Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies. Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies of the Petrograd Cobeta of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies on the democratization of the army

1.03.1917 (14.03). - The Petrograd Soviet issued "Order No. 1", depriving officers of disciplinary power over soldiers. The beginning of the collapse of the Russian army

Democratic Order No. 1

And therefore, with the deliberate aim of disintegrating the army, in order to secure itself, the Soviets on March 1, 1917, issued their famous order No. 1 on the democratization of the army. This order transferred power in the army to soldiers' committees, established civil rights for soldiers and sailors, placed political actions of troops under the control of the Soviets, and abolished the titles of officers. The order undermined the influence of the counter-revolutionary officers, facilitated the transfer of troops to the side of the revolution, playing on the selfishness and willfulness of the armed crowd, into which the Russian army was turning. Officers were expelled from military units, in some places they were even killed.

True, the Provisional Government, which came to power on March 2, intended to continue the war against Germany in alliance with the "fraternal" Entente. Therefore, it tried to limit the action of order No. 1 only to the Petrograd garrison, the naval minister of the Provisional Government Guchkov even canceled the order. Then the leadership of the Petrograd Soviet sent out on March 7 an explanation that Order No. 1 applies only to the troops of the Petrograd Military District, not extending to the front-line units.

However, the genie had already been released from the bottle: the order continued to play a revolutionary role in the troops everywhere, and this in a short time led to the complete collapse of the army to the joy of war-exhausted Germany: she received a respite for eastern front... So the Februaryists sacrificed the national interests of the Russian people in the hardest for the sake of their revolutionary goals.

With the same goal - to paralyze the resistance of the defenders of the monarchy - the Provisional Government dismissed the police and opened prisons, releasing not only political prisoners of the same mind, but also a lot of criminals: at first, the Februaryists thought that this was also for the benefit of the revolution. Only later did they admit in their memoirs (Kerensky, Milyukov, Tyrkova-Williams, etc.) that they "made a mistake" by destroying the conservative state structuresby sowing chaos and underestimating the forces of evil that they could not cope with. But was it just a mistake?

It was in this first act of the Russian democratic government, Order No. 1, that it clearly demonstrated the essence of Westernizing democracy: its stability is based on the moral decay of the people - in order to break the resistance of its healthy forces and to manipulate the selfishly soulless mass more easily. In this, democracy is completely opposite to the Orthodox monarchy, which is based on moral education people to the joint service of all social strata to the highest absolute values.

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From the "Code of Military Regulations" (Book. I, Part III - ed. 1859) of Imperial Russia:
“The soldier is a common, famous name. Both the first general and the last private are called a soldier. The name of a soldier bears on himself every one of the loyal subjects of the STATE, on whose mighty shoulders lies the duty to defend Faith and the Royal Throne, sweet to heart and soul, and motherland; to defeat foreign enemies, exterminate internal enemies and maintain a universal, defined by laws, order in the State ”.

From the petition of a wounded soldier in April 1917 to change the "monarchist" surname: "I consider it offensive to have the surname Romanov at the present time, and therefore I ask you to allow me to change the surname of Romanov to the surname of Democrats." // Quoted. Quoted from: B. Kolonitskiy "The Language of Democracy: From the History of Translation into Russian". // "Zvezda" - SPb., 1997 - No. 11 - p. 3.

For the garrison of the Petrograd district, all the soldiers of the guard, army, artillery and navy for immediate and accurate execution, and for the workers of Petrograd for information.

Workers' Council and soldiers' deputies decided:

1) In all companies, battalions, regiments, parks, batteries, squadrons and individual services of various kinds of military directorates and on ships of the navy, immediately select committees from elected representatives from the lower ranks of the above military units.

2) In all military units that have not yet elected their representatives to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, elect one representative from the companies, who will appear with written certificates at the building of the State Duma by 10 o'clock in the morning on March 2.

