missions that have understood them were acquainted with the defense plan. However, documents relating to the defense plans, the headquarters of the corps and divisions did not have, therefore, were not developed.
Commander of the 45th Rifle Division of the 15th Rifle Corps General Major G.I. Sherstyuk writes that when studying plans for combat readiness of the parts of the 45th rifle division, he was surprised by the fact that the leadership officers of the division headquarters (the head of the headquarters - Colonel Chumakov) and the commander of the rifle and artillery regiments with their headquarters "did not know the turn of the state defense" And therefore, did not work out issues of "nominations, developing defensive borders and conducting a battle for the holding of the State Government, as was played by the extent of my command of the 97th Rifle Division of the 6th Army."
Former chief of headquarters of the 62nd rifle division of the 15th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army P.A. Newbies wrote that no written document on the organization of defense of the state border by the beginning of the war division did not have. However, he confirms the fact that in the first days of April, the commanders and heads of the headquarters of the 87th and 45 rifle divisions were caused to the headquarters of the 5th Army, where the scale of scale 1: 100,000 and their own pursuit of battalion districts from the Army Plan engineering equipment defense strips of compounds.
In the 6th Army, on the basis of a cover plan of the Kiev Special Military District, the Commander and the headquarters developed a plan for the cover of district No. 2. The same plans were also in the 62nd and 12th armies of this district. But they were not brought to subordinate compounds.
So, the commander of the 72nd rifle division of the 8th Rifle Corps of the 26th Army Colonel P.I. Abramidze after the war in his memoirs wrote that the mobilization plan (MP-41) before the beginning of the war he did not know. True, after opening the package, he was convinced that all command-staff teachings and other preparatory work on the eve of the war were carried out in strict accordance with this plan.
The headquarters of the Odessa Military District, according to the memoirs of the head of the Operational Department of the 9th Army. Zakharova, Defense People's Commissar Directive on the development of a state border cover plan on May 6, 1941. In this directive, the tasks of the County troops were formulated in general terms.
The opening plan of the state border was presented to the General Staff, the headquarters of the Odessa Military District on June 20, 1941. For his approval to Moscow, Deputy Head of the Staff of the district on operational issues Colonel L.V. Rags. He came to Moscow when the war has already begun. But the headquarters of the Odessa Military District, not expecting the official statement of the plan by the General Staff, gave instructions to the commander of the buildings on the development of compound plans.
* * *Thus, the General Staff of the Red Army in the first half of 1941 was held a lot of work on strengthening the Red Army, the engineering equipment of the theater of hostilities, the exploration of the likely opponent and planning hostilities in the event of the beginning of the war. At the same time, this work was mainly carried out at the level of the General Staff, the headquarters of military districts and the headquarters of the armies of the state border. To the level of hulls, divisions and regiments, this work was not fully descended. Therefore, it is quite appropriate to say that the Great Patriotic War was sudden only at the tactical level.
In the work of the Soviet General Staff there was no proper clarity. Many events were planned and spent spontaneously, without a specific assessment of the possibilities of the country and the conditions for the established situation. Huge efforts were spent on the engineering equipment of the new border of the USSR, despite the fact that world experience was talking about the low effectiveness of such defensive lines in the new conditions of conducting hostilities.
Many incomprehensible in the work of Soviet foreign intelligence. On the one hand, it received the necessary information on the preparation of Germany to aggression against the USSR, on the other - this information was not enough to decide the decision with the highest Soviet leadership. This means that she was either incomplete or stuck on the way to the Kremlin and the Defense People's Commissariat.
There are a lot of questions related to the development of the General Staff of the Basic Guidelines for the Case of War. The quality of these documents can be recognized as good, but the deadlines were too tightened, which reduced all the huge work done. As a result, the troops were forced to join the war, without having the right combat documents.
The result of all these factors was that many defensive events were not planned or implemented until June 21, 1941, by the time the preparing war has already become a fact.
the USSR the USSR
Russia Russia
Russian General Staff (sokr. Genstab., GSh Sun.) - Central military department of the Armed Forces of Russia.
History of the Russian General Staff
In February 1711, Peter I approved the first "full-time regulations of the General Staff", in which the establishment of the office of the Land-winning team as the head of the special apartment departments (later became the service). States were determined 5 ranks of the apartment market; Later, the number of them increased, it was reduced: in 1720 - 19 ranks; In 1731 - 5 ranks for peacetime and 13 ranks for the military. These are almost exclusively headed by avant-gardes and advanced parties. According to the staff of the apartment, the apartment consisted of 184 different ranks, belonging not only directly to the composition of the controls of the troops, but also to other parts and departments of the military administration (Commissariat, Provisant, Military, military policeman, etc.).
Initially, the apartment-player part did not represent a separate institution and was created by the highest military heads only at the headquarters of the army (for the period of combat operations). Essentially, the apartment members were as it were, as it were, "temporary members" of the army (its field management), the preparation of which in peacetime was given little attention. Yes, and the general headquarters himself was understood as not as a military authority, but as a meeting of the highest military ranks. Such a situation has adversely affected the state of managing the Russian army during the seven-year war (1756-1763), despite the range of victories overwhelmed by Russia.