3) In all its political actions, the military unit is subordinate to the Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies and to its committees.

4) The orders of the military commission of the State Duma should be executed, except for those cases when they contradict the orders and decisions of the Council of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies.

5) All kinds of weapons, such as rifles, machine guns, armored vehicles, etc., must be at the disposal and control of company and battalion committees and in no case should they be issued to officers even at their request.

6) In the ranks and during the exercise of their official duties, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline, but outside of service and in their political, civil and private life, soldiers cannot be diminished in any way in those rights that all citizens enjoy. In particular, standing up for the front and obligatory saluting outside the service is canceled.

7) In the same way, the titles of officers are canceled: your excellency, nobility, etc., and is replaced by the address: Mr. General, Mr. Colonel, etc.

Rough treatment of soldiers of all military ranks and, in particular, addressing them on "you" is prohibited, and any violation of this, as well as all misunderstandings between officers and soldiers, the latter must be brought to the attention of company committees.

Read this order in all companies, battalions, regiments, crews, batteries and other combatant and non-combatant teams.

Petrogradskiy Workers' Council and soldiers' deputies

News of the Petrograd Soviet of workers

Declaration of the Provisional Government on its composition and tasks

March 3, 1917

Citizens!

The provisional committee of members of the State Duma, with the assistance and sympathy of the capital's troops and the population, has now achieved such a degree of success over the dark forces of the old regime that allows it to begin a more durable structure of executive power.

For this purpose, the Provisional Committee of the State Duma appoints the following persons as ministers of the first public cabinet, whose trust in the country is ensured by their past social and political activities.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior

prince G.E. Lviv.

Minister of Foreign Affairs - P.N. Milyukov.

Minister of War and Marine - A.I. Guchkov.

Minister of Railways - N.V. Nekrasov.

Minister of Trade and Industry - A. I. Konovalov.

Minister of Finance - M.I. Tereshchenko.

Minister of Education - A. A. Manuilov.

[Chief Prosecutor] of the Most Holy Synod - V.L. Lviv.

Minister of Agriculture - A. I. Shingarev.

Minister of Justice - A.F. Kerensky.

In its current activity, the cabinet will be guided by the following grounds:

1) Full and immediate amnesty for all political and religious matters, including: terrorist attacks, military uprisings and agrarian crimes, etc.

2) Freedom of speech, press, unions, assembly and strikes, with the extension of political freedoms to servicemen within the limits allowed by military-technical conditions.

3) Cancellation of all class, religious and national restrictions.

4) Immediate preparation for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly on the basis of a general, equal, secret and direct vote, which will establish the form of government and the constitution of the country.

5) Replacement of the police by the people's militia with an elected leadership, subordinate to local government bodies.

6) Elections to local self-government bodies on the basis of universal, direct, equal and secret ballot.

7) Non-disarmament and non-withdrawal from Petrograd of the military units that took part in the revolutionary movement.

8) While maintaining strict military discipline in the ranks and during military service - the elimination of all restrictions for soldiers in the use of public rights granted to all other citizens.

The Provisional Government considers it its duty to add that it does not intend to take advantage of the military circumstances for any delay in the implementation of the above reforms and measures.

Chairman of the State Duma M. Rodzianko.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers book Lviv.Ministers:

Milyukov, Nekrasov, Manuilov, Konovalov,

Tereshchenko, V. Lvov, Shingarev, Kerensky.

Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of workers and

“I have just read“ Order No. 1 ”issued by the Soviets,
essentially allowing soldiers to disobey orders
their officers. What madman wrote and published this thing? "

Pitirim Sorokin, 1917

The eve of the spring of 1917 in Russia was an amazing time. The autocracy had not yet fallen, and in the cradle of the empire of Petrograd, power was shared by the Provisional Committee of the State Duma and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies (Petrograd Soviet). The first was the organ of the Duma opposition, the second — of the Social Democrats, primarily the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. For both, control over the army was vital, but on the morning of March 2 (March 15 in the new style), the already rapid course of events took an unprecedented turn. It was then that the text of Order No. 1 on the Petrograd garrison was published.

From 1917 to the present day, diametrically opposite opinions have been voiced about the order. In Soviet historical literature, Order No. 1 was referred to as an act of "democratization" of the army. But there was another view, voiced, in particular, by the head of the emperor's security, General Spiridovich: "... Criminal order number one, which dealt a mighty treacherous blow from the rear at the Russian army ...".

On the eve of Order No. 1

The morning was marked by unrest in the Petrograd garrison. From early in the morning, delegates from various military units of the garrison began to arrive at the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet with complaints about officers who allegedly tried to disarm the soldiers. These statements were not confirmed either by the investigation of the Military Commission of the Provisional Committee of the Duma, or by any tangible evidence from the Petrosovet. At times, the fact that the command unit did not approve of the unauthorized seizure of weapons was perceived by the soldiers as an offensive by hostile forces.

February revolution on the threshold of the Tauride Palace in Petrograd.
http://www.pugachev-studio.ru

The Military Commission responded to the unsettled state of the garrison by issuing an announcement signed by Commandant BA Engelhardt. It said that rumors about the disarmament of the soldiers were false. At the same time, the announcement warned the officers: if such cases were allowed, the most decisive measures would be taken against them, up to execution.

These half measures did not suit the garrison, and the soldiers carried their concerns to the Petrosovet. The upcoming meeting of the council — for the time being only workers 'deputies, but with representatives from military units — was decided to be entirely devoted to "soldiers' needs." The agenda included 3 questions:

The attitude of soldiers towards returning officers;
About issuing weapons;
On the Military Commission and the limits of its competence.

On each of them, the representatives of the garrison were allowed to speak. In the general opinion of the speakers, the Executive Committee did not give due assessment to the actions of the State Duma Committee in relation to the "inclinations of the officers." At the same time, representatives from the soldiers were elected to the Executive Committee, with the proviso: "Temporarily, for three days." As you know, this dragged on for a much longer period.

The minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee of March 1, 1917 were not preserved, and perhaps they were not kept at all. From all available sources, one thing follows: the Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary leadership of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet did not have a shadow of doubt about the need to transfer power to the bourgeoisie.

Representatives of the Bolsheviks at this meeting, A. N. Paderin and A. D. Sadovsky, came out with a categorical protest against this idea. They offered to form a revolutionary government, but their initiative was rejected.

As a result, the Executive Committee took measures to calm down the soldiers. First, they were invited to join the Petrosovet - one representative from each company. Secondly, the Petrograd Soviet decided to oblige the government formed by the Duma, whoever it consisted of, not to transfer the Petrograd units anywhere.

However, the garrison did not find this enough. In the evening, representatives of the soldiers came to the Military Commission of the Duma and proposed to issue an order to the garrison, signed by both the Provisional Committee and the Petrograd Soviet. The delegates were received coldly, refusing to speak to them. The soldiers left, muttering displeased that if the Provisional Committee did not issue an order, they would issue it themselves.

Members of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma. Sitting (from left to right): V. N. Lvov, V. A. Rzhevsky, S. V. Shidlovsky, M. V. Rodzyanko. Standing: V.V.Shulgin, I.I.Dmitryukov, B.A.Engelgardt, A.F. Kerensky, M.A.Karaulov.
http://ftp.sovsekretno.ru

Approximately at the same time, the program for forming a government worked out by the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet was announced at an expanded meeting of the Executive Committee. There is also little information about him. The debate was over, the time was late, and a significant part of the deputies went home.

At the end of the day, a delegation was formed to negotiate with the Duma Provisional Committee. It included N. S. Chkheidze, N. D. Sokolov, Yu. M. Steklov, N. N. Sukhanov, who "Immediately took up their duties"... And at 4 o'clock in the morning, the Provisional Committee was given Order No. 1.