From 1815 in accordance with the decree of Alexander I was established The main headquarters of his imperial majesty And it was transferred to the management of the All Military Office, as part of this Supreme Management Authority began to function (in parallel with the retinue), the special office of the General Staff General of the General Staff.
The participation of some types of Sweets in the uprising of the Decembrists threw a shadow on the entire department, the result of which was the closure of the Moscow School of Copination, as well as the reversion of the transfer to the apartment of the officers below the order of the Lieutenant. On June 27, 1827, the retinue was renamed General Headquarters. In 1828, the management of the General Staff was entrusted to the General Staff General I. I. V., with abolition in 1832, the main headquarters as an independent management body (the name was preserved for a group of senior officials) and the transfer of all the central administration to the military minister. The General Staff, who received the name of the Department of General Staff, became part of the Military Ministry. B 1863 he was transformed into the General Directorate of the General Staff.
Further transformations of the General Staff, with the apartment general, A. I. Neidgardt, were expressed in the opening of the Imperial Military Academy in 1832 and in the Institution of the General Staff Department; The General Staff is included in the body of the topographers. The exit from the General Staff to other departments was prohibited, and only in 1843 it was permitted to return to operation, but not otherwise, as in those parts where anyone had served.
By order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVS) of February 10, 1921, Chamber of February 10, 1921 was merged with the Field Staff and was called the headquarters of the Workers' and Peasant Red Army (RKKA). The headquarters of the Republic of Kazakhstan became the unified department of the management of the Armed Forces of the RSFSR and was the executive body of the RVS of the Republic, since 1923 - the RVS of the USSR.
Chiefs of the headquarters of the Red Army were:
P. P. Lebedev, February 1921 - April 1924.
M. V. Frunze, April 1924 - January 1925.
S. S. Kamenev, February - November 1925.
M. N. Tukhachevsky, November 1925 - May 1928.
B. M. Shaposhnikov, May 1928 - June 1931.
A. I. Egorov, June 1931 - September 1935.
The commissioner of the headquarters of the Red Army was I. C. Unshlikht, Deputy Chairman of the OGPU. With the appointment by the head of the headquarters of Mikhail Frunze, the position of Commissar Staff was abolished - thus the unitedness was established in the headquarters' leadership, and the control of the Bolshevik (communist) party over the headquarters was carried out by other methods.
Reorganization of 1924.
In 1924, the headquarters of the Red Army was reorganized and a new military body was created with narrower authority under the same name. Since the Main Directorate of the Red Army (Chief RKKU) and the LDKKA inspectorate, a number of functions and powers were transferred from the headquarters of the Republic of Red Army to new structures of the highest military administration of the Russian republic.
In March 1925, the RKKKA Department was formed by the decision of the NCMM (from January 1925 - the General Directorate of the Red Army), where the functions of the administrative guidelines for the current activities of the Armed Forces of the Republic were transferred from the management of the RKKA: combat training, military mobilization, acquiring and a number of other functions.
Staff structure from July 1926
By order of the NKVM of July 12, 1926, the headquarters of the RAK was approved as part of four departments and one department:
The first (I control) is operational;
Second (II Governance - from July 1924) - organizational and mobilization;
Third (III management) - military messages;
Fourth (IV control) - information and statistical (intelligence);
Scientific authorized department.
RRKKA headquarters submitted to the NKMM and was its structural division.
Organization and mobilization management (wow) was established in November 1924 by the merger of the organizational and mobilization controls of the headquarters of the Red Army. OMA headed the head and military commander of the former Orgiculture S. I. Crowns. Since July 1924, organizational and mobilization management began to wear name II control of the headquarters of the Red Army. In 1925-1928, the administration was headed by N. A. Efimov.
Creating the General Staff of the Red Army
September 22, 1935 RKKK headquarters was renamed the General Staff of the Red Army. Chiefs of the General Staff were:
A. I. Egorov, September 1935 - May 1937.
B. M. Shaposhnikov, May 1937 - August 1940.
K. A. Meretkov, August 1940 - January 1941
K. Zhukov, January 1941 - July 1941
Preparation for a big war and the creation of front-control
In connection with the accelerated militarization of the USSR and the intensive preparation of the Red Army to the big war, Joseph Stalin, in January 1941, at the head of the General Staff puts the young nominator George Zhukov, who held this post until July 1941. The appointment was associated both with the personal sympathies of Stalin and taking into account the outcome of the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict in the area of \u200b\u200bLake Khalkhin-Gol, where G. K. Zhukov led the preparation and conduct of hostilities.
In June 1941, Head of the General Staff of the Republic of Red Army, Georgy Zhukov, gave an order to transform the Western military districts in the European part of the USSR to the fronts with the formation of front-line field controls (FPU) and the output of the controls on the advanced field control (PPU Front).
German attack on the USSR and the formation of the Eastern Front
With the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941 on the Soviet-German East Front during the years