Bolshevik interlinear?

There is a version that the Bolsheviks, at least, had a hand in creating this order. And as a maximum, the RSDLP (b) acted as both the initiator and the distributor of the text. In order to weigh this opinion, for all its conspiracy, let's take a look at how the order was created.

So, the meeting of the Executive Committee is over, room No. 13 of the Tavricheskiy Palace is almost empty, the delegates set off for negotiations with the Provisional Committee. As they say, who stayed in the shop? As we remember, the minutes of the meeting were not preserved. The work on the text of the order was described in his memoirs by a member of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) A.G. Shlyapnikov: "The drafting and editing of the order was entrusted to a group of comrades, members of the Executive Committee who worked in the Military Commission, and soldiers delegated to the Executive Committee.".

At one end of the table Shlyapnikov places a "deeply civilian", secretary of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of the non-factional Social Democrat ND Sokolov, who, by the way, was supposed to participate in the negotiations as part of the delegation. He was surrounded by representatives from the soldiers, of whom the author remembers only the Bolsheviks: A. N. Paderin, A. D. Sadovsky, V. I. Badenko, F. F. Linde, who dictated paragraphs of the order to Sokolov. What follows is a very important note: "The rest of the members of the Executive Committee did not interfere with their technical work ...".

Perhaps the situation will be clarified by the recollections of the Menshevik N. N. Sukhanov, who returned to room No. 13 when the meeting of the Executive Committee had already ended. He saw Sokolov sitting at his desk. “The soldiers who were sitting, standing and leaning on the table, clung to him from all sides ... and either dictated or suggested to Sokolov ... It turned out that this was a commission elected by the Soviet to draw up a soldier's 'order'. There was no order or discussion ... ", - wrote Sukhanov.

The photo is attributed as a snapshot of the process of drafting the text of Order No. 1, which confirms the words of Sukhanov. An oblique cross marks a folder near ND Sokolov.
http://bygeo.ru

Both memoirists portray a picture of "democracy in action," and there is no reason to disbelieve the scene described by Sukhanov. However, such a spontaneous situation is not very conducive to quick work on the text, unless we are talking about a letter from the Cossacks to the Turkish Sultan. As the British historian G.M. Katkov noted, "... the Order itself refutes the assumption that the printed text is identical to the collective draft ... The printed document is dry and restrained"... The original text written by Sokolov has not survived. Researchers have at their disposal only printed copies of the Order, one of which Sokolov presented at the negotiations at 4 am.

And here one more extremely important detail comes to light: between the drawing up of the order and its publication, the original was for several hours in the printing house of the Izvestia newspaper, which on February 27 (according to the old style) was occupied on his own initiative by the Bolshevik V. D. Bonch-Bruevich - without exaggeration a professional publishing. It was with his submission that on February 28th the first issue of Izvestia was published with the appendix - the manifesto of the RSDLP (b). “This was my first sin in Izvestia, - noticed Bonch-Bruevich, in his own words the victim "For his Bolshevik faith".

Is it possible to be sure to the end of the invariability of the content of the text of Order No. 1 before and after its publication, given the way it was created, the business overload of the “purely civilian” secretary Sokolov and the transgression of the Bolshevik publisher Bonch-Bruyevich? Only the original text would probably have allowed an answer, but it has not survived.

The text of Order No. 1 is one of its 9 million copies.
http://1917.shpl.ru

Exploding grenade effect

Order No. 1 was a shock for the members of the Provisional Committee. Still: in fact, overnight he lost all hope of retaining power in the army! The chairman of the Military Commission of the Provisional Committee, AI Guchkov, was at that time in Pskov, awaiting the abdication of Nicholas II. He flatly refused to sign the Order, although he, like others, had only to sign his own impotence. The fragments of the exploding grenade were no longer caught. Moreover, according to many contemporaries, it was Guchkov "... destroyed the army and brought it to complete collapse". “I don’t recognize Alexander Ivanovich [Guchkov], how he allows these gentlemen to get into the army ...” - Alarmed, Major General A.M. Krymov, who clearly understood the threat the Order was carrying to the Army in the field, was perplexed. Major General GA Barkovsky later told the former chairman of the Provisional Committee, MV Rodzianko, that a huge number of copies of Order No. 1 were delivered to his division straight from German trenches. Perhaps he himself believed it.

On the other hand, the Petrosovet was forced to accept Order No. 1 as an expression of its line - there was nothing else left for it. The cancellation threatened, at least, with the loss of influence on the garrison, and even on the entire army. Of course, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in the Petrosovet tried to distance themselves from what had happened, but they could not risk so much. A few days later, Order No. 2 saw the light, "explaining" that the provisions of the first concerned only the Petrograd garrison, and not the entire army ... But the time was already hopelessly lost.

Of course, the revolts in the troops began even earlier. The blood of officers of the army and navy was shed on February 27 and March 1 (old style). However, it was Order No. 1 that made the processes of the disintegration of the Russian army irreversible. Shortly before the last, July offensive, the compiler of the Sokolov Order will go to the front as part of a delegation. He will try to call the soldiers to discipline, but will be severely beaten. During the offensive, St. George's distinctions will be awarded even for convincing soldiers to go on the attack. And whether Order No. 1 was the brainchild of the Bolshevik party or not, it was they who in 1918 will have to create a new army on the ruins of the old one.

Sources and Literature:

Katkov G.M. The February Revolution. M., 1997.
Kurlov P.G.The death of imperial Russia. M., 1992.
Pushkareva I. M. The February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917 in Russia. M., 1982.
Spiridovich A.I. Great War and the February Revolution of 1914-1917. New York, 1960–62.
Startsev V.I. February 27, 1917.Moscow, 1984.
Shlyapnikov A.G. Eve of the seventeenth year. Seventeenth year. In 3 books. T. 2 .: The seventeenth year. Book. 1-2. M., 1992.
Rodzianko M. V. The Reign of Rasputin: An Empire's Collapse. Gulf Breeze (FL), 1973.

Kostyaev Eduard Valentinovich - Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of the History of the Fatherland and Culture of the Saratov State Technicaluniversity named after Yu.A. Gagarin

T the issue of making any decisions by the power structures that affect the state of the armed forces of the state and are capable of strengthening or weakening its defense capability is still relevant today. The negative consequences of the military reform of the late 1980s are still well remembered. of the last century, and we can observe with our own eyes the cleaning of the Augean stables by Defense Minister Shoigu, a solution to the numerous problems of our army left by his predecessors. This indicates the caution with which decisions on the reform of the armed forces must be taken, because if they are poorly thought out, they can very quickly weaken the state's defenses and thus jeopardize its independence and sovereignty.

In our history, there has already been a vivid example of how a decision made in the euphoria after the victory of the February Revolution out of good intentions to democratize the army, paved, among other factors, the road to hell - led to the inglorious withdrawal of Russia from the First World War on humiliating conditions Brest- Lithuanian Peace Treaty. The Social Democrats, then playing the first roles in the new power structures, took a direct part in the development, adoption, and practical implementation of the notorious Order No. 1 of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies (Petrosovet). But, unfortunately, in the historical literature, this topic is either undeservedly ignored either [Tyutyukin 1994: 253-260; Tyutyukin 2000: 241-242; Political history ... 1993: 22-25; Basil 1984: 26-35; Miller 1994: 57-69; Galili 1994: 77-78], or is honored with brief mentions in order to indicate the significant influence of the soldiers' representatives on the appearance of this document. The specific role that the social democrats played in the process of its development and implementation is not reported. It is the task of this article to fill this gap in historiography.

Such well-known "defencists" as the Menshevik Semyon Klivansky and the non-factional Social Democrat Nikolai Sokolov took an active part in the development and editing of Order No. 1 issued on March 1, 1917 by the Council for the Garrison of the Petrograd District to all soldiers of the guard, army, artillery and navy for immediate and precise execution, and for the workers of Petrograd for information. " According to it, soldiers were equalized in rights with officers, rough treatment of lower ranks was prohibited (in particular, "poking"), traditional forms of army subordination were abolished (for example, standing up in the front and obligatory saluting by soldiers to officers during off-duty hours), soldier's committees were legalized , the election of commanders was introduced, the army was allowed to conduct political activities. The Petrograd garrison was subordinate to the Soviet and pledged to carry out only its orders [Denikin 2003: 169-170].

According to the memoirs of the Mensheviks Zaslavsky and Kantorovich, at that time (March 1, 1917), as the executive committee (executive committee) of the Petrograd Soviet, was busy with the question of the attitude to the Provisional Government, a noisy meeting of soldiers was going on in the next room, chaired by Sokolov. "Prominent and responsible figures" of the executive committee were not there, and Klivansky possessed the attention of the soldiers more than others. The meeting was impressed by rumors about the beginning of the disarmament of the soldiers, about the threatening behavior of the officers. At the suggestion of Klivansky, the following measures were outlined:

“1) Immediately offer ... the soldiers not to hand over their weapons to anyone. 2) Suggest. the soldiers immediately elect representatives to the Council of Soldiers and Workers' Deputies. 3) Suggest. soldiers obey only the Council in their political speeches. 4) Suggest. to soldiers, being subordinate to officers in the front, at the same time to consider them outside the front as equal citizens. "

The meeting added its own to these planned Clivan measures: “the selection of company and battalion committees, which would be in charge of the entire internal order of the regiments; subordination of the military commission only as long as its orders do not disagree with the decisions of the Council of Workers' Deputies "and others." To edit these measures and to draw up an appeal, wrote Zaslavsky and Kantorovich, a commission was elected, which immediately got down to business. The commission was headed by Sokolov, but there was essentially no leadership. The appeal was given the appearance of an order. It was composed by several people on the instructions of the assembly, where unknown soldiers came to the podium, made proposals, one more radical than the other, and left with loud applause. It would be a mistake to look for an individual author of this work, who has received historical fame under the name of “Order No. 1”. It was composed of a soldier's impersonal mass. " [Zaslavsky, Kantorovich 1924: 50-51].

The reaction of soldiers and officers to the appearance of Order No. 1 was the opposite. The first, as Shlyapnikov wrote, were “overjoyed” [Shlyapnikov 1992: 190-191]. We observe a different reaction to its content among the higher officers. According to Denikin, Order No. 1 gave “the first, main impetus to the collapse of the army” [Denikin 2003: 169], and General Krasnov wrote that “The Brest Peace was an inevitable consequence of Order No. 1 and the destruction of the army” [Krasnov 1991: 103]. General Lukomsky also noted that Order No. 1 “undermined discipline, depriving the officers of the command staff. power over the soldiers ”[Lukomsky 1991: 30].

As a result, the soldiers of the 703rd Suram Regiment of the 10th Army Western Front On June 21, 1917, they "thanked" their defender Sokolov, who had come "to fight the darkness of ignorance and moral decay that manifested itself in this regiment," by the fact that the editor of Order No. 1 and "the creator of the new army system" was beaten to a pulp and arrested by them, when I tried “on behalf of the Council. call on the regiment to fulfill its duty and to participate in the offensive ”[Denikin 2003: 488, 519].

Sensing the negative consequences of the distribution of Order No. 1 at the front, on March 5, 1917, the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet hastened to publish an explanation of its application: “This explanation, - we read from Zaslavsky and Kantorovich, - called Order No. 2, concerned. the question of the election of the command staff, which was resolved in a negative sense; in addition, it was finally established that Order No. 1 had application only within the Petrograd garrison and to the front. cannot be distributed. This explanation significantly weakened the initial impression caused by Order No. 1, but nevertheless the psychological atmosphere of hostility and mistrust in the circles of the higher officers was created, and it was already difficult to dispel it. " 2 days after Order No. 2, the executive committee again addressed a brief explanation-appeal to the troops, which drew attention to the observance of discipline. Among others, the appeal was signed by the fellow chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, the Menshevik Matvey Skobelev [Zaslavsky, Kantorovich 1924: 74]. However, in Denikin's opinion, Order No. 2 was not circulated among the troops and did not affect “the course of events brought about by Order No. 1” [Denikin 2003: 173].

On May 4, 1917, a meeting was held in the Mariinsky Palace under the chairmanship of Prince Lvov, in which all members of the Provisional Government and the Executive Committee of the Petrosovet took part, on the one hand, and on the other, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Alekseev and the commanders-in-chief of the fronts: Western - Gurko, South-Western - Brusilov, Northern - Dragomirov and Romanianskiy - Shcherbachev. When General Alekseev directly told the meeting participants that the army was "on the brink of death" and the beginning of its decomposition was laid by Order No. 1, Skobelev stood up to defend the latter, saying: “You might understand Order No. 1 if you could imagine the situation in which it was published. Before the Soviet there was a disorganized mass of soldiers who went over to the side of the revolution and were abandoned by their officers. In conditions when the victory of the revolution had not yet been ensured, Order No. 1 ordered ... the elected soldiers' committees to take control of the weapons of military units and in no case give them to officers if they so require. What caused this measure? The fact that at the moment the soldiers went over to the side of the insurgent people, all the officers of the Petrograd garrison left the regiments and fled. It is easy to understand that this behavior of the officers in the midst of the life and death struggle between the old regime and the revolution caused alarm in the Council, as well as among the soldiers. There was a fear that the officers would find obedient forces and make an attempt to disarm the revolutionary regiments. Could the Council in these conditions not have taken the measures that it took? But even under these conditions, the Council did not forget to remind the soldiers about their military duty and included in order No. 1 a prescription that in the ranks and when performing military duties, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline ”[Tsereteli 1963: 407, 409].

However, General Denikin still believed that the Soviet deliberately destroyed discipline in the army by Order No. 1, “humiliating and depersonalizing the command staff” [Denikin 2003: 223]. As proof, he quoted Skobelev's words: "In the troops that overthrew the old regime, the commanding staff did not join the rebels and, in order to deprive it of its significance, we were forced to issue Order No. 1." [Denikin 2003: 374]. Even more sincere, in Denikin's opinion, was the non-factional Social Democrat Joseph Goldenberg, who declared: “Order No. 1 is not a mistake, but a necessity. It was not Sokolov who edited it; it is the unanimous expression of the will of the Council. On the day we “made the revolution,” we realized that if the old army is not destroyed, it will crush the revolution. We had to choose between the army and the revolution. We did not hesitate: we made a decision in favor of the latter and used - I boldly affirm this - the proper means ”[Denikin 2003: 172].

Having thoughtlessly using this "proper means" for the sake of maximum democratization of the army of the victorious revolution, the Russian Social Democrats still did not calculate all the possible consequences of the publication of Order No. 1, which became an even greater decay of the army and a decline in discipline among the soldiers, which ultimately led to the defeat of Russia war and huge territorial losses under the terms of the Brest Peace. This is a very vivid indication to the descendants of the need for the most responsible and balanced approach to decisions concerning the fate of the armed forces of the state.

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Application.

ORDER No. 1

PETROGRAD COBETA OF WORKERS AND SOLDIERS 'DEPUTIES ON DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE ARMY.

March 1, 1917

Order No. 1 of the Petrograd Soviet was adopted on March 1, 1917 at a joint meeting of the workers 'and soldiers' sections of the Soviet. D

For the garrison of the Petrograd district, all the soldiers of the guard, army, artillery and navy for immediate and accurate execution, and for the workers of Petrograd for information.

The Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies decided:

1) In all companies, battalions, regiments, parks, batteries, squadrons and individual services of various kinds of military directorates and on the ships of the navy, immediately elect committees from elected representatives from the lower ranks of the above military units.

3) In all his political speeches military unit submits to the Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies and its committees.

4) Orders of the military commission of the State Duma should be carried out, except for those cases when they contradict orders and resolutions of the Council of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies.

5) All kinds of weapons, such as rifles, machine guns, armored vehicles, etc., must be at the disposal and control of company and battalion committees and in no case be issued to officers even at their request.

7) In the same way, the titles of officers are canceled: your excellency, honor, etc., and is replaced by the address: Mr. General, Mr. Colonel, etc.

Rough treatment of soldiers of all military ranks and, in particular, addressing them as "you" is prohibited, and any violation of this, as well as all misunderstandings between officers and soldiers, the latter are obliged to inform company commanders.

Read this order in all companies, battalions, regiments, crews, batteries and other combatant and non-combatant teams.

Reader on the history of the USSR. 1861-1917. M .. 1970.S. 528-529.

Order text:

Order No. 1 of the Petrograd Soviet was adopted on March 1, 1917 at a joint meeting of the workers 'and soldiers' sections of the Soviet. A special commission was formed to develop the order. It was headed by a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet N.D. Sokolov, who left an interesting memoir about how the text of the order was created.

For the garrison of the Petrograd district, all the soldiers of the guard, army, artillery and navy for immediate and accurate execution, and for the workers of Petrograd for information.

The Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies decided:

3) In all its political actions, the military unit is subordinate to the Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies and to its committees.

4) Orders of the military commission of the State Duma should be carried out, except for those cases when they contradict orders and resolutions of the Council of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies.

7) In the same way, the titles of officers are canceled: your excellency, honor, etc., and is replaced by the address: Mr. General, Mr. Colonel, etc.

Read this order in all companies, battalions, regiments, crews, batteries and other combatant and non-combatant teams. "

Output: By agreement with the Petrograd Soviet, a radical democratization of the army was carried out. It was carried out on the basis of order No. 1 of the Petrograd Soviet of March 1, 1917 for the garrison of the Petrograd military district. The Petrograd Soviet decided to elect soldiers 'committees in all divisions, units and on ships, elect one representative from each company to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, stressed that military units in all their political speeches obey the Soviet and their committees, and all orders of the State Duma military commission were subject to execution only if they did not contradict the orders and decisions of the Council. Soldiers were required to observe the strictest military discipline in the ranks and during the "discharge of their duties", and outside of service and formation they could not be "diminished in the rights that all citizens enjoy." Order No. 1 canceled the title of officers who were not allowed to issue weapons that were at the disposal and control of company and battalion committees. One of the members of the Petrograd Soviet, I. Goldenberg, later admitted that Order No. 1 was "not a mistake, but a necessity", since "we realized that if we do not crush the old army, it will crush the revolution." Despite the fact that the order applied only to the troops of the Petrograd garrison, it became widespread in the active army and in the rear, causing the decomposition of the troops and the decline in their combat effectiveness. In the army, military courts were abolished, the institution of commissars was introduced to control the activities of officers, about 150 high-ranking officials were dismissed into the reserve, including 70 division chiefs. By decree of March 12, the government abolished the death penalty, reinstating it on July 12, and also established military revolutionary courts. The basic rights of military personnel were set out in the order of the military and naval minister A.F. Kerensky of May 9 on the implementation of the Declaration of the Rights of a Soldier of the Provisional Government. The order noted that all military personnel enjoy all the rights of citizens, have the right to be members of political, national, religious, economic and trade union organizations, abolish mandatory saluting, corporal punishment, and so on.